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An Abstract of the Dissertation of
Roger A. Adkins for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Comparative Literature Program to be taken June 2010
Title: THE "MONSTROUS OTHER" SPEAKS: POSTSUBJECTIVITY AND THE QUEERING OF
THE NORMAL
This dissertation investigates the cultural importance of the "monstrous Other" in
postmodern literature, including novels from Sweden, Finland, and the United States. While
the theoretical concept of "the Other" is in wide circulation in the humanities and social -
sciences, the concept has only recently been modified with the adjective "monstrous" to
highlight a special case of the Other that plays an important role in the formation of human
subjectivity. In order to better understand the representational legacy ofthe monstrous
Other, I explore some of the principal venues in which it has appeared in western literature,
philosophy, folklore, and politics. Using a Foucauldian archaeological approach in my
literature survey allows me to trace the tradition of the monstrous Other in such sources as
medieval bestiaries, the wild man motif in folklore and popular culture, and the
medicalization of intersexual embodiment. In all cases, the monstrous Other is a complex
phenomenon with broad implications for the politics of subjectivity and the future of social
and political justice. Moreover, the monstrous Other poses significant challenges for the
ongoing tenability of normative notions of the human, including such primary human traits as
vsexuality and a gendered, "natural" embodiment. Given the complexities of the monstrous
Other and the ways in which it both upholds and intervenes in normative human identities,
no single theoretical approach is adequate to the task of examining its functioning. Instead,
the project calls for an approach that blends the methodologies of (post)psychoanalytic and
queer theory while retaining a critical awareness of both the representational nature of
subjectivity and its material effects. By employing both strains of theory, I am able to "read"
the monstrous Other as both a necessary condition of subjectivity and a model of
intersubjectivity that could provide an alternative to the positivism and binarism of
normative subjectivity. The texts that I examine here reveal the ways in which postmodern
reconfigurations of the monstrous Other challenge the (hetero)normativity of human
subjectivity and its hierarchical forms of differentiation. My reading of these texts locates
the possibilities for a hybridized, cyborgian existence beyond the outermost limits of
positivistic, western subjectivity.
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1CHAPTER I
MONSTERS/It\IK: (RE)PRESENTING THE MONSTROUS OTHER
The monstrous has been getting a lot of attention lately. From television programs to
advertising, and from political rhetoric to literature both popular and 'high,' the monstrous
has been rearing its ugly head everywhere. A number of academic conferences were held
during the first decade of the new millennium, creating a space for an interdisciplinary
discussion of the culturally resurgent monster - and these are not just marginal
conferences held off-season at far-flung universities. The seventh annual Global
Conference on Monsters and the Monstrous, for example, was held at the University of
Oxford in September 2009 (Asma B11). In a relatively short period of time, the monstrous
has moved from its seemingly eternal station at the edges of cultural consciousness back to
centerstage - a site it has occupied during certain other historical periods as well. To
investigate this phenomenon properly, and examine its importance in our particular cultural
'moment' critically, it is necessary to begin with a deceptively simple question: What is a
monster?
Perhaps the concept instantly calls to mind an array of associations, running the
gamut from the most fantastic examples, like those ogres and dragons and forest peoples
found in epic poems and superstitions, to the all-too-real, such as warmongers, torturers
and serial killers. Some of us might think of the simultaneously fearsome and enchanting
personae of children's stories and fairy tales, and that particular association holds the
concept at a distance safely rationalized by the fact that there simply are not creatures
2living under our grown-up beds. Then there are the classic movie monsters, such as Boris
Karloff's emblematic rendition of Mary Shelley's creature in the 1931 James Whale version
of Frankenstein, and these images, too, are also contained and distilled, in another way.
Culturally iconic in their own right, and representative of the halcyon early days of
Hollywood, monsters like the Karloff creature have come to connote a complicated matrix
of ideological and moral simplicity, seemingly sincere romanticism (quaint, from a
postmodern perspective and, therefore, suspect) and a generalized nostalgia for an
ahistorical, uncomplicated past. To the extent that the monstrous should evoke horror or
disgust or a sense of dread, these filmic monsters from the era of James Whale and his
immediate successors are now little more perilous than those of children's stories.
Just beneath the surface, though, both the monsters of children's narratives and
those of old films are closer to the heart of horror than we might (lfke to) believe. For all
our efforts to sanitize and contain them, monsters seem to be crawling out from under
every rock, populating every storyline. The past few decades have seen a veritable
explosion of narratives of the monstrous Other, in a staggering variety of genres, cultures,
forms, modalities, and theories. The moralistic slasher films of the 1970S and 1980s - post-
Vietnam descendents of Whale and his contemporaries - have given way to an unruly and
seemingly infinite new generation of silver-screen horror, with vastly productive (and often
problematic) new subgenres like the one in which travel to foreign countries results in
horrifying outcomes, the Japanese imports (e.g., The R.ing, The Grudge) and their western
remakes, and the combined psychological thriller/horror film in which the villain, who may
at first seem supernatural or inhuman, turns out to be one of us, gone so mad that torture
and terror have become his or her sole purpose. This 'new horror villain' could be the
3person down the street, a newfound lover, or a stepparent; the danger lurks everywhere.
Filmic zombie narratives, too, have morphed from supernatural tales of necromancy and
evil magic to horrifying spectacles of contagion and postindustrial pollution. 2010'S
Zombieland and the earlier arrival of Shaun of the Dead (2004) signaled yet another
variation: a half-horror/half-comedy in which the zombie - the risk of contagion and all- is
but one more of the terrifying things troubling the postmodern antiheroes as they struggle
to discover some semblance of humanity and purpose amidst the chaos of a world that is
very nearly completely monstrous.
The small screen is equally agog for the monstrous. Vampires have played a
significant part in this televised resurgence of representations of the monstrous Other and,
as Hollinger (1997) notes, that fact is probably not accidental given that the vampire, part-
human and part-Other, at once living and dead, prOVides a special case of the monstrous
Other that is rather close to home. Vampires skulk through a variety of programs (and
feature films, too), and we are also introduced to the throngs of their lovers, enemies,
friends, hunters, and human companions. Many characters cross the boundaries between
these categories, sometimes occupying two apparently opposed roles (e.g, hunter and
lover) at the same time. Buffy the Vampire Slayer and spinoff Angel gave us vampires and
many other monstrous characters in a tangled web of postmodern existentialism,
punctuated with often corny, always wry, generally metafictive humor, while HBO's True
Blood presents the immediate fallout from the sensational moment that vampires 'came
out of the coffin' and assumed their place at the table of identity politics. The parallel to
the queer rights movement is, if anything, overly emphasized in these vampire programs,
which cast vampiric Otherness as largely an erotic form of difference. Moreover, all three
4series greatly complicate the simplistic moral dichotomies that many folkloric accounts of
the monstrous uphold. Characters that are human are unreliably 'good,' and a good many
monsters are - at the least - ambiguous, while some are downright heroic - at least,
sometimes. Indeed, even a good percentage of the apparently human characters are
themselves 'monstrous' or 'different' in some significant ways, whether those be magical
abilities, a mystical calling to protect humanity from the monstrous, telepathic abilities,
superhuman strength, extensive arcane knowledge, or other qualities that trouble the
overly simplistic category of 'human.'
Beyond the vampiric, a litany of other monstrous personae appear in television
programming as well. In Charmed, a trio of witchy sisters employs magical powers (and the
power of sisterhood) to resist the ever creeping forces of darkness - sometimes coming
from within their own family. In Supernatural, a pair of brothers, often armed with little
more than a couple guns, a magical knife, and a daunting firsthand knowledge of the
mystical, travels across North America to drive back and contain a nonstop effluence of
paranormal creatures and events, landing, in the 2009-10 season, in the middle of the
ultimate battle between good and evil: the end of days. As is the case in other recent
narratives with monstrous characters or elements, though, the angels and demons of
Supernatural are not always easily read, and there is an ample amount of side-switching.
Lucifer is portrayed at least partially sympathetically, and Archangel Michael is terrifying
beyond anything that traditional angel imagery could have suggested. Still other televised
programs present us with cyborgs, demons, ghost whisperers, and an array of other
characters who embody the forbidden, the immoral, and the monstrously hybrid.
5So-called reality television also participates in the monster rush. A spate of new
programming over the past decade has made the equipment and data used in ghost-
hunting and paranormal investigations into household terms (e.g., EVPs, or 'electronic
voice phenomena,' ghostly voices recorded on standard or special audio recording
equipment that were not audible, in most cases, at the time of recording but are audible
during the playback). These programs have inspired a generation of amateur investigators
to take up the search themselves. Some of these 'amateurs,' then, have later become the
stars of their own televised programs, thus completing the self-perpetuating miasma of
reality television.
Still other programs investigate known human anomalies. A Discovery Channel
program called "The Real Superhumans" explores the experiences of people with unique
abilities that result from genetic mutations, mirroring the fictional television program
Heroes. In Heroes, mutated superhumans struggle to find their appropriate relationship to
the general population, taking on a range of unstable identities extending from outcast to
outlaw, hero to villain. In "The Real Superhumans," though, the reality-TV drama focuses
on people simply trying to understand their unique abilities and how to manage with them
in daily life. Existentialism is not absent, but the questions and tentative responses are less
epic and more mundane: how to function normally as a synesthete who, due to sensory
fusion, tastes all of the sounds she hears; or how best to make use of an ability to maintain
core body temperature under conditions of frigidity that would have killed an average
person many hours earlier. Such 'reality'-based narratives are no less enthralling than their
fictional (and often more grandiose) counterparts. Indeed, in many ways, the two strains
of monstrous narratives go hand in hand in our postmodern moment, much as they did in
---- -
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similar pairings from earlier eras, such as the medieval period's epic poems and sagas, on
the one hand, and bestiaries and hagiographies, on the other. For additional contemporary
examples of 'real' and 'fictional' monsters, see Table 1.1.
Table 1.1. 'Real' and 'fictional' pairings of the monstrous Other (contemporary).'
'Reality' Fiction
Ghosts/spirits Most Haunted The Ghost Whisperer
Ghost Hunters The Grudge
Aliens UFO Files V
The Fourth Kind
Spiritual/demonic Paranormal State Paranormal Activity
possession The Exorcism of Emily Rose
Infection H1N1, Hunta, Ebola Quarantine
HIV in many strains Resident Evil
Environmental Global warming 2012
Destruction Supervolcano The Day After Tomorrow
Terror AI Qaeda Fringe
Ecoterrorism
Divergent evolution The Real Superhumans and the The Hills Have Eyes
Quest for the Future Fantastic The Descent
Moreover, while this cacophonic explosion of monster narratives may at first make
it seem that any definition of the monstrous will have to be tentative, provisional, and
open-ended, the sheer volume of sources emerging at this time may in fact facilitate a
particular way of engaging with the monstrous. Given so great a sampling, it might be
possible to think about the monstrous as that which serves a particular cultural function,
rather than trying to pinpoint any structural or generic boundaries for what constitutes a
monster. Indeed, such an approach aligns itself comfortably with our postmodern
obsession with questions of epistemology and our corresponding distrust of ontological
1 Bibliographic information for these films and televised programs appears in the Works Cited section of this manuscript. This
table includes a simple sampling of possible titles only and is not intended to be an exhaustive list.
7approaches - a pair of proclivities that may also aid in explaining why we are seeing a
resurgence of interest in monstrousness at this particular time.
One such functional approach appeared in an article written by Stephen Asma and
published in The Chronicle Review in October 2009. Reaffirming my own observations,
Asma notes that U[m]onsters are on the rise," and he then proceeds to propose that the
commonest 'liberal' approach to monster narratives - that is, reading them as morality
tales about the dangers of intolerance - perhaps misses the mark (811). Instead, Asma
suggests that monsters play an important (and probably irreplaceable) role in what he calls
the umoral imagination," which he glosses as "the way people actually do their moral
thinking" (B11). What he really seems to mean, however, is that monsters allow us to cope
imaginatively with the diverse ways in which we and our loved ones are vulnerable to a vast
array of calamities - that is, to process our rational and irrational fears in ways that do not
require extreme responses and do not pose 'real' dangers. For U[i]maginging how we will
face an unstoppable, powerful, and inhuman threat is an illuminating exercise in
hypothetical reasoning and hypothetical feeling" (812). Such excursions into hypothetical
danger are, in Asma's view, one of the key reasons that art remains morally relevant,
allowing us to engage with ethical questions in the absence of the full weight of their
consequences.
Of course, Asma is also quick to point out that such an exercise is not purely
hypothetical, since circumstances in our lives can become suddenly and profoundly similar
to the fever-pitched fictional accounts of zombie attacks, alien invasions, and terrifying,
late-night encounters with amorphous monsters in out-of-the-way settings. Asma cites, as
eVidence, an example involving a man entering a Connecticut coffee bar in 1994 and
8proceeding to attack innocent and unsuspecting staff and patrons with a knife. For Asma,
such a "horrifying event shares many qualities with the imagined monster attack" since the
people present in the coffee bar were "suddenly presented with a deadly, irrational,
powerful force that sent them reeling for mere survival" (B12). Public responses following
the event were also telling: many people wanted to know why no one had stopped the man
- who turned out to be himself the victim of a mental illness (yet another kind of monster)
- from continuing his rampage before seven people were stabbed and seriously injured.
This line of questioning implies, in Asma's view, precisely the kind of moralistic thinking that
the monstrous occasions. Since none of us likes to see her- or himself as vulnerable to this
sort of attack, we tend to imagine that we would have been equipped to handle such a
situation differently. We all like to envision ourselves as the survivalists and heroes in
narratives of monstrous violence, whether those are zombie invasions or the more
everyday possibility of encountering the worst at the neighborhood coffee bar. For Asma,
this functional role of the monstrous is important even when it ignores the reality that we
cannot always survive a monstrous onslaught.
Furthermore, Asma is highly critical of what he describes as a progressive, post-
Enlightenment tendency to view monsters as the relics of a more superstitious epoch. He
identifies two strands of this thinking, namely, the culturally conservative notion that
rationality will eventually prevail against all things monstrous, revealing them "to be merely
chimeric," and the more progressive variation, which holds that, "when we properly
embrace difference, the monsters [here read as fictional representations of racial and other
forms of difference] will vanish" (812). For Asma, both of these views are equally flawed,
and the monstrous is destined to be a permanent fixture of our cultural pantheon, playing,
9as it were, a unique role that cannot be eradicated with any amount of 'progress.' Rather
than viewing the monstrous as the manifestation of particular cultural and historical
projects and, therefore, circumscribed by and to historically and culturally delineated
epistemologies, Asma reads it as serving a specific cultural function that can never be
unseated. Because there will always be something that "has no satisfactory semantic
substitute or refinement," there will always be a need for the functionality of the
monstrous, in Asma's view (B12). In fact, as far as he is concerned, "[t]he term's
imprecision ... is part of its usefulness" (B12). That is, the monstrous is a catch-all category
for amorphous and unnamable threats, real or perceived.
In many respects, Asma has it right. The monstrous is indisputably resurgent, and
even a cursory investigation of its myriad manifestations reveals that it serves more ends
than the simplistic conservative and progressive purposes that he cites. Moreover, the
monstrous does seem to facilitate moral imagining, though even Asma may have
oversimplified the complexities of its functionalities. Considering just the example cited
earlier of reality-television programming that focuses on people with genetic mutations and
their resultant abilities, it is clear that not all representations of the monstrous (which
includes the hybridization of the human body) concern themselves with the kind of lifeboat
ethics that Asma's argument describes. Never just the embodiment of ethical concerns, the
monstrous also encompasses questions of epistemological, metaphysical, and even
ontological import. For the monstrous is hybrid not just in its innumerable forms, but also in
its very essence, that is, in its various modalities and registers. Indeed, while Asma is right
that we will likely always have the category of the monstrous, he is not entirely right about
the reason. The monstrous doesn't just serve as the domain of the moral imagination; it
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provides an imaginary space in and through which we are continuously able to choose
between containing and calcifying our humanity, or reconstituting it in radically new ways.
To put this idea into Lacanian terms, the monstrous is a symptom of humanity-
that is, the human needs the monstrous to serve as its foil, as the outside to the boundary
of the human. Without the multifarious and unstable category of the monstrous, the
human would cease to exist as such, since there would no longer be any threat against
which to define the normalizing and homogenizing category of 'human.' This is not to say
that the boundaries between the human and the monstrous are fixed or even clearly
discernible, nor is it to say that there would no longer be a species we know as Homo
Sapiens sapiens occupying planet Earth if there were no longer a notion of the monstrous.
Rather, the notion of the symptom implies a more or less closed epistemological
relationship in which the Same (the self) occasions an identity that requires an opposition
with its Other: that which is cast out from the identity of the Same and functions as the
repository for every notion that the Same rejects. In other words, the Other is the
symptom of the Same: the evidence of identity-construction in the Same and, perhaps
more importantly, the functional space in which that identity is - negatively - constructed.
To the extent that we can label as a 'monster' anything that would challenge the notion of
humanness, the monstrous is the symptom of the human.
In fact, the monstrous Other is a special case of the symptom for several reasons.
First, unlike most examples of the Other, the monstrous Other is not the symptom of a
particular dominant group of people but, instead, of humanity itself. Thus, while woman
may serve as the symptom of man and - within the U.S. at least - black as the symptom of
white, the monstrous Other serves as the symptom of the entirety of humanity: our
11
collective humanity is predicated on the exclusion of all things monstrous. This does not
imply that there are not similarities between the monstrous Other and other Others -
indeed, this project will exploit these similarities, proceeding via a side-by-side reading of
the monstrous and the queer. Nevertheless, the monstrous Other tells us less about
specific intergroup politics and more about the politics of the notion of humanity itself.
Because of this unique relationship to humanness, the monstrous Other may be employed
as a particularly productive concept for the project of critically examining difference itself.
Second, the monstrous Other comes very close to being the 'big Other,' that is, the
Other that can be seen to contain and inform all other Others. Because the monstrous
Other is the catch-all for anything considered inhuman, abnormal, and threatening, it can
encompass and influence such other symptomatic categories as the racially Other, the
feminine, and the queer. Indeed, in many ways, the relationship is reciprocal, since the
'monster' may be easily read, in alternate situations, as racially Other, as having a disability,
as excessively feminine and/or feminizing, as queer and/or contrary to the heteronormative,
and as proletarian. Over the past few decades, scholars have conducted extensive research
to investigate this relationship from a variety of perspectives, considering, for example, the
queering power of horror film, or the relationship between animalistic monsters and the
racialOther.2 To be sure, there are important differences between the monstrous Other
and various other "symptoms" of the human, but the monstrous Other shares a special
relationship with these other symptoms and can be used in deconstructive and
psychoanalytic scholarship to interrogate such categorical imperatives.
2 See, for example; A22arello (2008); Bernhardt-House (2008); Cassuto (1997); Stephens (2006); and Talia (1994).
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Third, the monstrous Other also enjoys a special relationship with symptomaticity
itself. Because the monstrous Other encompasses all that is not human, or the not-all of
humanity, it is in many respects the symptom par excellence. This relationship can be
elaborated by means of an analogy to linguistic and structural theory. As theorists such as
Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida have elaborated, the system of signs that make
up a language is entirely arbitrary; there is no predetermined or apriori reason that any
particular sign should correspond to any given signified.3 In fact, and contrary to popular
understanding, it is neither the sign nor the signifier itself that carries meaning; instead,
meaning is located within the entire system of signification and, in particular, in the
differences between assorted signifiers. Thus, meaning functions in a negative fashion,
with any particular signifier Iworking' only because of its differentiation from every other
signifier. In several significant respects, the monstrous Other is that very moment of
negation that precipitates language. It is everything that is beyond (re)cognition; it is
everything that is unnamable and that threatens to unhinge the possibility of naming itself;
it is the provision of meaning, for there would be nothing to close in and activate the
system of meaning without the horrifying and the abject, the polluted, the dangerously
hybrid, and the evil that not only must not, but ultimately cannot, be named.4 An individual
monster, such as the vampire, can be domesticated and rendered familiar in literary and
other representations, but there will always be another monster to take its place. The
monstrous Other is the condition of and for humanity.
3 5ee: de Saussure (1915) and Derrida (1976).
4 My discussion here and throughout this work is indebted to Julia Kristeva's Powers of Horror (1982), which defines the abject as
that which lies outside the symbolic order that has the power to induce horror. In many ways, Kristeva's own argument and, by
extension, mine, are also indebted to Mary Douglas, whose Purity and Danger (1966) offered visionary new ways to theorize the
social and cultural dimensions of what Kristeva calls abjection.
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Functions of the Monstrous in the Postmodern Era
Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, one of the foremost scholars of the monstrous, has offered seven
theses about what he calls "monster culture" as a means of "reading cultures from the
monsters they engender" (Cohen, "Monster Culture" 3). His contributions in this area are
seminal and merit a brief overview here. The first thesis is that U[t]he monster's body is a
cultural body," by which he means that any given monstrous Other may be 'read' as the
embodiment of a range of cultural concerns prevalent in its specific historical, cultural and
geographic context (4). He literally compares the monstrous to the processes of
signification, "like a letter on the page," noting that it always "signifies something other
than itself" (4). Similarly, his second thesis holds that "[t]he monster always escapes" since
anything as elusive and symptomatic as the monstrous cannot be fully or finally contained
(4). One particular monster may meet its end in a film or a work of literature, but the
monstrous Other is always in a state of resurrection, always recurring in another text - if
not a sequel or a prequel, another text by another author. Likewise, while we may
domesticate and make mundane a particular monster, there will always be another
monstrous Other to take its place. For, while particular specimens, once captured (both
physically and intellectually), can become taxonomized and made a part of the known
systemization of 'reality,' there must always be that edge between 'reality' and its Others,
like the literal edges of the world on a medieval map, and that contact zone will always be
populated by monsters.
The next three of the seven theses are chiefly concerned with the functions of the
monstrous Other. The third thesis, for example, concerns one of the chief functions,
namely, that the monstrous serves as "the harbinger of category crisis" (6). To this end,
14
the monster embodies what Cohen identifies as "ontological Iiminality," straddling the
ostensibly absolute boundaries between various categories, and seeming to revel in its
recalcitrant hybridity (6). Thus, monsters serve to challenge the outer edges of taxonomies
and categories, calling their systematic logics into question and helping point the way in
what is, in fact, the always evolving 'order of things.' Along the same lines, the monster
also embodies social, cultural and other forms of difference, and this is Cohen's fourth
thesis. Historically, many monsters found in various representations correspond to
geographic and ideological contact zones between different groups of people, or between
different sorts of people within anyone culture. (This fact will be elaborated in some detail
in the next chapter.) Furthermore, the monstrous allows for an exaggeration of the extent
of various differences and therefore serves as the site of ideological work - whether
progressive or conservative - related to the relative importance and meaning of various
differences. Finally, the monstrous Other is uniquely situated to reveal that "difference is
arbitrary and potentially free-floating," thus allowing for the possibility of radical critiques
of the politics of difference (12).
Cohen's fifth thesis addresses the main socially conservative function of the
monstrous: "polic[ing] the borders of the possible" (12). Although the monstrous itself
evades capture and is always in a state of epistemological flux, its haunting presence along
the boundaries of the socially acceptable serves as an undeniable (and generally
unwavering) warning against violating social prohibitions. There are two primary ways in
which this result is achieved: first, monsters patrol the edges of the normal, serving as a
horrifying threat of harm to those who would consider violating the norms; and second, the
monstrous serves as an example of the possibility of becoming monstrous oneself, should a
15
person decide to cross social boundaries. In the case of gender norms alone, the examples
are palpable: the monsterization of people with such identities as gay, tomboy, sissy, and
feminist demonstrates the awesome power of the monstrous Other to regulate and direct
lived social experiences, and to provide the means for full or partial control of those who
refuse.
Cohen's final two theses are perhaps the most interesting and the least anticipated.
The sixth thesis concerns the extent to which "[f]ear of the monster is really a kind of
desire" (16). The association of the monstrous with the realm beyond social interdictions
makes it undeniably attractive, given the extent to which the same social order that lends
our identities and actions meaning also chafes against our desire for complete freedom.
Like any kind of Other, the monstrous appears, in one view, to dwell in a state independent
of social strictures, in much the same way that many well-meaning heterosexuals may
assume that queer-identified persons are free of the strict norms of the heterosexist order.
Of course, such observations are categorically one-sided and incomplete, since the Other is
also locked into its respective roles because of its indissoluble bond with the Self. This
matrix of differentiation and desire is a key component of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory
to which I will return in the third chapter of this dissertation.
Finally, Cohen's seventh thesis positions the monstrous on the "threshold ... of
becoming," indicating its inimitable ability to divine the social and cultural changes to come
(20). As Cohen notes, while monsters can be banished to the very edges of our maps, and
repressed into the "forbidden recesses of our mind," they will always return, like every
other repressed aspect of ourselves (20). He goes so far as to call them "our children,"
drawing a direct parallel to Shelley's account of a creature who keeps returning to haunt its
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irresponsible maker, demanding that he explain himself - both in terms of his arrogance in
assuming the radical alterity of the creature with respect to the human, and to his need to
have created a monster in the first place (20). In this respect, Frankenstein's creature is an
excellent avatar for the monstrous Other on the whole, which we make to embody some of
our worst qualities (arrogance, obsession, recklessness), and which serves as a palpable
reminder of the limits of our humanity.
In this dissertation, I will explore these functions of the monstrous Other by
examining: first, the ways in which the monstrous Other has been discursively deployed in
sundry historical and cultural settings; second, a theoretical framework for approaching the
monstrous Other that mingles both (post-)psychoanalytic and "queer cyborgian"
methodologies in an intentionally messy theoretical hybridity (bUilding mainly on the work
of theorist Slavoj Zitek and archaeologist Jimmy Strassburg); and finally, three postmodern
novels that feature monstrous characters or creatures that live in close contact with human
characters. These works include John Gardner's Grendel (1971), Kerstin Ekman's The Forest
of Hours (1998), and Johanna Sinisalo's Troll: A Love Story (2000). These novels collectively
provide a direct challenge to the very heart of the dualistic and representational projects
that the 'monstrous' embodies, since Gardner, Ekman and Sinisalo each, in their own ways,
unmask the functionalities of the monstrous Other in all its bloodthirsty insurgence. These
postmodern authors show how the return of the repressed - here represented by the
monstrous Other reclaiming its agency and intervening in human affairs - can prOVide a
powerful critique of a subjectiVity that is (hetero)normative and predicated on hierarchical
differentiation. The monstrous events in these novels provide artful models of
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intersubjectivity and presage a queer new world: a hybridized, cyborgian existence beyond
the outermost limits of positivistic, western subjectivity.
In approaching this project, though, I do not want to lose sight of the pragmatic
reasons that such a discussion is useful and warranted. For, while employing a theoretically
laden term like the 'monstrous Other' may suggest a largely intellectual exercise, the
continual redeployment of the monstrous and the Other in numerous contexts has material
effects on the lived realities of everyone, though these effects are differentially distributed
and political to their core. Moreover, such effects are not, as Foucault would undoubtedly
observe, orchestrated at some higher level, nor are they produced only at some centralized
facility of cultural production. Rather, the material effects of the monstrous Other are both
created and experienced in so many innumerable moments, in the everyday acts of
individuals who call upon the reservoir of imagery in the monstrous for purposes that may
seem utterly benign. Indeed, both the monstrous and the Other dwell primarily at the level
of microsociaJ interactions, in gestures, conversations, interactions, and glances. They are
folklore: the stories that we tell to and about ourselves and each other. In the next section,
I will explore the cultural and political contexts of the monstrous Other, using three stories
from my own repertoire to demonstrate just how commonplace monstrous representation
can be.
Three Encounters: The Monstrous and Mimesis
To provide concrete examples of this special status of the monstrous Other, I will turn now
to three narratives of monstrous encounters involving people I either know or know about
through my acquaintances. I include these examples for two primary purposes. The first is
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to address the inevitable question of monster scholarship, namely: Are monsters real? The
second purpose it to provide experiential data for an examination of the ongoing
importance of the monstrous Other in a purportedly enlightened time. As I hope these
examples will demonstrate, the monstrous is very real indeed, haunting our every
experience and enjoying wide circulation in various kinds of social discourse. Moreover, I
also hope that these examples will illustrate how we continue to need the monstrous Other
to serve as a shibboleth for experiences that we cannot fully explain or understand and,
perhaps more notably, as a way of affirming our common humanity by way of continual
contrast with everything that it is not.
(1) I am seven years old. I have traveled, along with the rest of my young family (I am the
oldest of three children) to visit my father's parents and other extended family on his side.
We live in northwestern Ohio, and the trek to northwestern West Virginia leads into
increasingly mountainous, forested, and rural areas. Inevitably, too, the seven-hour journey
ends in darkness, my father skillfully maneuvering around the hairpin curves of mountain
roads he has known and driven for several years.
The voyage itself gives rise to intense feelings. What starts off as the excitement of
travel and a change of scenery slowly evolves into the tedium of a long car journey. In
addition, the gradual changes in both the landscape and the population density generate a
sense of moving further and further from the everyday and the known. While the
experience differs from this formula for my father, who is heading toward his place of
origins, the trip is a long and tiring journey-to-nowhere for the rest of us. My grandparents
live in a house situated on the exact summit of a mid-sized mountain, and the after-dark
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arrival at their somewhat remote home dumps us from a cramped car into the semi-
populated wilds of West Virginia, complete with all the noises of a mountainous woodland
in the nighttime.
The setting always held a kind of magic for me. Everything seemed larger-than-Iife
in West Virginia. The trees far outranked those of heavily populated northeastern Ohio,
and the mountains were phenomenal to me as a child growing up in a nearly flat
Midwestern area. The people, too, were epic. They lived lives of immense struggle
punctuated by periods of profound bliss. Their stories towered over anything that people
in Ohio would say about the human experience, and supernatural and seemingly impossible
elements were abundant. I could always count on my relatives - 'hillbillies,' as we called
the West Virginian folk - to spin a yarn that would spark my imagination for days to come.
And, even much later (into my teens), I often had trouble distinguishing between what the
storyteller clearly knew to be embellishment or exaggeration and what they might sincerely
believe, in their own tale. It was only as a student of folklore (my first year in graduate
school) that I would come to appreciate these folktales on more emic terms, and to stop
wondering where the boundary of the real occurred. After all, this boundary was not what
was important in these tales. It was their performance and its effects that would interest
me in later years.
On this particular trip to West Virginia, though, my father and I were invited by my
grandfather to accompany him to the source of a pure mountain spring, where he was
accustomed to traveling to bottle up some of the font's wonderfully refreshing water in
reused, plastic milk jugs. My grandfather was a sickly man by this time, a retired coal miner
struggling against the impossible odds of black lung disease - an illness that would claim his
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life just two years later. On this particular day, though, he was in great spirits, and seemed
literally to soak up the energy of the mountainous landscape as my dad drove us toward
the remote spring.
As we headed into a certain hollow (or 'holler,' as my grandfather and other locals
called it), he was suddenly inspired by a memory and turned to look at us. "Have I ever told
you what I saw in this here holler?" he asked both of us. My dad seemed as if he'd heard
this story before, but he still answered for both of us with "What?" "I saw a Bigfoot," was
the answer, and I was instantly hooked. He proceeded to narrate how he was traveling
alone, just before dusk, in the same direction we were traveling now, when he suddenly
saw movement somewhere between 15 and 20 feet up in the branches from the level of the
road. "Imagine my surprise," he said, "when I saw a big hairy hand holding back the
branches, and a big hairy face looking out at me from the trees." And then he turned and,
as if perfectly timed, added, "right there!" He was pointing at a spot unimaginably high off
of the ground, making the story's conclusion send a shiver through my small child's frame.
Already somewhat incredulous even at that age, though, I looked at him and my father to
see if there were any signs that the story was a put-on. Both of them, though, remained
perfectly silent and seemed lost in their own separate trains of thought, deeply reflective.
Grandpa believed what he said that day. There was a monster living in those wooded hills.
(2) As an undergraduate student, I attended Hiram College, located in the tiny village of
Hiram, Ohio. Hiram is known as one of America's most haunted locations and, as local lore
has it, there at least a dozen serious hauntings in this tiny village with around 150 years of
collegiate history. If you search for "Hiram Ohio" and "ghost" together, your results will
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include information about one or more ghosts of President James Garfield's family
(President Garfield was the president of the college before being elected to the highest
office in the U.S.); ghosts connected to the Revolutionary War-era cemetery (still used
today); and ghosts connected to the village's history with Mormon settlers, who were
eventually run out of town and ended up ioining the migration to Utah. In addition, there
are also a number of stories about Ethel, the ghost of Bowler Hall, one of the oldest
residence halls at Hiram.
As Hiram lore has it, Ethel was never even a student at the college. Instead, she was
visiting a friend who attended Hiram way back in the early 1900S and was killed in a fire that
destroyed a part of the building's interior. Even in today's modernized Bowler Hall, some of
the building's original hallways remain, and the architects hired to redesign the building
have retained the seemingly random irregularities of these passageways, which often cut
off at odd angles and, taken together, create a maze-like feeling. It is not difficult to
imagine that a visitor to the college, a young girl caught off guard at night and not yet fully
familiar with its winding hallways, might have been overcome by the smoke or heat before
finding her way out.
The summer just before I matriculated at Hiram, the building's original chimney
collapsed, taking large chunks of the surrounding floorboards down with it. Although a few
students remained in residence in the bUilding, no one was injured, and the building was
immediately evacuated and closed. As things turned out, it remained closed for the entire
time that I was a student at Hiram, while a special committee and the Board of Trustees
sought to raise funds to renovate and modernize the building. Of course, a closed building
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with a peculiar history was a pretty irresistible destination for college-aged students.
won't say that I ever entered the building illegally, but it was a very appealing idea.
However, a group of women I knew (who shall remain nameless here) did, in fact,
break into the bUilding late one night to sit and talk in the dark and try their luck at
communicating with Ethel. Now, most of their time there was uneventful, until a series of
strange noises spooked them, and they decided to head out. As they came down the
building's grand old staircase, the woman bringing up the rear of the procession suddenly
cried out as if in excruciating pain. When asked by the others what had happened, she said
she had burnt her hand, and that it had felt like the staircase's banister was on fire. None of
the others who had used the banister had felt anything out of the ordinary. The women
escaped the building without further incident but, sure enough, the woman's hand was
burned. It looked like she had grabbed a baking pan from inside the oven without a pot
holder. She had to have it treated. I saw it, as did many of my friends. The explanation
that was offered was that perhaps they had, in fact, made contact with Ethel, who had
made her presence known by sharing one of her own traumatic sensory memories with this
young college student. The fact that someone suffered a burn severe enough to require
treatment and bandaging seemed monstrous enough to all of us.
(3) One of my colleagues is a Japanese national in the process of obtaining U.s. permanent
residency, and she has many friends who are also Japanese nationals. In the middle of a
casual lunch with coworkers during the workday, she launched into a story that left all of
our hairs on end. It went like this:
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One of her friends who lives in California accepted an informal arrangement in
which she babysits a wealthy couple's two children in exchange for the opportunity to stay
in their home both while watching the children and during breaks in the schedule at the
university where she has been working on an undergraduate degree. Sometimes, she even
spends long periods watching the children while the couple travel out of the state for
business or short vacations. Their large and lavish home is located along a rural stretch of
the beautiful mid-California coastline, so the situation definitely has its perks for a cash-
strapped international student.
During one particular stint of watching the children and caring for the home, this
young woman had a harrowing experience. Late one evening, after the children had retired
to their own area of the home to watch some television before heading to bed, this young
babysitter went back down to the big kitchen to retrieve some late-night snacks for herself
and the children. On her way back to the children's area of the home, she took a little-used
route through the formal living room and was surprised to see that the couple had
purchased a garish statue of a clown. Although the lighting was poor, she could make out
some fairly unattractive features, but she chalked it up to the couple's odd taste in
collectibles (they had a number of unusual items). She returned to the children's area, and
the rest of the night proceeded uneventfully.
The next morning, when the mother called to check in on the children and
babysitter, the young woman mentioned the odd new statue in passing. The mother
paused and then asked, quite concerned: UWhat new statue?" The young woman
answered that she was referring to the statue of a clown. The mother paused again and
then said, frantically, uOh my god! Get the children and get out of the house now!" The
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young woman, alarmed, did as she was instructed as qUickly as she could. Shortly
thereafter, two police officers arrived on the scene, and they initiated a search of the large
property. What they discovered was a homeless man, clearly suffering from some sort of
mental illness, and wearing clown-like garb. He had been occupying the attic, from the
looks of things, for some time without having disturbed the family. In the end, the man
was taken into custody and transported to a jail and, later, to a hospital ward for the
mentally ill. Nothing serious ensued, but the young woman and the family were certainly
on edge for some time afterwards.
Admittedly, these three narratives have a certain undeniable folkloric quality, providing us
with a strange blending of the uncanny, eyewitness accounts, a number of details that
seem to establish a degree of verisimilitude, and a range of highly improbable events and
encounters - not to mention a certain je ne sais quoi, a property or characteristic that rings
familiar. However, for the purposes of my argument here, this folksy quality is hardly a
reason to rule such narratives ineffectual or unimportant. On the contrary, the fact that
such tales resonate with a thousand other, easily recalled examples affirms their value as
exemplars of the many ways in which the monstrous Other appears in our lived, everyday
experiences. For that very storytelling quality that might lead some scholars to dismiss
tales like these as unreliable sources actually establishes their place in a pattern of
representation about the monstrous Other - a pattern that is at the hea rt of our
relationship with the monstrous. To better understand this pattern, we need to
acknowledge the political investments of all monsters, whetherfolkloric orfrom more
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formalized modes of representation. Moreover, we also need to consider representations
of the monstrous within the larger context of representational politics.
An enormous body of scholarly work addresses the politics of representation,
including work in such diverse fields as anthropology, literary theory, sociology, gender
studies, cultural studies, political science, film studies, and many others.s Much of this work
informs our understanding of the politics of the Other, too, since representation of the
Other is a - if not the - key mode in which power over the Other is both created and
enforced. "Representation" should be understood here to include not just formal
portrayals, such as mass media or filmic representation, but the entirety of the system of
signification, in which, as was noted earlier, there is an arbitrary relationship of signs
(representations) to signifiers (concepts being represented), with a second degree of
arbitrariness between signifiers and signifieds (the supposedly fixed, material reality behind
a concept being represented). Because representation, like signification, proceeds by way
of negation and contrast, any given representation inheres only in the context of the entire
system of representations.
The history of representation in the western world greatly informs the problematic
representational politics that we have inherited.6 Although this history extends throughout
the entire record of western civilization, the early history differs from the representational
trends after the epistemic shifts wrought by the tectonic cultural and social changes in
Europe during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. In the ancient and medieval periods
5 See, for example: Abu-lughod (1997); Baudet (1988); Clifford (1986); de lauretis (1997); del Rio (2000); Foster (1982); Hall
(1993); Harbsmeier (1985); Jay (1988); Minh-ha (1989); Mitchell (1986); Petchesky (1993); Shapiro (1988); and Watney (1993).
6 My discussion in this section is heavily indebted to the work of James Duncan, and particularly his essay "Sites of
Representation," published in the collection Place/Culture/Representation, edited by Duncan and ley (1993).
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of European history, scholars and lay people alike embraced a self-avowedly subjective
perspective, accompanied by an ethnocentric point-of-view steeped in religious ideology.
The Other was viewed as profoundly different from the European self: barbaric, uncultured,
heathen, and naturally deviant. These ideas applied especially to the non-European Other
but also to internal Others such as, depending on the period and specific location, Germanic
tribes, Celts, Vikings, Picts, Jews, Saracens, and so on. Representations of such peoples
were unabashedly biased, since these groups were conceived of as radically Other, as
nonhuman, as monsters of sorts (Cohen, Hybridity 2-5). While the predominance of this
ideological framework would not disappear overnight, the revolution began - somewhat
more quietly than we might expect - in the realm of two-dimensional art, where the
introduction of three-dimensional perspective in painting promised a new social as well as
aesthetic perception (Duncan 40-3).
However revolutionary they took it to be for the practice of painting, Brunelleschi
and Alberti could little have imagined the full effects of their innovation in three-
dimensional representation. In the fifteenth century, these two masters invented
perspectival painting by innovating in the two-dimensional possibilities for linear
perspective. Artistic representation in Europe immediately began to change from the
flattened worlds of medieval iconography and early portraiture to the apparently mimetic
landscapes and historical subjects of the Renaissance (including its newly three-dimensional
window into both the pagan pasts of Europe and the pagan presents of the world beyond
Europe). "The mathematization of space which underpinned this type of representation
appeared to promise a systematic means of producing a mimetic reproduction of the
material world" (Duncan 41). As with many other movements of the Renaissance, these
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changes in artistic representations blended art and science in the hopes of achieving what
Alberti called a 11transparent window" onto the subjects of artistic rendering (41). From a
contemporary perspective, it is quite ironic to consider that the western obsession with
precision, reason and objectivity - which has had so little use for the arts in recent history -
actually began with a radical new approach in artistic representation.
This ideological revolution was not confined to the arts, however, and its central
tenets rapidly appeared in other disciplines as well. In particular, the philosophical work of
Descartes was greatly influential, allowing for a radical conception of mind/body separation
that would facilitate the stance of the western scholar from his own time onward. This
stance, what Husserl calls lithe natural attitude," proceeds on the assumption that it is
possible to make objective observations, and to represent everything from flora and fauna
to ideas to foreign peoples in ways that are increasingly accurate, complete, and unbiased'?
Along with the advent of such a purportedly objective stance came a shift in focus,
replacing the divine order of the ancient and medieval periods with a natural order
assumed to describe the relationships between things as they 'really' are (Duncan 40-2).
One of the key developments along these lines was the advent of natural history, which set
about the project of meticulously categorizing and documenting nearly every living and
nonliving material thing on the planet. As Ishall discuss further in the next chapter,
however, the categorical obsession of natural history, which gives the field its aura of total
objectivity, was deeply troubled by the persistence of older ideas about the origins of
particular traits, properties, and qualities.
7 See: Husser! and Gibson (1931).
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Concomitant with the rise of a dualistic, Cartesian understanding of the identity of
the western observer, the vast projects of European exploration, expansion and
colonization made a million political uses of the ostensibly objective observations of
Europeans as they came into contact with vastly expanding numbers of flora and fauna,
geological samples, as well as cultures, locations, and practices. Older classificatory
systems began to give way in the face of abundant new data, and a vast amount of
materials and living creatures - including people - were extracted from their normal
environments and carried back to Europe in aid of the vast project of scientific inquiry. The
ever accumulating stores of specimens housed in zoos, museums, universities, and private
collections of curiosities bolstered the sense of evidentiary support for a growing sense of
the total mastery of the entire natural world by a Eurocentric, scientific form of inquiry.
Moreover, this massive movement of material examples into Europe was accompanied by
rapid expansions in the vocabularies used to describe sundry items, and both this linguistic
expansion and the exacting, three-dimensional drawings of natural items enhanced the
moral and intellectual authority - not to mention the mimetic mystique - of scientific
representation. Over time, the project became increasingly focused on cultural difference,
as traders, travelers and early anthropologists created a burgeoning library of information
about the Other, with varying degrees of mimetic mystique. Given the complexly
intertwined interests (political, economic, religious, etc.) of the western world in its
nonwestern Other, even the most scientific of these projects (ethnographies and the like)
were called into the service of colonial prerogatives (Duncan 41-3).
In the nineteenth century, another artistic revolution further ensconced the
authority of mimetic representation into western epistemologies. The invention of
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photography promised the possibility of capturing the most elusive of natural phenomena
- moments, experiences, and events - and creating semi-permanent and mimetically
perfect representations of them. 8 With even perspectival painting fading into the
background as a mere creative practice, and still plagued by the vagaries of subjectivity,
photography (and, later, videography) became the representational mode par excellence.
Its almost magical ability to preserve every detail of a scene made it invaluable in the
ongoing (though more culturally relativistic) ethnographic projects of the twentieth
century, and it also became the inspiration for writers in diverse genres and movements,
from Victorian social realism to the mimetic experimentation of 'high' modernist prose and
poetry (Duncan 43-4). Indeed, mimesis became the raison d'etre of representation itself-
at least, until the onset of what many postmodern critics have called the 'crisis of
representation.'
Under conditions of postmodernity, westerners have "lost faith in totalizing stories
such as capital-H History, capital-S Science, or capital-R religion" (Hollinger 199). This loss of
the once-unquestionable metanarratives has made it impossible to continue ignoring the
machinations required to achieve narrative coherence, including in the case of
representation itself. For, no matter how objective and mimetic a representation may
appear to be, the act of representing is, itself, situated and contingent. As geographer
James Duncan (1993) has argued, representation has at least two implied sites: the site of
that which is being represented, and the site of those doing the representing. The latter
8 Not surprisingly, one obsession of those who study the monstrous - for example, cryptozoologists and ghost hunters - has been
the promise of 'capturing' the monster on film. 'Getting it on film' holds out the promise of making the monstrous 'real' and,
therefore, forcing disbelievers to believe in its existence. Of course, such a hope reaches for what would be, ironically, the end
of the monster, per se, since anything that can be documented becomes, atthe same time, domesticated and categorized,
qualities that are opposite of the monstrous. This dynamic will become important in my discussion of Troll: A Love Story in
chapter4.
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site was not acknowledged in the age of mimetic representation: Brunelleschi is not Ithere,'
inside of the perspectival painting, nor were the natural historians Ithere' alongside the vast
taxonomies they presented. Ethnographers may have often written a quite personal
introduction or coda to their works, but the body of the ethnography generally aimed for
mimetic accuracy, leading to what Duncan calls an ethnographic IItension between
rhetorical modes" (43). But this tension was not limited to ethnography, since lithe site
from which representation emanates is occulted, but nevertheless remains a phantom
space, denied but present" (44). Even though the site of those doing the representing is
obscured, along with its historical and cultural contexts, it nevertheless remains a powerful
force in shaping how representation ensues. This acknowledgment of the impossibility of
/pure,' mimetic representation has led to the dethroning of the longstanding notion that
signs and signifiers bear a special correspondence to /reality,' and they are now generally
recognized as constitutive of any possible notion of /reality' (Ebert 895).
The case of photography is no exception. Just to consider one example, a
collection of essays on images of Native Americans, edited by Lucy Lippard (1992),
completely demythologizes the mimetic possibilities of both historic and contemporary
photographs depicting Native American people(s), sites, and customs, whether the
/phantom space' of the site of representation (the site of the photographer) is Native
American or otherwise. In a series of acutely personal responses to individual photographs,
beginning with an introduction by Lippard herself, the anthology interrogates the
ostensible objectiVity of photography, demonstrating how the 'reality' of any given
photograph is shaped by such disparate forces as the identity and political orientation of
the photographer, the kind of camera used, the particular relationship(s) or agreement(s)
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between photographers and the subjects of any given photo, choices made in setting the
scene before a photo was taken (setting, props, costuming, positioning of subjects, etc.),
subtle acts of resistance in photographic subjects that are outside the control of the
photographer, the framing modality of photography (including the important consideration
of what lies outside the photographic frame), and even a kind of metaphysical force that
results from the ways that the photographer's and sUbjects' feelings and thoughts about
one another interact with the quantum-level chemistry and physics of the photographic
process itself. In addition to all of that, of course, there is the matter of reception,
encompassing such questions as whether an observer of a particular photo identifies more
with the invisible photographer, the subject(s) of the photo, or neither of these. Lippard,
for example, focuses her introductory essay on a single photograph of a First Nations family
in British Columbia, taken by a lone female traveler in the early 1900'S. The photo seems
uncharacteristically modern, lacking the 'staged' quality of most of the extant photos for
native North Americans from its time, and Lippard proceeds to read the photo through
three 'takes': the general context of similar photography of the time, her own personal
response to the photo, and the results of archival research. What she discovers is that the
photo takes on vastly different characteristics depending how its sites of representation
interact with its sites of reception. In other words, representation and reception - both
understood here as complex and multi-sited in their own respective ways - interact in any
given conception of 'reality.' Mimesis may at times be part of that conception, but it can
hardly be recognized as the driving force of representation.
To return, then, to the three narratives of monstrous encounters given earlier, we
can now see that the knee-jerk response that such narratives are unreliable is, in fact, based
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in the Cartesian insistence on keenly mimetic representation, coupled with an assumption
that things not yet taxonomized do not exist. However, if we read the narratives in the
same ways that Lippard and her collaborators in Partial Recall 'read' photos of native North
Americans, we can begin to see that this concern is less important than questions of the
construction of meaning and identity in and through such narratives. Just as is the case
with Lippard's reception of that single photo of a First Nations family, our response to
narratives like these three tales of monstrous encounters involves complex relationships
between the sites of representation and the sites of reception. There are numerous
possible interpretations. On the one hand, the narrators of these tales may need to share
with their audiences a deeply seated sense of fear as well as a depiction of an encounter
with the uncanny. On the other hand, reception of this type of narrative in the context of
an academic study is almost certainly bound to run toward disbelief or at least well-founded
doubt, perhaps in part because one of the two main sites of representation, that of the
monsters being represented, is so unbelievable as to be virtually absent from these
representations. It is almost as if the monsters, in fact, do not exist outside these
representations at all; lacking any extranarrative evidence that specimens of Bigfoot roam
the wooded hills of Appalachia, or that ghosts can transfer physical experiences from their
own lived experiences to currently living persons, what we have, in effect, are the
encounter experiences themselves - and only from the 'side' of the encounterer. In effect,
the two sites of representation collapse together, such that the narrators of these tales
occupy both the site of representation and the site of that which is represented. In other
words, it is as if the monstrous Other is us.
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If this is the case (and I will argue that it is), then the monstrous Other is not so
much a category containing all known and unknown monsters as it is a phenomenon
concerned primarily with the internal consistency of the notion of the human (once again,
the symptom of the human). The observations of Edward Said in Orientalism (1978) are
useful here. Writing about both the myriad representations of the Orient by and for the
Occident, and the material effects of these representations in both the west and the areas
of the world described by the concept of 'the Orient,' Said argues that Orientalism follows
internal rules of logic that ally with western projects as diverse as economic expansion and
investments in prescribed gender roles. "Orientalism responded," he notes, "more to the
culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West.
Thus the history of Orientalism has both an internal consistency and a highly articulated set
of relationships to the dominant culture surrounding it" (Said 22). In much the same way,
the monstrous Other tells us more about the internal logic of the 'human' than it does
about any possible 'real' monsters. Moreover, because there are diverse investments in
what 'human' means (e.g., normal in experientiality, embodied in a particular way, etc.), the
monstrous Other takes, much like 'the Orient,' a variety of disparate forms, each with its
own projects of cultural, historical, political, and material significance. By investigating
diverse instantiations of the monstrous, we can come to terms with crucial knowledge
about ourselves - in particular, how we employ the monstrous Other to stabilize and justify
the self-aggrandizing notion of the human. That is the project to which I turn in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER II
AN ARCHAEOLOGY OFTHE MONSTROUS
Discourses surrounding the monstrous are the primary datum of this study. My task in this
dissertation consists mainly of a careful analysis of discursive projects operative within the
three novels, and in their direct and indirect, textual and contextual sources, as well as a
few of their critical responses. Given this focus on discursivity\ rather than 'criticism' or
'the existing literature,' I have elected in this chapter to provide a review of the discursive
record ofthe monstrous Other (i.e., instead of a 'review of the literature,' per se). In
choosing this direction, I am employing Foucauldian methodologies that allow for an
exacting focus on the ways that contemporary notions of both 'the monstrous' and 'the
Other' build upon - indeed, rely upon - the earlier but still operative remains of earlier
notions.
Even in those instances in which postmodern renderings of the monstrous Other
seem to provide fundamentally new formulations of 'difference' or 'identity' or 'pOlitics,'
the buried strata of discursive formations continue to operate. Postmodern renderings are
not innocent of their cultural origins even when - as I will argue is the case for the three
1 Foucault employs both the terms 'discourse' and 'discursivity.' In many ways, this distinction mirrors Ferdinand de Saussure's
distinction between 'langue' and 'parole.' In Saussure's formulation, 'parole' describes any and all individual speech acts or
instances of the use of language, while 'langue' describes the entire language as a finite but evolving system in which speech
acts can occur and have meaning. Similarly, Foucault uses 'discourse' to describe all the practices involved in the construction
of meaning within a particular field of meaning, and 'discursivity' to describe the mode of thinking that makes a particular
discourse possible. In the present study, then, there are multiple examples of discourses of the monstrous (medieval bestiaries,
monster movies, etc.), all of which function within the discursivity of monstrousness, the 'field of meaning' in which
monstrousness inheres. Foucault first introduces the notion of discursivity in his essay "What Is An Author?" (1979), translated
and republished in English in The Foucault Reader (Rabinow 1984).
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primary authors examined here - those renderings attempt radical interventions in the
ways that the monstrous Other is (discursively) deployed. This inescapability of discursive
histories and cultural contexts is the raison d'etre of Foucaudian critical approaches, which
facilitate the unearthing of underlying discourses - the diverse, 'polymorphous' discourses
that Foucault bequeathed to cultural studies - and the tracing of the lineages between the
specific discourses prevalent in different periods or contexts. The present chapter will
focus on the former project, the archaeological one, while the following two chapters will
engage the genealogical project - both with respect to discourses regarding the monstrous
Other, specifically.
In the sections that follow, I will begin with a brief treatment of Foucault's
methodologies, especially the archaeological method, which is the main approach used
throughout this chapter. I will also provide a sketch of Foucault's theoretical support for
the archaeological method, which includes his own treatment of the monster as an
exemplary figure against which discursivities and the 'order of things' are arranged and
deployed. Following on this review of the archaeological method, I will apply it to an
analysis of representative 'venues' in the development of the postmodern conception of
the monstrous Other, including: the monstrous embodiment of hybridity and liminality
found in both literary and other cultural sources, such as medieval bestiaries and modern
international expositions; the folkloric circulation of the monstrous as the boundaries of
normalcy and of the community, as in the wild man motif and in folktales more generally;
and the teratological notions of monstrosity that helped delineate and coagulate the
notion of biological sex. Finally, I will discuss the role of modern science, the major
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discursive field that continues to deploy rationalistic thinking as an antidote to all that is
hybrid, wild, and monstrous. For it is precisely the rational thinking of the scientific mind -
the kind of thinking that makes monsters inconceivable and 'imaginary' - that postmodern
authors seek to undermine in their re-imaginings of the monstrous Other.
Digging Up Fossils: The Archaeological Method
As noted earlier, Foucault is known for two main approaches to scholarly work, what he
called the archaeological and genealogical methods. Both methods require that scholars
concern themselves with the differential epistemological approaches to a particular subject
of study across varying historico-ideological mo(ve)ments and their (cultural) contexts -
what Foucault called epistemes. Both methods grew out of Foucault's desire to employ
approaches that would not privilege but, instead, de-center and destabilize the powerful
Subject of the western world that had, since the Enlightenment, served as an absolute
condition of both scholarly and lay epistemologies (e.g., historical, cultural, social, political,
and psychological). Such a move is necessary in order to uncover the contingent, political,
and never innocent ideologies underlying particular practices and to demystify the sense
that 'the way things are' is an inevitable outcome of the rationalistic progression of science,
law, and philosophy from ancient Greece forward: the mythology of 'western civilization.'
In Foucault's view, the mid-twentieth century insistence of most humanistic and social-
scientific scholarship on western subjectivity as the grounds for all inquiry, serves only to
delimit the discursive possibilities of scholarship to those already most widely accepted at
the time - indeed, such approaches cannot help but serve the interests of the Western
------------ ..._. _._---
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subject, while failing to account for or critique its need for the subjection of its many
Others.
The archaeological method characterizes Foucault's early work and is most fully
elaborated and employed in The Order of Things (1966), in which Foucault traces the
underlying trajectories of the social sciences. The genealogical method, on the other hand,
becomes more prevalent in Foucault's later work and is particularly well developed in the
three-volume History of Sexuality (1978ff). The former method focuses on uncovering the
differential discursive formations operative in different contexts and exposing their
underlying political and social trajectories. It is, in short, a type of historical and
historiographical scholarship of ideology that proceeds at a metasubjective level, paying
particular attention to the polyphonic discursivities that both occasion and condition the
possibilities for subjectivity in any given context. The 'archaeological' aspect of the method
lies in its insistence on 'digging up' the various discursive formations that are buried
beneath the apparent surface of a concept, fact or policy.
The genealogical method, then, builds upon the archaeological method, tracing the
lineages within and amongst differential discursivities and demonstrating the multifarious
and polymorphous sources implicated in any given discursive formation. For example, a
genealogical approach to Surrealist literary practice would track its multiple lineages to
such prior discursivities as Dada, Impressionism, Romanticism, psychoanalysis, and Marxist
theory (to name a few possibilities), demonstrating how some of the political projects
extant in these earlier discursive formations continue to operate within Surrealism itself.
Table 2.1 further summarizes the two methodologies.
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In this dissertation, both of Foucault's methodologies will be employed, and it is
most practicable and elemental to begin with an archaeology of the monstrous in Western
discourses. Since we will need, first and foremost, to understand how the monstrous has
been defined and situated with/in a complex network of discursivities, an application of the
archaeological method to a variety of disparate venues can be instrumental for unearthing
the polymorphous lsources' of our contemporary monsters. Such an examination of what I
am calling culturallvenues' can facilitate the explication of the monstrous in western
literary, folkloric, cultural, political, and religious discourses.
Table 2.1. Elaboration of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methods.
Archaeological Method Genealogical Method
Objects of Discourses and discursivities Discursive lineages and
inquiry transformations
'Natural' The order of things: the ways in The history of sexuality: the ways in
habitat of which we group, categorize, and which we come to understand
these objects exclude ourselves in and only in relation to
others
Purpose Uncover the operative rules - a kind Place discursivities in historical and
of grammar - by which we organize cultural contexts, mapping out their
and understand the world. Much complex and multiple lineages, and
like de Saussure's langue/parole showing how traces of prior
distinction, Foucault employs a discourses remain operative with/in
discourse/ discursivity distinction. any given episteme
Langue: discourse :: parole: discursivity
Traces Gaps in the lsystems of elements' Discursive dissonances, survivals
Modality Exigency Contingency
Subjective Metasubjective: able to access and Intersubjective: Operative only in
state of the critically examine the subjective the interfaces between internal and
scholar unconscious, even though still external subjectivities, no longer
employing it able simply to function subjectively
The stakes involved in such a project are not as superficial as they may at first
appear to be: indeed, while the idea of an intensive, academic study on the monstrous may
initially seem a bit indulgent or frivolous, an archaeology of the monstrous is a significant
39
inroad into the critical task of destabilizing and dethroning the hegemonic power of
western discourses. For, without an Other like the monstrous, 'order' ceases to inhere,
since it is precisely the monstrous (the 'unnatural,' the dissonant, the chimerical) that order
is deployed to exclude, preclude, and negate. Order enables the western subject (and
subjectivity itself) by sanitizing it of any non-subterranean hints of the monstrous, but
myriad traces of the monstrous (i.e., of alterity) lie buried just beneath the surface of the
western subject, and Foucault's archaeological method is uniquely well suited as an
approach to uncover them.
As Foucault pointed out, however, order's Others are not simply set in direct and
perfect opposition to it. Rather, the processes of ordering rely on complex and
multifaceted systems, categories, and ways of defining and delineating. In fact, for
Foucault, it is not the differences between objects or categories themselves that carry the
burden of establfshing order; instead, it is what he called a system of elements, /la definition
of the segments by which the resemblances and differences can be shown, the types of
variation by which those segments can be affected, and, lastly, the threshold above which
there is a difference and below which there is similitude" (Foucault, Order xx). Attention to
such systemic and microscopic moments of differentiation is necessary in order to
demythologize the binary opposition between order and disorder, the self and the Other,
the natural and the monstrous. Moreover, Foucault further elaborates that order is /lthat
which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language;
and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in depth as though
already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression" (Foucault, Order xx). In
order words, order operates primarily in the 'blank spaces,' the gaps between categories,
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identities, and other positively or negatively identifiable entities. Order is not purely the
opposite of disorder, but the force of magnetism that holds, at one and the same time,
similarities together and differences apart, the invisible push-pull in the fissures and cracks
separating one thing from another.
Locating order in this functionally defined 'space' allows Foucault to create a
scholarly approach that seeks to uncover these tiny openings, these gaps, between
differentiated items and to show the politics involved in that process of differentiation
itself. It is this scholarly approach that he calls archaeology. "[A]rchaeology, addressing
itself to the general space of knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of
the things that appear in it, defines systems of simultaneity, as well as the series of
mutations necessary and sufficient to circumscribe the threshold of a new positivity"
(Foucault, Order XXiii). Significantly, the archaeological method enables a means of
critiquing the politics of Cartesian positivity itself (as well as its twin, western subjectivity),
thus opening a critical space in which what is usually taken for granted as the very
conditions of meaning, language, and scholarship can be called into question and shown to
be complicit in various political projects, including the category of the monstrous.
Archaeological scholarship, then, functions on a metasubjective level, allowing the scholar
to direct a critical awareness toward (even while still acting within) western subjectivity - a
subjectivity that always already assumes the existence of the monstrous as the outside of
the self, as the not-self. That is, the archaeological method creates a critical space at once a
part of and apart from the usual restrictions of our seemingly omnipresent western
subjectivity, 'addressing itself to the general space of knowledge' so that the scholar may
investigate how scholarship itself (along with many other discourses) contributes to the
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ongoing policing of the boundaries of the 'real,' and to the incarceration of that which
defies classification into the heterogeneous, murky and always mythologized category of
the monstrous.
In The Order of Things (1966), Foucault is particularly interested in the role of the
monstrous (as well as the fossil record) in facilitating the epistemic shifts required for the
advent of natural history as the successor to a largely religiously or cosmically figured
understanding of both history and nature. In his archaeological treatment of the origins of
classificatory impulses in natural history, Foucault traces the shifting terrain of
'evolutionisms,' noting that the familiar Darwinian understanding of evolution was not the
first form of evolutionism, nor was it of the same ilk as the other evolutionisms that
preceded it. In fact, the particular evolutionism that conditions the rise of natural history is
one concerned less with athe emergences of beings as a process of one giving rise to
another" and more Iia way of generalizing the principle of continuity and the law that
requires that all beings form an uninterrupted expanse" (Foucault, Order 152).
Nevertheless, it is important to understand these earlier evolutionisms, since their
ideological and discursive apparatuses continue to operate beneath the surface of our
familiar, Darwinian evolutionism, Ihaunting' its rationality with prescientific notions that
continue to shape our more visceral and primary responses to the monstrous.
These pre-Darwinian evolutionisms, imbued with the imperatives of the episteme
that immediately precedes the Enlightenment (i.e. the episteme prior to our own),
generally take one of two forms. The first form, heavily steeped in classical philosophy and
medieval Christianity, hinges on an understanding of the continuity of all beings as a
collective march toward divine perfection, with all creatures changing, in successive
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generations, to become more and more 'godlike.' Although different creatures may be
seen as differentially placed along this continuum of perfection, and although the distance
between even the most 'evolved' creature and (the Christian) God remains vast and
(im)possibly untraversable, the same impetus carries all creatures - even the monstrous-
toward perfection. In this evol utionary system, monsters may be seen as occupants of the
lower rungs on the 'great chain of being' - a chain that connects all creatures in the
movement toward perfection. From the perspective of a conception of historicity in the
processes of evolution within this form of evolutionism, time functions only as the universal
movement (back) toward God (Foucault, Order 151).
In the second form of evolutionism, time functions as the necessary condition of
the specific forms that differential species have taken, the anatomical and physiological
formations that arise in a host of various creatures. Moreover, most of these variations
may have their roots in particularities and vagaries of the many environments in which
living things have found themselves throughout time. Though this second form appears,
on the face of it, however, to resemble Darwinian evolutionism closely, this pre-Darwinian
model pinpoints the character of the species itself, and the power of character to
determine responses to the effects of the environment, as the forces propelling evolution.
A creature's character may be, for example, courageous or melancholic or even sinister.
Furthermore, the changes that may be observed in a species, in the perspective of this form
of evolutionism, follow an a priori range of possibilities for all life on earth: the evolving
species of this particular evolutionism are not so much independently changing in response
to environmental stimuli as they are gradually unfolding all the possibilities accorded them
by the continuity of the forms of life and their respective characters. In the view of this
43
form of evolutionism, monsters are simply those creatures whose deformed or insidious
characters have propelled them, in a series of environmental and other responses, to take
on physical forms reflective of their debased essences (Foucault, Order 153).
Both of these pre-Enlightenment forms of evolutionism rely on broad principles of
the ordering of things that governed categorization and taxonomy in the earlier episteme.
Foucault identifies resemblance as the guiding tenet of the pre-Enlightenment episteme,
and he further specifies four forms of similitude that were prevalent at the end of the
sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, namely, convenientia, aemulatio,
analogy, and sympathies. According to Foucault, these four varieties of resemblance largely
dictated contemporaneous understandings of what was natural, what were the possibilities
of life and, by extension, what would be considered monstrous (Foucault, Order 17-25).
The first similitude, convenientia, describes "resemblance connected with space in
the form of a graduated scale of proximity" (Foucault, Order 18). Foucault notes that it had
almost as much to do with adjacency as with similitude, but adjacency and, in particular, the
intermingling of things in the locations where "the extremity of the one also demarcates
the beginning of the other," could complicate the possibility of distinguishing between
proximal convenience and identicalness (Foucault, Order 18). In any event, too, proximity
can lead to a certain indistinguishability, and natural examples of this kind of comingling
abound: some organisms live exclusively inside of others, for example, begging the
question of where the one ends and the other begins. Or we may consider the example of
cancer, in which cells produced within the body begin to grow and multiply in a markedly
disorderly fashion, gradually overtaking and displacing the healthy functioning of
surrounding tissues and organs. While we categorically identify cancer as something inside
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of and yet somehow separate from the body proper, the proximal 'convenience' of
cancerous cells and tissues to other cells and tissues leads to the extreme difficulty of
treatment for cancer - an illness treated by approaches that attack both healthy and
cancerous cells - and makes it exceedingly difficult to demarcate clearly where the cancer
ends and the healthy body begins. It is little wonder, then, that cancer is often portrayed as
a monstrous attack of the body upon itself, or that cancer is so feared.
The second form of similitude, aemulatio, or emulation, does not require any
particular spatial relationship. Instead, emulation is characterized more by a sort of mirror-
imaging, as Foucault characterizes it, in which space and time can be 'overcome' by the
resemblance of two things at opposite ends of the universe, or distant from each other in
other ways. Foucault offers examples such as the human eye as "a reflection of the vast
illumination spread across the sky by sun and moon" and the way that human intellect
mirrors (without matching) God's immense wisdom (Foucault, Order 19). In fact,
embedded in the metaphor of emulation is the sense of struggle, as one or the other of an
emulative pair is always the stronger, though there are constant struggles for this upper
hand. The more the human eye penetrates into the depths of space (via the prosthetic of
the telescope, for example), the more its ability to emulate the lights of the firmament
draws the two closer together. And human intellect is always striving to displace the
superiority - to emulate to the point of overcoming - the wisdom of God. Rather than
delineating a great chain of being made up of things ordered by proximity, as in
convenience, emulation is a form of resemblance in which mirroring pairs are locked in a
kind of concentric dance, with each member of the pair seeking to emulate the other to the
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point that it becomes more identical than its twin and competitor with the similitude that
governs them both, while that twin is always already emulating it as well.
The third form of similitude, analogy, is unhinged from both spatial proximity and
mirror-imaging and functions in a much more grandiose and sweeping fashion, such that
nearly any two things in the universe may be related one to the other by means of an
analogy. Analogy functions on a cosmographic level, providing explanatory insight into
such relationships as that of human excrement to Hell, or of disease to a natural disaster.
By means of analogy, we can readily understand these relationships, though they cannot be
explained by means of either convenience or emulation, occupying neither the same
proximal space nor the same 'register' in identification. Foucault further indicates that, in
the world of the proto-Enlightenment, it is Man2 that stands as the indexical key to the
analogical cosmography. Man may be analogized with anything from God to bacteria to
stray particles in space and serves as the lynch pin in even those analogies in which 'he' is
not one of the items held in resemblance. Indeed, Man (or what I have already called the
western subject) is lithe great fulcrum of proportions" for all analogies, and this fact makes
the third form of similitude one of the most important for understanding the history of the
Other as that which is excluded from the heart of order and of reason (Foucault, Order 23).
The final of the four major forms of similitude in the period just before the
Enlightenment is characterized by what Foucault calls lithe play of sympathies" (Foucault,
Order 23, emphasis original). Sympathy may be understood as a freely moving, boundary-
crossing flow of similitude that is characterized by motion and, by virtue of its power to
2 Although the purportedly generic term "Man" has long been roundly criticized by feminist and other theorists for its now-
obvious shortcomings, I follow Foucault here in using the term as the intrinsic conceptualization of humanity in the historical
period in question. It is, however, deployed here as a historically specific concept, rather than a collective noun for humanity.
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draw things together and intermingle them, its (dangerous) ability to assimilate. Foucault
offers the example of fire which, as it raises away from the earth, becomes increasingly
sympathetic with the air into which it rises, gradually assimilating and becoming smoke and,
thus, like air, gaseous. In fact, to extend the correlation, fire also transforms the objects it
consumes into carbon, a key building block of the Earth and the life it has sustained, as well
as the various gases that rise into the ether. Fire is, therefore, a transformative agent of
sympathetic resemblance, but fire is only one example. Foucault also cites the example of
the flowers from a funeral, which can have the sympathetic power to make mourners of
everyone who encounters them. Indeed, sympathy is so threatening a form of similitude
that it must be countered with antipathy, which functions to limit its effects and hold each
thing in its isomorphic uniqueness. It is the sympathy-antipathy pairing, in fact, that
functions as the push-pull of identification throughout every part of the order of things
(Foucault, Order 23-5).
Because of the necessity of the sympathy-antipathy pairing - because, that is,
resemblance alone is not sufficient, at the threshold of the epistemic shift, to explain all the
morphologies that have ever arisen - natural history began to deploy some of the existing
forms, both 'real' and legendary, in the service of containing and delineating the natural.
This (re)deployment relied on both sympathetic resemblance and antipathetic tension to
isolate and ossify the identities of various species, strains, and populations. Although
monstrous creatures had been observed and described throughout the preceding centuries
in all known civilizations, the proto-Enlightenment brought, ironically, a "proliferation of
monsters" that served as a foil for what could be considered 'natural' or thought to have a
'history' and - perhaps more to the point - a future (Foucault, Order 156).
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likewise, the fossil became "the privileged locus of a resemblance required by the
historian of the continuum" (Foucault, Order 156). That is, the fossil could be deployed to
demonstrate the history of resemblances across enormous expanses of time. Thus, while
the monster served as the 'outside' of natural categories, the chimera that hems in identity
by providing evidence of morphological differentiation, the fossil came to serve as the
backwards projection of identity through time, such that it "recalls, in the uncertainty of its
resemblances, the first buddings of identity" (Foucault, Order 157). The fossil, part animal
and part mineral, is the calcified remains of various stages in the formation of an identity,
while the monster is the embodiment of morphological recalcitrance, a refusal to allow
form to serve identity. Taken together, the monster and the fossil provided 'solid' evidence
for the mapping of specification in natural history, contributing to the rise of our
recognizably modern species and, perhaps most importantly, modern Man.
The Monster With/out: Liminality, Hybridity, and the Edges of Identity
The accretion of textual evidence for the monstrous in the literature, film, and popular
culture of the postmodern period owes a great debt to the vast warehouses of information
found in the natural-history texts of the Enlightenment and, extending back further still, to
the bestiaries of classical and medieval authors (which themselves drew on similar works
from other cultures outside of Europe). Indeed, the fascinating collections known as
bestiaries provide an array of information about their cultures- and periods-of-origin,
encompassing, as they do, both the mundane animals of urban and agrarian life in Europe
and the most fabulous varieties of monsters and hybrids. These archaic bestiaries, then,
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and the natural history that grew out of them, provide a plausible place to begin an
excavation of the monstrous in western cultural traditions.
As Arnold Clayton Henderson observes in his 1982 essay on medieval animal fables
and bestiaries, each classical or medieval fable involving an animal, and each entry in a
classical or medieval bestiary, ultimately occasions a moral. In classical antiquity, these
narratives tended to be simpler and more general, such as the fable of the wolf and the
lamb drinking from the same stream. In the antique version, the wolf accuses the lamb of
spoiling the water that he is drinking, even though he is upstream from the lamb, and he
uses the false accusation as a reason to eat the lamb. As the story is reconceived in
medieval fable collections, the straightforward moral gradually turns to social commentary,
with the wolf increasingly identified with the rich and powerful, and the lamb representing
the poor and disempowered. By the time of the latter Middle Ages, the tale had begun to
take on a sharply satirical tone, sometimes with oblique references to particular figures -
especially in the guise of the wolf. likewise, with the bestiary, what appears on the surface
as simply a description (however 'flawed,' from a contemporary perspective) of a particular
creature may have become, by the time of the rise of natural history, a complex instance of
social commentary with political or moralistic 'lessons' coded within the prose (Henderson
40-1). The wolf had, by this time, fully assumed the 'character' that would follow it into
natural-historical inquiry as well as modern folklore.
Other creatures remained more exotic. The giraffe, for example, was a creature
seldom observed by European chroniclers yet one that nevertheless made its way into
bestiaries from late antiquity on. Though it may have appeared somewhat less frequently
than some of the other monstrous creatures also seldom seen in daily European life - such
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as the tiger, the centaur, or the unicorn - the giraffe was a prize for the kinds of 'collecting'
that bestiaries performed for precisely the same reasons as the other fabulous creatures
who populated their pages: it was a strange kind of creature, composed, from the medieval
European perspective, of some sort of odd amalgamation of the traits of other, better
known creatures. In fact, the giraffe was thought to be a creature that was part camel and
part leopard, and it was known in many medieval bestiaries as the cameloparda/is, which
either served as its only name or was given as the formal (Latinate) name alongside the
common name giraffe. Like many of the monstrous creatures that enraptured medieval
audiences, the giraffe presented a mixed morphology, bearing the spots associated with
the leopard and the long neck and, in many representations, the hump of the camel (Cuttler
163-5). It was also often depicted with horns - a trait that fit with neither of the two other
animals thought to be its relatives and that therefore increased its mystique as a monstrous
hybrid. Indeed, like other horned, hybrid monsters, such as the faun, the Minotaur, or the
Horned Man or Horned God, the giraffe may have been (sometimes) associated with evil, or
at least worldly, tendencies. Interestingly, both a giraffe and a centaur appear in an
illustration depicting one episode of the life of St. Anthony of Egypt, included in a book of
hours3 published in Germany by the Limburg brothers around 1410.
In an essay on the historical and cultural context of the Limburg illustration, Charles
Cuttler (1991) addresses the use of the two medieval monsters in the scene from St.
Anthony's life. Cuttler notes that the medieval bestiary, "a conquest of nature on
3 A book of hours is a type of illuminated (illustrated) manuscript common throughout the Middle Ages. Generally, a book of
hours collected together short writings, such as prayers, psaims, and cycles of short narratives from the lives of saints (usually
grouped in series of twelve - thus, the name 'book of hours'). Though many books of hours were illustrated only with tiny
figures, often surrounding the first capital letter of each particular piece, some were elaborately illustrated and could even
double as a kind of bestiary. The Limburg collection, Belles Heures, is described in Cuttler (1991).
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parchment," suffered from lithe lack of a methodology based on observation [that] led to
some farfetched conclusions about the natural world" (161). In fact, as Cuttler notes, even
well-known animals were often misunderstood and misrepresented in the bestiary genre;
his examples include bovine corpses serving as the source of bees, and beavers gnawing off
their own testicles when pursued by predators (161). No wonder, then, that renderings of
the giraffe and the centaur may have been based more on their significance to the spiritual
import of the particular text than to any similitude to their 'actual' forms; indeed, as Cuttler
himself notes, the obsession with depicting corporeal creatures in bestiaries and related
medieval genres was, ironically, more concerned with lithe life of the spirit" than any
natural history or other corporeal science (161).
In the illustration in question, St. Anthony is depicted wandering through the desert
en route to visit the hermitage of St. Paul. The centaur is shown assisting St. Anthony by
offering him directions to the hermitage, while the giraffe occupies the middle distance
between St. Anthony and his destination. (A third figure, perhaps a lion, stands on the
slopes of a distant mountain beyond the hermitage.) For Cuttler, the piece is interesting
because the Limburgs appear to have created a rather unique (and possibly original)
interpretation of the episode. The piece is unusual both for the inclusion of the figure of
the giraffe, which was quite rare in Northern European collections from the period, and for
the relative accuracy of the portrayal of the giraffe among all medieval examples: Cuttler
speculates that it must have been based on a no-longer extant representation that the
Limburgs encountered in Venice (Cuttler 163-7). Indeed, Cuttler demonstrates exhaustively
that most contemporaneous representations of the giraffe portrayed the animal as a
camel-leopard hybrid, and that this particular kind of depiction persisted well after the
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Enlightenment, given that real giraffes were not common in Europe - even in royal or
municipal menageries - until the nineteenth-century rise of the more comprehensive zoo
(163-73,176).
Cuttler's treatment of the subject belies his greater interest in the presence of the
giraffe in the illustration, and he addresses the figure of the centaur much more briefly,
noting that, while the creature once encapsulated for the ancients the notion of the
uncivilized man, by the time of the Limburgs U[t]he Centaur is a symbol of both evil and
lasciviousness" (175). Indeed, as Cuttler also points out, centaurs appear in Dante's Inferno
as a type of demon that torments the human souls in one portion of hell (175). In fact,
though, both the centaur and the giraffe in the Limburgs' illumination serve much more
ambiguous roles. Both creatures populate the desert wilds that St. Anthony must traverse
to visit the hermitage of St. Paul and, given this geographical location of the creatures, it is
clear that they dwell outside the realm of civilization. Nevertheless, St. Paul, a holy man so
devout that he is to serve as a mentor for St. Anthony, also inhabits this same desert, which
cannot be read simplistically as the locus of evil or wild moral abandonment. Indeed, the
centaur in the illustration is depicted as providing assistance to St. Anthony, with the
serene giraffe - known to be docile and harmless, even in the absence of representations
with a high degree of similitude - is shown standing peaceably in the distance. While both
creatures are clearly hybrids that populate the wilds, even they may be of service to the
man of God who is striving for spiritual perfection. They stand, at once, as an object lesson
for the godly man who wants to understand the dangers of ambiguous identity and as
fellow travelers on the journey toward holiness. While still clearly situated in the
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metaphysically steeped evolutionism of the late medieval period, the use of these figures in
the Limburg manuscript gestures toward the revolution in discursivity that natural history
would bring.4
Another text that straddles the origins of this revolution, Ambroise Pare's Des
Monstres et prodigies (1840) is perhaps the definitive volume in the nascent field of natural
history contemporaneous to the second form of evolutionism described by Foucault.
Writing about the classic volume in 1960, Jurgis Baltrusaitis remarked that t4[t]he fantastic
realm of the image-maker is joined here to the awakening of a realistic mind" (quoted in
Pal lister XXiii).5 Indeed, Pare's work represents a catalytic moment in the tectonics of
epistemes, blending, as it does, ancient and medieval legends, late medieval evolutionisms,
and a markedly modern interest in the specifically natural history of anomalous and
fantastic anatomical variations (as well as other strange occurrences). Jean Ceard, who has
also written about Pare's work, notes that, although Pare's volume quickly pinpoints the
purpose of the existence of monsters as portentous, his more enduring concern
throughout the collection is on causation and the seemingly infinite variety of anomalies
and deformities catalogued in the treatise (Pallister xxvi). Because Pare was writing the
volume as part of a multi-volume series designed for surgeons and barbers (professions
more closely related to each other at the time), he presents a quite practical and, at times,
vulgar natural history that ironically serves as a perfect vehicle for an archaeology of the
monstrous at the precipice of the Enlightenment.
4 For additional discussions of medieval bestiaries, see: Clark and McMunn (1989); Gravestock (2000); Hassig ("Marginal," 1997);
Hassig ("Sex," 2000); Miyazaki (2000); and Shank (1998).
5 This quotation comes from Baltrusaitis' 1960 monograph, Reveils et prodigies, published in Paris by Armand Collin, pages 330-l.
The work is cited in Pallister's introduction to the edition of Pare cited here.
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Before Pare proceeds with his cataloguing of various monsters and marvels, he
begins with a brief list of the causes of monsters, which is worth quoting in full:
There are several things that cause monsters.
The first is the glory of God.
The second, his wrath.
The third, too great a quantity of seed.
The fourth, too little a quantity.
The fifth, the imagination.
The sixth, the narrowness or smallness of the womb.
The seventh, the indecent posture of the mother, as when, being
pregnant, she has sat for too long with her legs crossed, or pressed against
herwomb.
The eighth, through a fall, or blows struck against the womb of the
mother, being with child.
The ninth, through hereditary or accidental illness.
The tenth, through rotten or corrupt seed.
The eleventh, through mixture or mingling of seed.
The twelfth, through the artifice of wicked spital beggars.
The thirteenth, through Demons and Devils. (Pare 3-4)
From the contemporary reader's perspective, Pare's list brings together apparently
disparate and unrelated kinds of causation, from the metaphysical (e.g., the wrath of God,
or Demons and Devils - both ends of the divine spectrum) to the merely physical (e.g., the
posture of the mother, or a fall she suffers while pregnant), from the biological (e.g.,
corrupt seed, that is, tainted semen) to the spiritual, and from the most mundane (such as
illness) to 'the power of the imagination.' The result is a range of causative agents almost
impossible for us to take seriously, but it is precisely what makes this list improbable for the
modern reader that reveals the operative discursivities contemporaneous with the natural
history of Pare.
A similar kind of epistemic dissonance occurs when we encounter lists from other
cultural sources. Discussing the disorientation that western audiences might feel when
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reading Jorge Luis Borges' treatment of a 'certain Chinese encyclopedia'6 in which the
categories for animals range from tame to fabulous to "drawn with a very fine camelhair
brush," Foucault notes that western readers' puzzlement arises not from the categories
themselves, nor from the mere odd juxtaposition of seemingly disparate elements
(Foucault, Order xv). Instead, it is "the narrowness of the distance separating" the
categories that produces the dissonant effect in reception of such lists - no different for
the late medieval cataloguing of monsters than it is for Borges' 'Chinese' categories for
animals (Foucault, Order xVi). According to Foucault, this effect of encountering a radically
different order of things results, in large part, from the hermeneutic and epistemological
doubt stemming from the shadow such categorical systems cast back on our taken-for-
granted understanding of the world (Foucault, Order vv-xxiv).
Pare's typology of the causes of monsters brings into proximal convenience on the
page, categories that, when thus assembled, leave contemporary readers a bit
uncomfortable. It is not just that some of the categories rely on fantastic or divine
explanations; in fact, we expect as much from the thinkers of the period in question.
Moreover, because we are able to relegate such beliefs to a former episteme, the
categories of Pare and his contemporaries neatly contain such cosmological tendencies,
sanitizing the present episteme of any (easily detected) traces of a religiously construed
natural history. And that is precisely why Pare's list of causes is so discordant to the
modern ear: the mix of fantastic and seemingly scientific explanations for monsters is
jarring because it seems to blend the operative assumptions of 'our' own episteme with the
6 Argentine writer Borges wrote about this list from the Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge in "The Analytical Language
of John Wilkins," published in English translation in Borges, a Reader: A Selection from the Writings ofJorge Luis Borges, edited
by Monegal and Reid (1981).
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prescientific ideas that preceded it, thereby calling into question whether the two
epistemologies are really as different as common sense would have it. If monsters can
result from mundane and biological causes as well as divine or demonic ones, how do we
continue to maintain the radical separation of 'irrational' (medieval) and 'rational' (modern)
epistemologies? Pare's text seems to introduce secret passageways honeycombing their
way between the two epistemes.7
The examples provided by Pare only heighten this unnerving sense of epistemic
collapse. As an example of the monsters created by the wrath of God, Pare mentions the
offspring of men and women who engage in unnatural forms of copulation, "like brutish
beasts, in which their appetite gUides them" (Pare 5). This example is almost
indistinguishable from those given in the next category: too great a quantity of seed. In
this latter grouping, we find primarily variations of multiple births and conjoined twins
presumably resulting from an excess of 'seed.' In both examples, mishaps or mistakes
during copulation lead to monstrous results, but one of the categories mentions God's
wrath as the causative agent, while the next presents an etiology that reads, from the
modern perspective, as flawed but clearly naturalistic, even (quasi)scientific (Pare 5-9). Of
course, the distinction is purely modernist since, for Pare and his contemporaries, all of the
thirteen categories of causation listed above represent variations on the single theme of
violations of the natural/aw, which is largely the same, from Pare's perspective, as divine
law. True to their epistemic context, these thirteen explanations for the existence of
monsters exhibit a remarkable degree of similitude, with resemblances in both the
7 Indeed, it is also useful to remember that Pare's text was written in the sixteenth century and therefore stands as an excellent
example of the fact that the two epistemes have some 'proximal convenience' of their own. That is, there was no really distinct
rupture between the two epistemes but, instead, a gradual blending of one into the other.
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operative logic and the outcomes: all of the monsters and marvels described present with
morphological and/or other deviations of form. In Pare's view, the unnatural, in all its
myriad manifestations, has unmistakable and inevitable consequences. The monster is
deviance embodied, leading Pare, in the 1579 edition, to add that it[i]t is not good that
monsters should live among us" - a statement that perfectly encapsulates the monster's
status as Other (Pare 9).
In fact, most of the morphological deviations presented by the monsters assembled
in Pare's collection may be characterized as one or another kind of hybridity. The volume is
replete with creatures that are part human and part animal, or that blend together the
parts of several animals, often in unexpected and 'unnatural' ways. Examples include a colt
born with a man's face; a chicken's egg that contained a monster with a human face and
live snakes for hair and beard; a child with a frog's face; a boy with a dog's parts from the
waist down; a creature described as seventy-two feet in length, with the head of a sow, a
fish's body with fishlike appendages, and three eyes on either side of its massive body (Pare
7-115); and a monster with ita horn on its head, two wings, and a single foot similar to that
of a bird of prey, at the knee joint an eye, and participating in the natures [sexual organs] of
both male and female" (Pare 6, editorial insertion original). On the other hand, the
collection also includes a number of animals well-known to contemporary readers but still
quite exotic for Pare and his contemporaries; those listed include the giraffe (again), the
elephant, and the rhinoceros. For Pare, these creatures are just as monstrous and
marvelous as the other examples in the volume, since they also present apparently hybrid
or deviant morphologies, including the extremely long neck of the giraffe; the size, long
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nose and great tusks of the elephant; and the "armor" covering the outside of the
rhinoceros (168).
As it is with Pare's thirteen types of monsters, however, the juxtaposition of
creatures that we now know to be quite real with those that we know to be fabulous
creates a discursive dissonance and opens a critical space in which to interrogate the
discourses of both our own episteme and that of Pare in relation to what counts as
'monstrous.' In particular, we can observe that Pare's collection of 'monsters' includes any
creatures that are themselves, and those that present morphologies that are, outside the
normal experience of everyday life in Europe at the time, whether such creatures are
known as mundane in the modern world or not. While some of the creatures mentioned in
Pare's work may have changed categories over time, however, the guiding principles of
what constitutes the 'monstrous' have changed little. In the well-connected and -traveled
world of the present, creatures like giraffes are exhaustively documented and easily seen -
even outside their natural habitats, given the omnipresence of zoos, print photographs,
and videographic resources. They are certainly not considered monstrous. Our
contemporary monsters - such as aliens, lake monsters, Sasquatch, and el chupacabra, to
name a few - still reside, as Pare's monsters did, on the fringes of the known world, helping
to define such cultural frontiers as the primeval, the littoral, the terrestrial, the necrotic,
and the savageS (see Table 2.2).
8 "Savage" is inarguably a loaded term, and one that calls to mind centuries of colonial and oppressive aggression toward many
peoples by western powers and such other powers as Japan. However, in the context of this discussion, it is precisely this sort
of extreme and xenophobic response to various Others that "savage frontier" is intended to invoke. The fear may be
(somewhat) rational, as in the case of serial killers, or almost completely irrational, as with Aboriginals or the Roma. (See Table
2.2.)
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Table 2.2. Examples of the diverse monsters that help define various cultural boundaries.
Ancient/Medieval Monsters IModern' Cousins
The Primeval Behemoth, Cyclops, dragon, Kaiju, King Kong, Sasquatch,
Frontier dryad, giant, the Green Man, werewolf (and other were-
hippogriff, ogre, troll animals), Yeti
The Littoral Frontier Giant squid, Leviathan/lithe great EI Nino/La Nina, kaiju, great white
fish," mermaid or merman shark, lake monsters (including
(triton), sea serpent, siren Nessie),lusca
The Terrestrial Angel, Djinn ('genie'), daemon, Alien, cosmic rays, the Devil,
Frontier god(dess), portentous celestial impact comet, Yaoguai
event, Ziz
The Necrotic Cerberus, draug/revenant, ghoul, Cyborg, doppelganger, ghost,
Frontier goblin, golem, myling, Samael mummy, shade/shadow person,
(the Angel of Death) vampire, zombie
The Savage Frontier Barbarian, centaur, chimera, Aboriginal, chupacabra,
Legion (biblical demon that may (eco)terrorist, hippie/bohemian,
have represented the Roman pirate, Roma ('gypsy'), Satanist,
presence in Judea), Minotaur, serial killer
primitive, Saracen/Moor
As both the giraffe and centaur of the Limburgs' manuscript and the monsters
listed in the table above demonstrate, the monstrous is often hybrid both in its morphology
and in its 'natural' habitat: the geological, cultural, and (super/sub/un)natural boundaries
surrounding normative human society. Themselves (de)composed of mismatched parts,
disproportionate limbs and unexpected contours, monsters then further embody the
uncanny by dwelling on the fringes of the known human world - whether the literal spaces
adjacent to human settlements, such as the forest primeval or the underwater depths just
beneath the surface of the sea, or the metaphorical borderlands located at the edges of
human experience, such as the 'spaces' between the living and the dead, human and
animal, animal and vegetable, or organism and machine. In fact, the monstrous is at once
located within and an embodiment of a special category of experience that folklorists and
anthropologists refer to as Iiminality, a kind of suspended state located on the margins
between geographical locations, states of existence, or even times of the day or the year.
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Although first articulated by Arnold van Gennep in his sociocultural studies of
rituals, the concept of the liminal was definitively elaborated by Victor Turner in The Forest
of Symbols (1967), largely in relation to the midd Ie phase in a rite of passage. Turner defines
liminality as <tan interstructural situation" and characterizes it as the period after which an
individual has departed from a previous state of existence (e.g., childhood) and before
which they have fully joined the next state (e.g., adulthood) (93). In his descriptions of the
liminal, Turner follows van Gennep's three phases of a rite of transition: separation,
marginal or liminal, and aggregation (Turner, Forest 94). Turner then goes on to elaborate
several important characteristics of the liminal that bear repeating here, given the fact that
the monstrous occupies a permanently liminal sociocultural location.
First, Turner notes that the liminal is structurally invisible (Forest 95). Because
individuals in the liminal phase do not occupy any of the positively identifiable social
categories of their respective societies, they have, in a very important sense, no current
place in the social structure. As Turner remarks, <tA society's secular definitions do not
allow for the existence of not-boy-not-man, which is what a novice in a male puberty rite is
(if he can be said to be anything)" (95). Furthermore, Turner observes that, while there are
names for groups of persons in the liminal phase (e.g. initiates or neophytes), these names
tend to emphasize the transitional period itself, rather than the individuals per se, thus
further erasing their identities as individuals with any kind of defined place in the social
order (96). In many ways, monsters, too, are always structurally invisible, eXisting
permanently outside the clearly delineated categorical schemes of the social order. In fact,
this characteristic of the monstrous contributes to the sense of the uncanny that
accompanies monsters and motivates the horror that their sudden physical visibility can
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elicit: nothing is quite so disarming as the sudden physical presence of those things that the
structural order cannot accommodate.
Second, Turner addresses how the liminal is loaded with a rich array of cultural
symbolism - including some symbols that have peculiar associations. Turner takes a
particular interest in the ways that individuals in the liminal phase are neither clearly
associated with the living, nor clearly with the dead. They may be at once associated with
metaphors such as dissolution and decomposition, on the one hand, and with gestation and
the embryonic, on the other. This ambiguous positioning suits the liminal phase, since
individuals in the liminal phase are in the process of becoming some recognizable
personage within the social order, while their prior identities are simultaneously dissolving.
Moreover, this highly ambiguous nature of the liminal makes it a socially dangerous
'moment' since, belonging to none of the positivistic claims of the structural, the liminal can
be "a realm of pure possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and relations may
arise" (Turner, Forest 97). This, Turner notes, leads to the excessive amount of social
attention to and control of the transitions that occasion the liminal phase (96-8). Here,
again, the monstrous may be seen as the liminal in a kind of eternal suspended animation,
since monsters, as a rule, either straddle the life/death boundary by their very natures, or
threaten that boundary and promise the chaos of death leaking into life, and vice versa. In
addition, the monstrous may be read as the very embodiment of the socially dangerous
since, as an absolute outside to the social order, its presence and its agency threaten the
very social fabric itself:
Between incumbents of positions in secular politico-jural systems there exist
intricate and situationally shifting networks of rights and duties proportioned to
their rank, status, and corporate affiliation. There are many different kinds of
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privileges and obligations, many degrees of superordination and subordination. In
the liminal period such distinctions and gradations tend to be eliminated. (99)
That is, the liminal has a socially leveling effect, reductive to the extreme. In the liminal,
there are no longer individual identities, only bodies and matter. The monstrous, too, tends
to emphasize the material and the basest notion of embodiment and to erase illusions of
caste, family, and other such identifiably human structures.
Finally, Turner presents an interesting 'reading' of the role of monstrous and
grotesque imagery in the liminal phase and during its rites and ceremonies. For Turner, the
"figure of the monster - so often appearing in the masks or other sacra used during rites-
serves a didactic purpose, exaggerating certain physical features or amalgamating
disparate items (such as humans and animals) in order to facilitate a kind of reflective and
self-reflexive activity in the neophyte. Rather than viewing monsters as the bogeymen of
primitive peoples, then, Turner sees them as constitutive of the social order, as the very
model of social disorder that is needed in order to instruct neophytes about their proper
place and - indeed - the entire system of order that gives meaning to social life. As a
period in which the monstrous is propagated and called forth, the liminal allows "a
promiscuous intermingling and juxtaposing of the categories of event, experience, and
knowledge" (Forest 106). Yet, much like the carnivalesque of Bakhtin's theorization, the
liminal phase is a carefully contained social event and, ultimately, the social order is
restored, with all its constituents in their proper places. Contrary to the cogency of its
imagery and expression, the liminal, as conceived by Turner, is ultimately a conservative
force, contributing to the reproduction of the social order by instructing the participants of
that social order about the dangers of its absence.
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Likewise, the monsters of the ages have played their parts in deploying and
preserving social order. More than just the antagonists of scary stories told to children to
keep them from creeping out of their beds at night, monsters and the monstrous in general
are the negative backdrop to the entirety of sociocultural life: its Other. From the monsters
haunting the pages of medieval literature and histories to the surviving wild men of the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, all that is monstrous is the exaggerated reflection of
those traits, values, notions, and hybridities that the social order does not tolerate, that
which is cast-off, the warped, funhouse reflection of society itself. Wherever there are
bogeymen imperiling (or perceived to be imperiling) the social order - enemies ranging
from other peoples to death to the vagaries of nature, disease, and even new technologies
and knowledges - there arise monsters to serve both as wards against these enemies, and
as warnings to members of a social group to remain within its trusty and established
boundaries. Indeed, the monstrous encircles the outer rim of the known world,
demarcating the edges of known identities from that which does not belong.
The Monstrous Middle Ages
For monster theorist Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (2006), it is precisely this boundary-enforcing
property of the monstrous that led to an explosion of monsters in the writings of medieval
England, at once the scene of a high degree of social upheaval and the contact zone for a
variety of peoples, languages, religions, and identities. For Cohen, this intermixture of
cultural and social phenomena gave rise to porous and contested boundaries at the edges
of English culture, such that It[b ]etween imagined or desired absolutes like 'Angle' and
'Briton,' 'English' and 'Norman,' 'Christian' and 'Jew' flourished recalcitrant impurities"
63
(Cohen, Hybridity 1). Cohen sees these 'impurities' as instances of cultural hybridity, which
he reminds us is not a 'melting pot' but at once "a fusion and a disjunction, a conjoining of
differences that cannot simply harmonize" (2, emphasis original). Cohen asserts that such
hybridities had a certain ambiguous but not entirely undefined geography, such that there
existed "medial spaces" that "were difficult in a double sense: difficult to articulate, and
difficult to inhabit" (2).9 He calls these medial spaces "difficult middles," and notes that, in
the literary and historical writings of the medieval period in English history, these spaces
were the constant haunts of a parade of monstrous Others; his laundry list includes:
"prodigies, transformed persons, sorcerers, bestiality, tempests formed of blood,
monsters, reveries of dismemberment, [and] cadavers possessed of abiding life" (2). From
Cohen's perspective, these monsters and bizarre occurrences belied a cultural obsession
with the 'imagined community'10 of medieval England and the many ways that contact with
assorted and sundry Others threatened to degrade English cultural identity by way of
endless hybridities. Peoples such as the Irish, the Scots, the Welsh, the Cornish, the Danes,
the Normans, the Jews and the Saracens also populate the pages of medieval English
writings and are often as not as much or more threatening to, and constitutive of, English
9 Cohen here follows the formulation of Robert J.e. Young, a postcolonial theorist who noted that the concept of hybridity,
popular in postcolonial studies, can have two antithetical meanings, one emphasizing disjunction and the other assimilation.
This contradiction is fully operative and unresolved in the theoretical application of the term "hybridity:' Cohen cites Young's
Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (1995).
10 This term refers to the work of Benedict Anderson, whose seminal monograph Imagined Communities postulated the
essentially imaginary character of national identity, the ways in which the sense of belonging to a nation - or, indeed, any
community larger than a small village - is produced. Anderson stresses that 'imaginary communities' are not fake or false, but
that the "horizontal comradeship" they promise across all their members exists apart from any other real connections between
these members (7). That is, nations (and other identities) are 'imagined' because they are produced at the level of ideology,
through a variety of means (Anderson is partial to the mass media). To put it into Foucauldian terms, communities such as
nations are produced by the very discourses that purport to describe and delineate them.
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ethnogenesis11 as dragons and ogres and hermaphrodites with whom they often share the
same pages (3-4).
The ironic nature of the deployment of monsters in medieval English texts is not
lost on Cohen, who notes that "[u]ncertainties about the coherence and continuity of
identity are allayed by embodying difference in exorbitant forms, in barbarians or monsters
who are imagined to imperil community - but who in fact catalyze community by
circumscribing its contours" (12). Thus, in much the same way that monsters helped to
marshal in the discourses of natural history, they also served as the impetus for nationalistic
and ethnic discourses as well. Moreover, as Cohen indicates, this sort of monstrous Other
serves as the repository for everything that is discursively removed from the communal
identity. Identity, Cohen notes (following Butler and othersr2 is iterative and performative
and must be corroborated through repetition and citation. That is, identity is built at the
interface of discursivity and embodiment through a continuous process of self-referential
(re)iteration - what Cohen calls "bodily praxis" (13). This obsession with embodiment as
the proof of performative identity goes a long in explaining why the monstrous (from
Grendel to the Saracen of medieval English writings) is depicted as presenting such starkly
differential (and polymorphously perverse) physicality.
By way of example, Cohen reports on a case from 1230 involving a young boy
whose experiences rattled the delicate and iterative nature of identity in medieval England.
11 "Ethnogenesis" refers to the often rapid coalescence of the sense of ethnic or national identity, particularly in situations of
intercultural contact. Cohen borrows this term from Walter Pohl, particularly from the collection that Pohl edited, titled
Strategies of Distinction (1998). See especially his essay "Telling the Difference: Signs of Ethnic Identity."
12 Judith Butler is perhaps most closely associated with the idea of identity as performative and iterative, particularly in relation
to gender and sexual identities (Gender Trouble, 1990), though a number of folklorists and anthropologists have also explored
the highly performative nature of identity and culture. Some notable examples include: Gregory Bateson (19SS), Erving
Goffman (1974), Richard Bauman (1975), Victor Turner (1982 and 1986), and Richard Schechner (1998 and 1993).
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Found wandering alone by a river in Norwich, East Anglia, the five-year-old tearfully informs
the woman who discovers him that he is a Jew. Some Jewish men came to claim him (they
call him Jurnepin), but the woman will not relinquish him, and the men go to seek a
magistrate. In the mean time, a Christian man who claims to be the boy's father shows up
after another woman finds that she recognizes the boy and summons him. He calls the boy
Odard, and the boy agrees that Benedict, the Christian man, is indeed his father. The case
grows into a legal behemoth, lurching forward and then bouncing back, and moving from
one realm of the law -local, royal, ecclestiastical- to another. As the evidence unfolds,
several allegations come to the fore. On the one hand, Benedict was alleged to be a
converted Jew, and the men who may have abducted and circumcised his son were
accused of trying to steal the boy back from Christianity. On the other hand, a debate
raged about the power of the consanguineous flow of Jewish blood in the boy's veins
versus the power of the blood of Christ to overcome the Jewishness of his father (14-5).
Did the act of circumcision, by its spilling of (Jewish?) blood, undo the conversion? Did the
spilling of blood on the part of the condemned Jews who were hanged as a result of the
investigation restore the Christian hegemony of the community? These questions and their
"potential irreso!vability" reveal, as Cohen notes, the complicated relationships between
identity and embodiment in medieval Britain (15). They also reveal the insubstantial and
porous boundaries between the community and its Others, a situation that propels the
terrifying character of both the Other and the monstrous.
For Cohen, such scenarios represent the "crisis of community" that impelled the
production of diverse monsters in the collective imagination of medi~val Britain (41).
Numerous other scholars of medieval European literature and culture concur with at least
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the main theoretical orientation of Cohen's study. Bildhauer and Mills (2003) contend that
monsters in the medieval period helped to distinguish 'bodies that matter"3 from those
that do not, as well as delineating divisions of physical and other kinds of space, and units
of time. In a sense, then, medieval monsters represent "an early colonialist mentality, a
blueprint for the systematic creation of distinctions between territories, nations, and
peoples" (8). Moreover, the authors maintain that, given the reception of medieval
notions of the monstrous in later periods, the Middle Ages themselves have become a
monstrous Other and have, like the Orient in Said's Orientalism, been deployed in the
service of constructing modernity to such an extent that they are now largely understood
more as modernity's Other than in their own right.'4
Other essays in the same volume as the Bildhauer and Mills introduction offer
similar observations. Samanatha J.E. Riches, for example, discusses evidence that the
dragons and other monsters that inevitably confronted medieval saints "often operated as
metaphors of pre-Christian and heterodox beliefs, symbolized lust or other forms of
sinfulness, functioned as representatives of generalized evil and also acted as a useful foil
to ideas of human civilization" (198). Similarly, Deborah Youngs and Simon Harris discuss
the medieval representation of the night as monstrous - both as the harbor of monsters
that would dare not show their faces in the light of day, and in its own right, as a
13 Bildhauer and Mills here reference Judith Butler's Bodies That Motter (1993), a further elaboration of her theoretical work in
Gender Trouble that expands on the notion of identity as performative, particularly focused on clearing up misreadings of
Gender Trouble in which gender identity Was viewed as a completely personal choice, with any number of possible
performances open to each social actor. Butler stresses, in Bodies That Matter, that performance is constrained by iterability
(discursive possibility), even though the repetition that performance requires opens a space for the gradual transformation of
identity.
14 In Orientalism (1978), Said argues that the Orient, as it is understood in an array of western discourses (e.g., backward,
wrapped in mysticism, dominated by an effeminate modality), serves the primary purpose of constructing the Occident as the
center of rationalistic, modern values and practices. Thus, Said maintains, 'the Orient' as it appears in western discourses tells
us more about the Occident (and its cultural construction) than about any 'real' peoples, cultures, or customs of the
geographical areas that the term 'the Orient' purportedly represents.
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manifestation of the spiritual battle between the forces of light (God, Heaven, the angelic)
and the forces of darkness (Satan and his minions). However, Youngs and Harris also note
that the nighttime facilitated the possibilities of rebellious and revolutionary acts (mainly on
the part of men) and so was doubly envisioned as a time of evil and a time of possibility and
freedom - a kind of double nature not unlike that of the monstrous Other as deployed in
postmodern literature.
Double natures and hybridism are also the central subjects of Erika Hess' Literary
Hybrids (2004), in which the author examines the role of hybridities - particularly cross-
dressing and shapeshifting - in medieval and modern French literature. For Hess, the
monstrous Other is often laden with Uportentous symbolic freight," such that U we can
assert generally that hybridism and monstrous deformation draw into question at the most
basic level the philosophical assumptions that underlie the system of categories and
hierarchies through which we order our universe" (155). Echoing Foucault's observations
about the monstrous as that which can undermine order, Hess also clarifies that this role of
the monstrous Other was more dramatic in the medieval period, before the scientific and
rationalistic trajectories of modernity turned monsters into curiosities and cultural relics (or
the proper object of only the Romantic writers). However, Hess also notes that, in recent
decades, a resurgence of interest in the monstrous (i.e., in academia) has reinvoked a
medieval sense of the radical possibilities that the monstrous embodies, especially in its
ability to pose a direct challenge to the metanarratives of progress and determinacy.
For John Block Friedman, whose monograph The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art
and Thought (1981) focuses on both written and graphic representations of the monstrous
in the medieval period, it is particularly the metanarratives of normalcy and ethnocentrism
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that medieval monsters challenged. Given that the monsters of medieval maps occupied
the peripheral areas, devoid of human civilization (at least, from a medieval, western
perspective), the monstrous represented geographical marginality and obscurity. More
than that, though, the monstrous Other represented marginality as a condition or
experiential state, since the monstrous was located not just in the wilds but outside the
'normal' terrain of human experience. Furthermore, the existence of 'monstrous races'
created an ethical dilemma for the Christian west, since representations of the Other as
monstrous underscored a deep ambivalence about the relationship between deviance from
the norm, on the one hand, and the kinds of evolutionism that held open a place for all
creatures in God's creation, no matter how 'deformed.'
A number of authors also focus this sort of critical attention on the role of
Saracens'5 in medieval thought. Siobhan Bly Calkin (2005), for example, argues that the
Orientalist concept of 'Saracens' was instrumental in the construction of late medieval
English identity as a national identity. Calkin focuses particularly on the Auchinleck
manuscript, a collection of religious tales (hagiographic and otherwise), humorous stories,
satire, poetry, and a list of Norman Barons that is housed in the National Library of
Scotland. As Calkin demonstrates, the diverse assortment of Saracens included in the
manuscript uncovers the various projects of identity-formation that the manuscript
advances. In some cases, the Saracens are the residents of the Middle East and l'lJorth
Africa and represent the similitude of national and religious identities in fourteenth-century
England, gesturing toward the Crusades. At other times, Saracens appear in narratives that
15 "Saracen" is derived from classical Greek and latin words that meant "Arab," though the term came to serve as a collective
noun for Turks, Muslims, and Arabs in the Middle Ages (Calkin 2).
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take place on English soil, and the threat is closer to home. In all cases, though, the
Saracens included in the manuscript's writings "demonstrate the various ways in which
figures of religious alterity offer crucial insights into cultural and political debates in which
their audiences are directly engaged," chiefly, the formation of a coherent 'English' identity
(211 ).
In a volume that focuses on medieval artistic representations of Saracens and Jews
in relation to representations of demons, Debra Higgs Strickland (2003) notes that the use
of exaggerated physical features was prevalent in both types of representation. In
particular, the prevalence in both forms of representation of imagery such as dark skin
tones, deformed limbs, animalistic hybridities, and garish facial features makes it difficult, in
some senses, to distinguish images of Jews and Saracens from images of demons and
devils. For Strickland, these resemblances are deliberate, since both forms of imagery
served primarily as foils for the western, Christian subject for whom such imagery was
created. Again, we see in Strickland's treatment the Orientalist thematic of using a
misshapen representation of the Other in order to secure the identity of the 'self.'
This thematic is also prevalent in Jacqueline de Weever's treatment (1998) of the
representation of Saracen women - particularly the Saracen princess - in medieval French
epics. De Weever is particularly irked by the fact that, in the large number of epics she
surveys, the majority of the Saracen princesses are represented as having white skin and
other traits associated with beauty in contemporaneous European women. Not
surprisingly, these lighter-skinned princesses assume the role of heroine and typically aid
the French hero in his quest, while the darker-skinned Saracen princesses typically deceive
the hero and remain loyal to their own families and cultures. De Weever is troubled by the
-----------
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way that the 'whitewashing' of the Saracen princess makes such characters morally
ambivalent, at once supportive of the brave, Christian hero and "reprehensible" for their
betrayal of their own families (a cardinal sin for an unmarried woman) (9). Nevertheless, de
Weever's argument demonstrates how the use of the lighter-skinned Saracen princesses
comments on the alterity of the Saracen peoples while also, ultimately, bolstering the
values of a Christian and male-dominated French culture.
In his monograph Deformed Discourse (1996), David Williams take a more sweeping
and rather more philosophical view of the role of the monster in medieval life. Williams
focuses on what he calls the 'metalangauge' of the medieval period, a notion of language in
medieval Christendom that held the (postmodern-sounding) view that there is always
something supplemental to language, something that escapes its confines. Unlike the
assumptions of subsequent periods (namely, the early modern and modern periods) that
human intellect could master the entirety of existence and comprehend it fully, medieval
thinkers, in Williams' view, knew that language was highly symbolic and, therefore, subject
to degrees of inaccuracy and slippage. For, "[j]ust as the Word-made-flesh was conceived
as a kind of supreme marvel, so language, the science derived from Him, retained
something of the same monstrous dimensions in its own double nature, which consisted of
immaterial meaning incarnated in sensuous sound" (9). This 'double nature' of language
was important in the medieval view since it allowed for an elevation of the faithful beyond
the limitations of the physical world:
Stepping outside language in the direction of metalanguage is made possible
through the poetic construction of the paradoxes, ambiguities, grotesqueries, and
monstrosities of mediaeval art and legend, which sufficiently transgress the normal
process of signification and deform normal representation so as to urge the mind
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beyond its limitations, not by reducing the object of its understanding but ... by
liberating it from its own ascendency. (331)
For Williams, then, the function of the monstrous in medieval thought is revealed in its
ability to help the scholar escape the simple signifying assumption of language, applying a
surprisingly postmodern (if religiously construed) sensibility to the nature of rhetoric in
order to elevate the experience of Ma n beyond the simple perception of objects in
(im)materiaJ reality.
As this brief survey of scholarship on the monstrous Other in medieval writings, art,
and philosophy demonstrates, medieval monsters provided the counterpoint for the
project of creating national and other identities defining the normal, and exalting the
general condition of humanity.16 Often as not, these monsters embodied religious, cultural,
and other forms of alterity, helping to produce cultural and ideological coherence by
providing an example of the dangers of their absence. Medieval monsters demarcated the
normal, encircling the edges of the known world and occupying the gaps in its logic,
knowledge, and experiential record. At times, these monstrous Others traveled close to
the heart of medieval civilization and threatened the social order with an often tantalizing
spatial and cultural hybridity. Ultimately, though, even the Jew or Saracen or dragon found
in the very streets of medieval western civilization were enlisted (often violently and
without their consent) in the multifarious projects of building western hegemonies, from
the nationalistic to the religious.
16 For additional examples, see: Borsje (2001); Bovey (2002); Classen (1998); Cohen ("Limits," 1994); Cohen ("Order," 1998);
Flood (1998); Gregg (1997); Hubble (2004); Jongen (1997); Minard (2007); Mittman (2006); Riches ("Virtue," 2008); Wilson
(1993)
72
The Monster in Modernity
The mid-nineteenth century, in some ways reflective of Cohen's medieval England, was a
time of rapid social change and high levels of intercultural contact and mobility. The forces
of industrialization, urbanization and the push/pull of the colony-metropole dynamic
brought about unprecedented levels of migration, intercultural exchange, and new
challenges to the hegemonies of Western Europe and the europhilic societies in Oceania
and the Americas. The first really broad rumblings of anti-colonial revolution were heard
from assorted parts of the globe, and the socioeconomic world order predicated on
conditions of colonization, slavery, and exploitation of the urban working class was
beginning to show some stress faults. At the height of this tumultuous period, British
authorities mounted the 1851 Exhibition, a seemingly international exhibition that "actually
showcased British technological superiority and British values" (Thomas 898). In a part of
the exhibition known as Works and Industry of All Nations, exhibition organizers staged
individual exhibits for various cultures - all presented from a highly ethnocentric
perspective. Tensions ran high, as Londoners feared that the huge crowds of international
visitors to the Exhibition might bring crime, disruption and disease (Thomas 898).
Then, in 1854, the Crystal Palace, which had originally opened in the London suburb
of Syndenham as part of the Exhibition, was re-opened to the public with a motley
collection of semi-permanent exhibits. Among these was the Ninevah Court, which
showcased the work of archaeologist Austin Henry Layard, who had made two 'successful'
expeditions to the ancient Assyrian city of Ninevah. The Court consisted of a reconstructed
Assyrian palace prepared by a master architect and under the supervision of Layard himself,
nestled into the northwest corner of a vast glass greenhouse that provided a significant
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recontextualization of the structure, given its desert origins. The Court's presence in the
Crystal Palace served clearly pedagogic purposes, demonstrating, along with other, similar
exhibits, the history of fine architecture as well as the demise of decadent and immoral
civilizations. As Deborah Thomas (2008) notes in an essay on the monstrous in the
Victorian period and the first part of the twentieth century, the giant statues of human-
headed, winged lions that flanked the entrance to the Ninevah Court became celebrated
symbols of both human ingenuity and cultural Otherness. For, while British visitors could
perceive I'a kinship between themselves and the ancient Assyrians," the giant sculptures
were also ilintrinsically alien and other" (899-900). The exhibit was intended to invoke
both identification and disidentification, making it a representative example of the
monstrous Other under conditions of modernity.
Thomas goes on to note that Layard himself wrote the handbook for the Ninevah
Court exhibit, and that he repeatedly refers to the two statues as 'monsters' throughout
this visitor's pamphlet. This representation, clearly intended for a mass audience and
perhaps thought by Layard to be more in sync with popular reception of the statues, stands
in sharp contrast to Layard's scholarly writings about the statues (and others like them), in
which he never refers to such works as 'monsters' or 'monstrous' (Thomas 899). At first,
the Imonsters' from Ninevah made for an exhibitionary spectacle, bringing the utterly
foreign and monstrously hybrid into ready contact with large numbers of everyday people.
By the 1860'S, the figure had worked its way into children's literature, including the
illustrations in an edition of Alice in Wonderland, bringing the tremendous monuments
down to the scale of everyday life, and rendering their once-ominous and forboding
qualities harmless - at least, as harmless as child's play. This domestication ofthe Assyrian
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'monsters' did not completely divest them of their didactic qualities, but it did create
enough familiarity with the image to remove its most sinister (foreign) connotations and
place it safely in the vast pantheon of western(ized) folkloric and legendary figures.
A similar domestication may be found in Stith Thompson's multi-volume Motif-Index
of Folk-Literature (1955-8), still the definitive volume of its type, which records well over 150
unique motifs that address the monstrous Other across a vast diversity of folktales and
literary traditions. These motifs appear in every volume and in every section of the work,
from "Magic" to "The Dead" to "Reversal of Fortune" and beyond - demonstrating the
immense expanses of the folkloric imagination that are cultivated by monsters and hybrids.
The folloWing is just a brief sampling of the motifs that address the monstrous Other:
A1141.1
A107o.1
B15·1.2
(281
D55·2.2
D318.1
D741
E612.12
E652
F511.0.1.1
F721.2.2
F969·4·2
G346·3·1
G635·1
H335·3·7.
H516
Earthquakes from movement of subterranean monster
Birth of monsters as sign at end of world
Many-headed animal [With 23 submotifs]
Tabu: drinking without presence of dead heads
Devil (troll) makes self small
Transformation: monkey to person
Disenchantment of monster when prince promises to marry the
monster's mother
Reincarnation as monkey
God reincarnated as monster
Headless person with eyes (eye) and mouth on breast
Monster guards door of habitable hill
Fight with monster child causes earth to rock like waves of the sea
AmphibiOUS tree-destroying monsters
Monster's returning head. Joins body after it has been severed
Suitor task: to kill other monsters
Test: guessing trolls' names in order to save one's Iife'7
As even this abbreviated listing demonstrates, the monstrous Other (and monstrous
events) are prevalent across the full spectrum of folktales and related genres and assume a
17 These representative examples come from the first three volumes of Stith Thompson's Motif-Index of Folk Literature (1955-8),
which, taken together, cover index sections A through H. The examples chosen are randomly selected from among the many
dozens of entries that have to do with monstrous Others and are listed here in order of occurrence in the index.
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multiplicity of forms. However, Thompson's attempt at cataloguing the entire record of
folk-motifs takes an uncritically synchronic approach, offering us a cross-section of the
motifs operative in specific tales available (either in circulation in the 1950S or in existing
print collections and, therefore, already frozen-in-time) at the time that he created his
index. Such an approach fails to account for what Foucault would call the genealogies of
particular motifs, such as the Assyrian 'monster' mentioned above.
Another such example is the ghoul, a monstrous creature that appears in a wide
variety of recent and contemporary media, from the novels of fantasy author Laura K.
Hamilton18 and the series of novels on which the popular HBO series True Blood is based, to
a variety of video games, comic books, and other media. These contemporary portrayals of
the ghoul, though, are generally qUite removed from the monster's origins in the ancient
Arab world. As Ahmed AI-Rawi indicates in his recent article (2009) on the philological
tradition of ghoul (from the Arabic verb "ghal," meaning "to kill"), the folklore of the ghoul
has been altered significantly at the hands of western writers (292). Beginning in the early
1700s, when French writer Antoine Galland translated the Arabian Nights into a twelve-
volume French edition, western storytellers and even scholars have reshaped the tradition
of the creature, adding, for example, the notion that the ghoul might dig up a grave in
order to feed on the corpse (a conflation of the ghoul with the traditional figure of the
goblin). The ghoul of ancient and medieval Arabic antiquity, by way of contrast, has a
hybrid physicality, often bearing the feet of an animal species (of one foot each from two
different species), and sometimes other bestial traits. These creatures typically were
18 In Laura K. Hamilton's novel The Laughing Corpse (1994), ghouls take center stage as a witch who practices santaria (a
syncretic religion of Caribbean and African origins) transforms a ghoul into a sentient super-ghoul who becomes a marauding
murderer. Hamilton's running main character and hunter of wayward supernatural beings, Anita Blake, must pursue and
dispense with this new threat.
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represented as devilish in nature, sometimes a subspecies of Djinn (genie), and sometimes
belonging to their own genus. Always 'ugly' in appearance, both by virtue of their black-
grey, corpse-like skin and their hybrid forms, ghouls could also take the appearance of
beautiful (or familiar) people and were most well-known for luring travelers away from
their route (and from civilization), generally leading them to their deaths in the wastelands
(292-4).
After entering the western imagination via Galland's translation, the ghoul was
further transformed in the writings of a number of English and Irish authors, including
Thomas Moore, William Ernest Henley, Charles Dickens, and Elizabeth Gaskell, among
others. In these authors' reconfigurations of the ghoul, it becomes the consort of an evil
enchantress named Amina - who, incidentally, was also significantly transformed in these
narratives, when compared to her origins in the Arabian Nights. The focus shifts, to a great
extent, from the ghoul itself to the Orienta list femme fatale character of Amina, a witch
who uses the ghoul to carry out her bidding, and who eats her rice one grain at a time,
being so full from the previous night's gorging, together with the ghoul, on the flesh of the
dead. These representations pair demonic forms of monstrousness with an evil character
whose gender and sexual identities exceed all respectable boundaries, resulting in a
shocking alliance between excessive and murderous femininity and bestial, malevolent
monsters (AI-Rawi 300-2).
This theme carries through most subsequent representations of the ghoul,
including the deformed creature who feasts on the flesh of dead soldiers in the graphic
novel (Frank Miller, 1999) and, later, the film version of 300 (directed by Zack Snyder, 2007).
In the film version, in particular, the minions of the Persian god-king Xerxes include an array
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of monstrous creatures intermingling (and, in some cases, engaging in sexual intercourse
with) all manner of effeminate, deviant and queer characters. Indeed, the character of
Xerxes himself is presented as a formidable force but also one that is gender-variant,
guileful, and monstrous (in size as well as a striking amorality). In many respects, this
western usurpation of the figure of the ghoul mirrors the ways that the recontextualization
of the Assyrian statues in the Crystal Palace served the projects of asserting western
superiority in the face of numerous intercultural challenges. Indeed, the Spartan
protagonists of 300 present a stalwart, highly rational, ultramasculine version of western
polity and culture that is juxtaposed, in stark contrast, to the polyglot, heterogeneous
peoples - including a postmodern rendering of the Saracens - under the command of
Xerxes. While medieval monsters may have helped to construct national, religious and
other forms of identity, the polymorphously hybrid monsters of the modern period justify
the ongoing hegemony of western cultural norms in the face of a multiplicity of new
challenge(r)s.
Similar kinds of re-inscription and redeployment may also be seen in the travels of
the wild man motif. Dorothy Yamamoto (2000) discusses the motif's role in the Middle
Ages, focusing on the wild man's body and identity. Of the former, she notes that it His
basically a human body which has been overwritten with animal characteristics," most
notably, excessive hairiness (145). Yet this particular hybridity served, according to
Yamamoto, different purposes from those of the Saracens, the barbarians or the monsters
proper. Rather than operating primarily as a counterpoint against which hegemonic
identities could be constructed - as was the case for so many other monstrous identities of
the time - the wild man was more 'purely' hybrid, a true blending of the familiar and the
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foreign. Geographically imagined as inhabiting the literal outskirts of European civilization,
the wild man was never too far from the center of everyday experience and, thus, was
more internal to hegemonic identities than many other medieval monsters. Likewise, his
habitat - the forests, mountains and wildernesses that flanked the edges of the known and
settled areas of Europe - were not entirely unknown to the peoples of medieval Europe,
though these were areas not yet cultivated, settled and 'tamed.' These observations lead
Yamamoto to an interesting and important supposition about the 'wild': the wild is not
what is beyond the scope of human activity but merely what populates its most immediate
edges. The wild man, then, is the monstrous Other within, the dark side of civilized
Europeanness.
Because of this special positioning of the wild man and his habitat, both the figure
and his environs are capable of providing a rich and diverse reservoir of connotations,
comparisons and minutiae for a range of cultural projects, from buttressing notions of
civilized life and behavior to providing a model for unbridled sexual libido (Yamamoto 148-
68). Furthermore, the wild man frequently serves, in courtly writings, as a representation
of the baser side of humanity (again, this trait is here construed as an aspect of everyday
Europeans' character, not as an absolute Other like the Saracens). Indeed, in the numerous
literary battles between knights and wild men, the imagery of the coarse, bestial nature of
man waging battle against the highest forms of chivalry and self-sacrifice is quite
consciously deployed (169-70).
Over time, however, the wild man would take on an assortment of other guises. As
Roger Bartra argues in The Artificial Savage (1997), the wild man was gradually transformed
and enlisted in a variety of other projects. One such project was that of the 'noble savage,'
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the idyllic Other who lived in a natural state and was, as Bartra points out, free of original
sin but also ignorant of the moral and spiritual principles believed necessary for salvation of
the soul. This wild man is an innocent sinner, another variation of the embodiment of
Iiminality (44-45). This particular project was necessitated by the cultural tectonics of the
Enlightenment, which required that the wild man, much like Mary Shelley's creature in
Frankenstein (1817), serve as both a commentary on the vagaries of civilized life
(representing a way of life that was simpler and, therefore, less prone to decadence) and as
a model of humanity in a state of ignorance and amorality. Not coincidentally, this
particular incarnation of the wild man was closely allied with a host of colonial projects,
which deployed similar notions of the noble savage (think of Caliban) in order to justify
European economic and political expansion and cultural domination. Bartra has argued
elsewhere (Wild Men 1994) that the structure of a myth tends to remain intact across
epistemic shifts, and that the meanings associated with the substance of a myth exhibit an
astonishing degree of elasticity, such that "certain facets of a myth, often marginal ones,
adapt to the new conditions" and the myth survives, repurposed for the endeavors of a
new age (Artificial 46). This 'plastic' nature of the wild man motif accommodated its
transformation from a dangerous, liminal figure haunting the edges of medieval European
settlements to an almost respectable, 'noble savage' figure that was not a participant in the
scientific and commercial projects of the Enlightenment. In fact, Bartra's observation may
also be applied to the monstrous Other in general, since the monstrous has also adapted to
the specific exigencies of numerous cultural moments, including our own.
Both the concept of the wild man, in particular, and that of the monstrous Other in
general have made their contributions to the colonial projects of what we now call the
80
western (or northern) countries, and both Bartra and Raymond Corbey (2005) point out
how the motifs have persisted well into the twentieth century in ethnological and
anthropological scholarship and other cultural sites. In fact, Corbey also notes how the idea
of the wild man greatly influenced the first scientific inquiries (Le., in Europe) into the
behaviors and social patterns of multiple large primate species, whose members in many
ways resemble the wild man (42-3). For Bartra, though, the focus is closer to home.
Among other contemporary manifestations of the motif, Bartra mentions the Iron John
movement, in which North American men attend gatherings in wilderness areas and
attempt to manifest their - we might say - inner wild men. Bartra is quick to point out that
the Iron John practices are based on multiple misunderstandings of the wild man tradition,
but he also sees in this living example yet another retooling of the wild man motif for
particular sociocultural purposes (Artificial 19-21). The motif is as alive as ever.
The wild men of the three novels under consideration in this study - Grendel and a
mismatched pair of trolls - are exemplars of yet another plastic surgery on the part of the
wild man motif. In the postmodern moment, metafictive characters that draw their
Otherness from the vast archives of the wild man motif return (again and again) to the
village, meadhall or city and stake their claim to a seat at the table of humanity and, when
these claims fail to succeed (fully), monstrous events unfold. The variations in these three
novels lead to differential treatments of the topic, but the common traffic toward social
upheaval is unmistakable. Under conditions of postmodernity, the wild man returns to the
heart of civilization, posing an epistemological and ontological challenge for the hegemonic
and positivistic self that westerners have inherited from the (European) past. And, unlike
their carefully contained and (literally) marginalized medieval and modern counterparts,
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these postmodern wild men are the harbingers of a more lasting destabilization of
Cartesian order. Given their audacious insistence on being more-human-than-human, these
wild men turn our critical gaze toward the Other within. 19
The Monster With/In: Teratology, Intersexuality and the Inward-Facing Demise of Identity
Of course, the wild man is not the only monstrous hybrid that threatens identity from
within. Although such monstrous Others as Saracens, dragons, ghouls and werewolves
have populated the contours of the imagination for centuries, there has been - particularly
since the Enlightenment - a constant disquiet in the consecrated halls of natural history,
biology and embryology. For, despite the apparently expansive and totalizing character of
hegemonic discursivities such as positivism, there has always been a recalcitrant
undercurrent to embodiment itself. There have always been bodies and experiences that
fail to conform to the narrow confines of identity and ideology. Even in the Age of Reason,
the kind of monstrous births discussed by Pare (and generations of his predecessors)
continued to occur. Moreover, as a Foucauldian analysis makes clear, ancient ideas about
the monstrous continue into the contemporary moment, confounding any fully rational
response to these anomalous births - what we now typically call 'birth defects' or
'deformities' or, more politically correctly, 'disabilities' or 'congenital conditions.' Politically
correct or not, though, reactions to the sometimes surprising diversity of life cannot be
completely divested of their discursive genealogies. Indeed, the events themselves seem
19 For additional discussions of the wild man motif, see: Barton (1996); Forth (2007); Hutchinson (1997); Kinser (1995); Kulisz
(1997); Schwam-Baird (2002); Slavin (2007); and Strobl (2008).
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to threaten rationality and order, providing inexorable evidence that identity is not as firmly
grounded in bodily reality as we have been taught to believe.
In the past few hundred years, the study of abnormal births has come to be known
as teratology, literally, the study of monsters. Writing about teratology in 1907, Edwin
Taylor Shelly lamented the fact that the most ancient and unscientific superstitions still
beleaguered even the most scientific investigations of the topic. Positioning himself
squarely within the bounds of rationality and a Cartesian positivism that views the body as
but one more object to which the scientific mind can turn its presumably objective gaze,
Shelly remarks that "[tJO the whims and caprices of gods of its own making has mankind
too easily been lead in the past to attribute every misfortune and every unusual natural
phenomenon" (418). Shelly proceeds to describe two main strands of irrational belief
regarding teratology. The first is the ancient and medieval belief that monstrous births are
portentous, that is, that they signify the wrath of deities or otherwise foretell of events to
come. In fact, Shelly cites the practice of teratoscopy, practiced in Ninevah in 2000 BCE and
involving the divination offuture events performed by Ireading' the body and character of
the newborn Imonster.' Shelly clearly describes such practices in so great of detail in order
to dramatize their absurdity, from a modern (and, therefore, better informed) perspective.
However, when he describes the second strand of irrational belief in relation to monstrous
births - namely, the impression theory, which holds that a thousand different aspects of
the mother's behavior while pregnant can determine the Iitastes, disposition, character,
physical development, and intellectual endowments of her unborn offspring," he is clearly
distressed to report that it is often included as scientific fact in obstetric textbooks (418).
Calling his fellow practitioners to action, Shelly admonishes that II no earnest member in our
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ranks should hesitate to help with righteous zeal to dissipate this gross anachronism, this
hideous specter of a cruel, barbarous, superstitious past" (418). For Shelly and others like
him in the early days of professional teratology, there was a moral imperative to continue
decontaminating teratological knowledge of the lingering impurities of thought found in
ancient myths and medieval bestiaries.
This problem is endemic to scientific discourses, however. As Nelly Oudshoorn
(1994) demonstrates in her treatment of the history ofthe science related to sex
hormones, prescientific ideas are always operative within both the theory and practice of
science. In the specific case of endocrinology, the chemicals 'discovered' in the twentieth
century, which we now know as sex hormones, were not the origin of the notion that
essences issued from the gonads shaped gendered experience and behavior; indeed, that
notion goes back to classical antiquity at least (16-9). Oudshoorn carefully traces the
genealogy of the contemporary understanding of sex hormones and reveals the myriad
purposes to which the concept has been subjected. She is particularly interested in the
uses of hormonal supplements, an example of scientific understanding that is, in part,
imbued with prescientific notions being used to create technologies that are intended to
intervene in bodily processes and alter people's experiences. For Oudshoorn - who
acknowledges that there are a number of highly desirable uses for hormones - the
situation calls for some careful scrutiny, since "we need to understand science and
technology with all its [sic] tensions and ambiguities" (151).
Historian and sociologist of science Thomas Kuhn also highlighted the need to
understand what scientific exploration is and how it operates. His midcentury monograph
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) provided a theretofore unprecedented
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treatment of the modus operandi of science. In particular, Kuhn stressed that the popular
conception of science as a neverending procession of great discoveries conflicts with the
reality of day-to-day scientific practice, what Kuhn calls "normal science" or a "paradigm."
He notes that, in order for a radical new discovery to be taken seriously by professional
scientists requires a "shift of professional commitments" that is seldom achieved (6).
Given the paradigmatic nature of scientific work, in which, as Kuhn notes, theory and
practice are never separable (except in elementary science education), the pace of change
is much slower than nonscientists might believe. Indeed, Kuhn's "normal science" is a quite
conservative discursivity and one that is slow to abandon even those precepts that
experience (or experiments) have already disproven.
Teratology is no exception. A little more than a hundred years after Shelly's article
appeared, the field is still called 'the study of monsters' and, though the normal science of
teratology is much more sophisticated, and the impression theory is now disguised behind
the mask of teratogenesis (scientific understandings of how congenital conditions and
deformations occur), the central tenets of a medieval worldview remain operative within
teratology. Indeed, no amount of scientific understanding can quell how we react to
bodies that appear to be far outside the norm, as "[r]eaction is primary" and cannot be
filtered through reason (Starr 98). I\levertheless, teratologically focused obstetricians,
gynecologists, researchers, clinicians, and medical humanists continue to expound the
successes of their field. Harold Kalter, for example, published in 2003 a history of the past
one hundred years of teratological research that praises the field's advances and urges
scientists to continue unraveling the etiologies of additional forms of monstrous defects
(from among the dozens that are known and documented). Kalter reminds readers both
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inside and outside the profession of the same moral imperative so vividly exemplified by
Shelly a century earlier: disorder must be studied, explained, and 'treated' (eradicated) in
order to help ensure that everyone has a chance at a normal life. Indeed, it is hard to read
Kalter without seeing his point - even in the midst of writing a project like the present one.
After all, who wants children to suffer, either physically or socially, when both forms of
anguish might be preventable? So persuasive is this line of reasoning that we can almost
lose sight of the fact that not all forms of monstrous 'defect' are life-threatening or
medically emergent, and that, in fact, a good number of the treatments may be more
cosmetic than necessary.
Part of the sleight-of-hand by which biological variation becomes a medical
emergency is due to the degree to which we are all conditioned to trust scientific and
rational explanations and approaches - even to the disparagement of our own embodied
experiences. For, concomitant with the arrival of rationalistic discourses came the
disciplining and atomization of knowledge into an ever-growing range of specializations.
As Carrie Yang Costello argues in a 2006 article on the history of the obstetrical
specialization known as teratology, most of the articles that addressed monstrous births in
the early twentieth century did not address either etiology or treatment. Costello astutely
observes, however, that this dearth of writing on the causes and responses to unusual
births was not due to a lack of effective treatments (Le., such as those we now have);
indeed, Costello condemns that argument as spurious, since the professionals of the time
did employ treatments that they considered state-of-the-art (regardless how we might
judge them now). Instead, Costello posits, the glut of early twentieth-century publications
on teratology served to help solidify the professionalization of obstetrics as a branch of
86
modern medicine (in Kuhnian terms, to 'normalize' the specialization). Moreover, this had,
as Costello notes, a lasting negative impact on the perception of and public response to
both unusual births and disability in general, medicalizing (and disembodying) such
experiences and resuscitating the ancient sense of monstrousness that is accorded to
individuals with disabilities (28). Ironically, the rational and medical approach espoused by
both Shelly and Kalter ultimately contributes to, rather than debunking, the most irrational
ways of viewing certain human experiences.
The same can be said for the experiences of individuals who are labeled 'intersex.'
Intersexuality may best be understood as a collection of various conditions in which some
aspect of an individual's anatomy - usually genitals or internal sex organs - is in some way
ambiguous or not aligned with standards of sex definition.20 (One example is a child born
with both vaginal and penile structures, and a "fused" labia-scrotum.) Because of the
closed nature of the symbolic order (which is predicated on a two-sex system), intersexual
births are difficult to comprehend. Since the binary model of gender so completely
structures our fullest understanding of human subjectivity and the 'natural' world, the
usually simple (in both senses) initiation into the symbolic order contained in the
statements "It's a girl" and "It's a boy" is utterly incapacitated at an intersexual birth.
There are, then, two instances of sex assignment at birth. In the usual instance, sex
assignment takes but a few moments, since the birthing attendant merely examines the
genitals of the newborn to decide which sex predominates, and then quickly pronounces
the new person's role in the symbolic order as an 'obvious' fact. The less common instance,
20 My discussion of intersexuality here draws upon my previous treatment of the subject (Adkins, Sentenced 1999; Adkins,
"Where 'Sex' Is Born(e)" 1999). In addition, rny analysis draws upon the work of Suzanne J. Kessler in Lessons from the
Intersexed (1998) and of Alice Dornurat Dreger in Hermaphrodites and the Medica/Invention ofSex (1998).
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however, of an intersexual birth greatly confounds the fundamental logic of the
heteropatriarchal order, since that order's presumption of two and only two sexes is its
foremost project and the one without which it cannot function. Throughout western
history, a variety of responses to the crisis of intersexuality have been employed to contain
its potential damage to the symbolic order. In the period beginning around the middle of
the twentieth century, 'corrective' surgeries have been the mainstay option for (literally
and figuratively) inscribing intersexuals into that order. This 'reconstructive' process is an
excellent example of what Foucault called "discipline."
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) characterizes disciplinarity as an atomizing
force:
Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyzes,
differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary
and sufficient single units. It "trains" the moving, confused, useless multitudes of
bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements-small, separate cells,
organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segments.
Discipline "makes" individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards
individuals both as objects and instruments of its exercise. (170)
Near the end of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault (1978) expanded upon
his notion of disciplinarity with specific attention to the disciplining of 'sex':
the notion of "sex" made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity,
anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and
it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an
omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere ... (154)
'Sex,' then, does not correspond to any prelinguistic or precultural ontological presence,
but instead denotes a specific ordering of an infinite number of actual or potential
experiences, to the specific, political ends of the symbolic order. Foucault thus reverses the
seemingly obvious, received knowledge that sex is the natural identity-category to which
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the cultural identity-categories gender and sexual orientation somehow correspond in
some secondary or tertiary way. Instead, Foucault indicates that sexuality is primary,
though no more Inatural' than any other socially prescribed identity. It is the regulation and
disciplining of sexuality, then, that justifies and compels the heteropatriarchal symbolic
order and the scientific and medical deployment and normalization of sex as Inatural.'
Compulsory heterosexuality becomes, in this formulation, the organizing principle
of the symbolic order, including its prescribed sex and gender identity-categories. Sex,
both as identity and experience, recedes into the background as an effect of the
heteropatriarchal order - the normalizing grid in and through which people create sex -
and not its organizing principle. In fact, the notion of the difference between female and
male is naturalized precisely so the symbolic order appears to rest upon obvious,
extrasocially compelled kinds of differences. Maintaining heterosexual primacy as Inatural,'
then, is the raison d'etre of such identity-categories as sexual orientation, gender, and sex.
Fortunately, the hegemony of the heterosexual matrix is incomplete, as the mere existence
of intersexuals suggests, and their ongoing, subjective experiences of ambiguous sex,
gender, and sexual orientation - even after Icorrective' surgery - confirm.
Of course, the addition of an identity-category like intersexual or hermaphrodite to
the possibilities for biological sex is not sufficient to escape the heteropatriarchallogic of
the symbolic order. As an intersex individual identified simply as David attests in the online
publication Hermaphrodites with Attitude (1995):
I have come only very slowly to an awareness of my intersexuality.... Yet once r
started to accept this and identify with it, it became difficult for me to accept any
other reality. My gender identity issue became an all-or-nothing proposition.
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Either I am 100% intersexed (whatever that isl), or I am not intersexed at all. But
[ now realize that this is just the dilemma that our culture puts us in when we
establish the rigid either/or categories of male-or-female ... (np, emphasis added)
David's first stage of challenging the either/or opposition of the symbolic order is to posit a
new, equally exclusive category of "intersexual," but then he realizes that any such subject-
position defined as not-Other fails to escape the limiting, lack-imposing logic of
heteropatriarchy.21 Like many other intersexuals (and non-intersexuals), David is not
comfortable positioning his subjectivity in only one part of who he is or can be. He has no
desire to stop thinking of himself as male and masculine (as subject), yet he wants to
embrace his intersexual (ambiguous) and feminine aspects as well: "[ am saying 'yes' to
intersex, 'yes' to my masculinity, and 'yes' to the fluid and receptive femininity that has
enriched my life with its non-linearity and intuition. And this has given me an ease and
comfort that did not seem possible when I tried to deny any of these parts" (David np).
Indeed, David's resistance to the symbolic order's requirement to present a single, unified
subjectivity directly challenges the notion of static individuality, replacing it with a notion of
a necessarily partial self not unlike that advanced by feminist scholars since the 1970s.
Marilyn Friedman (1991) calls this notion the "social conception of the self," in
which an individual is actually a loose and dynamic collection of assorted "identity-
constituents" that correspond to different aspects of the person's social positioning vis-a-
vis other people and groups of people. A Black woman, to consider a very simplistic
example, is at once Black and a woman and, because both gender and race are figured as
inescapable aspects of identity in the symbolic order, she is always both Black and a woman
21 I am electing to use the male first-person subjective pronoun 'he' when referring to David, following his main way of identifying
himself. This decision is, of course, more expedient than accurate, and somewhat adversative to the point at hand in this
section. Nevertheless, David's identity remains problematic for the heteropatriarchal order.
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at every moment. She cannot embody her racial identity at one moment to the exclusion of
her gender (or sex) identity; thus, she is necessarily partial. In practice, this notion has
implications complicated by identity-constituents far more numerous and particular than
universals like gender and race. For intersexuals (and, indeed, all of us, to some extent),
gender is itself a complex, conflationary grouping of multiple identity-constituents - a
mishmash of partialities splitting the self almost infinitely. That our symbolic order
continues to demand binarily delineated, gendered individuality from any of us in spite of
our inherent partialities is a testament to the power of heteropatriarchy.
David's radical affirmation of his body and his lived experiences despite the
countervailing social pressures provides a working model for challenging the symbolic
order as it becomes less and less restricted by its heteropatriarchal history. People need to
be able to experience their bodies, desires, and emotions in all their complex, contradictory
partialities, without the condescending intervention of medicine and social constraints, and
without the limitations of gender as we know them. Furthermore, David's stance is also a
strong prototype for resistance to the forces that 'monsterize' individuals with unusual
anatomy and treat them as Other. To some degree echoing the tortured philosophizing of
Grendel in Gardner's novel, David resists the simplistic (and coercive) metanarratives of
rationality and positivistic identity and asserts his right to rely on his embodied experience
as the source of his gender experiences, rather than selecting one from a handful of
prescribed and predetermined identities. His simple refusal to occupy the positionality of
the monstrous Other, and his insistence on the legitimacy and inalienability of his
experiences, constitute in him the kind of speaking monstrous Other that appears in the
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three novels under review here - a kind of speaking that I will argue threatens the ongoing
tenability of the symbolic order as we know it.
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CHAPTER III
THE MONSTER IN THE MACHINE
The monstrous Other is a creature of the symbolic order, which describes the entire
sociocultural structure in which we come to be speaking, acting, thinking subjects, enjoying
a degree of agency but only within the finite possibilities of the symbolic order itself. The
order is entirely discursive; nearly all contemporary scholars agree on this point, despite the
apparently untraversable divergences in their specific ideas about how discursivity works,
or in what ways the subject is constituted as a subject. Of course, most of the critics also
agree that, just because subjectivity is discursive in nature, does not imply that a subject
can simply employ discourse in any conceivable way, to achieve any imaginable result.
Subjects may be constantly (re)constituting discourses in their everyday uses of speech
acts, written language, and other forms of representation, but the symbolic order is always
already (re)constituting the subject as well. Just as there is no final way to capture and
contain the monstrous, there is no way to escape the symbolic order so long as we are
creatures for whom meaning is discursive.
In the past half-century, a variety of significant (post)structuralist methodologies
have evolved in various sites (geographic locations, particular journals, subdisciplines, etc.)
within the humanistic and social-scientific fields of inquiry, many of them focused on the
complex character of the relationship between the symbolic order and the individual
subject and, therefore, interdisciplinary to their cores. Neomarxist and other structuralist
approaches, for example, continue to employ assorted (somewhat wide-ranging) variations
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of the Marxist notions of structure and superstructure. Poststructuralist approaches, and
particularly those that follow Derridean notions of the radical arbitrariness of discourse
(and of all representation) tend to focus on the gaps in meaning and in subjectivities, the
failures of the symbolic order that reveal its fallibilities without signaling its demise.
Multiculturalist approaches, including much of the work of critical race theory, feminism,
and similar 'schools,' home in on the particular hierarchical, binaristic politics of the
symbolic order as it is currently (and was recently) constituted. Performance theory uses
the critical lens of performativity to describe both how subjects assume their 'roles' as
subjects, and how the processes of the symbolic order are 'staged.' Performance theory
focuses critical attention on the ways that performances 'fail' and that the mandatory,
reiterative performativity of subjective identities is always slipping - much like the
meanings in Derridean discourse analysis. Foucauldian theory takes up the notion that
discursivity (the possibility of subjectivity, the symbolic order) precedes the subject, and
that subjectivity therefore exists prior to any individual subject - a reversal of the
commonsense understanding of social order (a reversal that mirrors Foucault's
observations about the relationships between disciplinarity and discipline, and between
sexuality and sex). As discussed in the previous chapter, the Foucauldian methodologies of
archaeological and genealogical inquiry help scholars investigate the tendencies of various
discourses to propagate certain forms of subjectivity, and to trace those tendencies across
historical and cultural changes.
Finally, there are the two approaches that will be of central importance in this
chapter as well as informing the analysis in the chapter to come. The first of these is
psychoanalysis, which describes the primordially bifurcated or split nature of subjectivity,
94
and the subject's need of an object, an Other, against which to define its subjectivity.
Although psychoanalytic theory grew out of the work of Freud, the generally
acknowledged founder of its many contemporary strands is the eccentric French critic
Jacques Lacan, whose writings - half governed by the strict logical processes of
mathematics, and half filtered through the creative and highly subjective lenses of poetic
language - are at once numinous and pragmatic.
The second key approach is queer theory, a methodology that grew out of early
academic work in LGBT studies, eventually turning a critical gaze on the normalizing
tendencies of subjectivity itself, which queer theorists view as both binary and hierarchical
and, therefore, inherently heterosexist in its formulation (with a heteromasculinist subject-
position and an always feminized and queered Other). For queer theorists, the normative is
always suspect, and the ideal of resistance to the norm has been enshrined as a verb: to
'queer' anything - whether a reading of a particular representation, another theoretical
approach, a discussion, a conference (or a non-academic event), or even the normative
aspects of institutionalized LGBT studies - is to challenge the norms governing those
things, interrogating them for their conservative and hegemonic politics, and insinuating
into their discourses other possibilities that depart from the norms (much as queer
identities depart from heterosexist norms). The counterhegemonic act of queering is the
ultimate objective of queer-theoretical scholarship, which seeks to provide new possibilities
for subjectivity and subject-positions.
But how do we become subjects in the first place? There are essentially two major
premises that address this matter in contemporary theory. The first, interpellation, comes
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from Louis Althusser, a French structuralist critic perhaps best known for his notion of
Ideological State Apparatuses.' His concept of interpellation is also in wide circulation,
however, including as an underlying principle in the writings of Slavoj Zitek. The classic and
often repeated metaphor for interpellation (provided by Althusser himself) is the moment
in which someone walking down the street hears someone else call, "Hey, you there!" The
person walking along then turns around and, in that moment of turning, becomes a
subject, since she recognizes (or assumes) that the hailing she heard was intended for her
and her alone. This utterance instantaneously calls the person who was, a moment before,
walking along alone, into a certain fully formed relationship with the one who called to
them, and it is a relationship structured by ideological exchange, in short, it is subjectiVity.
Moreover, Althusser stresses the ideological nature of this hailing/ this interpellation into
subjectivity, noting that "what thus seems to take place outside ideology ... in reality takes
place in ideology" so that I/[w]hat really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take
place outside of it" (Althusser 163). According to AJthusser, this is why we all tend to
believe ourselves (falsely) to be outside of ideology - almost always conceived of, in the
subjective conceit of independence, as the trap occupied by some other poor sap. In fact,
there is nothing outside ideology, in Althusser's formulation of subjectivity, which means
that lIindividuals are always-already subjects" (163, emphasis original). While this may seem
1 Ideological State Apparatuses (or ISAs) are "a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer
in the form of distinct and specialized institutions" (Althusser1998). Althusser proceeds to name such examples as educational
ISAs (system of public and private schools), family ISA, religious ISA (system of different religious institutions), etc. What
distinguishes this concept from similar ones [e.g., Foucault's 'discourses'} is that ISAs represent the infrastructure of ideology,
conceived of as a vast network of power structures that mostly exist within the private domain. In other words, what at first
appears to be diverse networks of ISAs, each with its own projects, aliiSAs are ultimately united under the single ruling ideology
of the current ruling class. ISAs are an excellent example of Althusser's unique blending of theories of capital and of subjectiVity,
which is pertinent to his notion of interpellation as well.
2 Althusser takes a post-Marxist view of 'ideology,' understanding It not as 'false consciousness' (which would imply the presence
of a 'real consciousness') but as all consciousness, which is inherently false, since any consciousness is subjective and is
therefore always already imbued with the interpellating propensities of power.
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counterintuitive, given the concept of interpellation, Althusser intends for interpellation to
describe not a singular moment of becoming a subject, but the fact of our existence as
subjects within ideological apparatuses that have a fully material existence, shaping not just
ideas and conceptions but practices and modes of living (155-64). Interpellation is a hailing
into subjectivity that has always already occurred (Le., from the moment we enter the
symbolic order), and which we cannot escape.
Interpellation is often confused (and at times used as if interchangeable) with the
Foucauldian notion of 5ubjectivation, which describes the process of becoming a subject as
understood and used within Foucauldian theory. In particular, Foucault's version of the
process of becoming a subject has to do with the ways that subjectiVity is conditioned by
disciplinary power, that is, by the forces that at once atomize and taxonomize individuated
aspects of our experiences, bodies, and worlds, and then group them together to create
'fictitious unities' upon which subjectivity depends. An important aspect of disciplinary
power after the Enlightenment is its internalization into the 'inside' of subjectivity, such
that any given subject is conditioned to self-disciplining and a kind of internal surveillance
by which social norms are enforced in the interior of subjectiVity itself (Le., rather than from
some external authority, such as a political or religious authority) (Allen 2-16). In particular,
"Foucault's genealogical works of the 1970S aim to show that disciplinary, normalizing
relations of power form, for us, the 'without' from which the 'within' of the modern subject
is constituted" (Allen 16).
In some ways, then, it is understandable that interpellation and subjectivation could
be confused, since both notions of the conditions of the subject klvolve an understanding
of the ways in which 'individual' subjects are constituted entirely within the reach of the
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extant power structures in which their subjectivities arise, and by means internal to the
subject itself. Nevertheless, Althusserian interpellation emphasizes the ideological control
over subjectivity, while Foucauldian subjectivation emphasizes the disciplinary forces that
occasion subjectivity - a subtle but meaningful distinction. Still, the two concepts are not
mutually exclusive; in fact, the work of Zizek proceeds from the assumption that both
Althusser's and Foucault's observations are useful innovations in the Lacanian tradition of
subjectivity. For Zizek, subjectivity is a condition fraught with ethical and political
dilemmas, but also one that includes some promise of mitigating the lopsided distributions
of power in normative subject/object (Self/Other) relationships. Before we can fully engage
with Zizek's innovations, though, it is necessary to examine the key aspects of Lacanian
theory upon which his work builds, as well as some of the critical responses to Lacan - in
particular, some of the feminist responses.
Queering Subjectivity: Zizek, Cultural Studies and the End(s) of the Other
Zizek's prolific body of work pushes Lacanian theory toward the possibility of agency or
action that is not entirely overdetermined by the schism-producing propensities of
interpellation and subjectivation, while also keeping alive a sense of the awesome power of
the symbolic order. Zizek's influences are numerous and include such disparate sources as
German idealism, Foucauldian theory, the work of Althusser and of other (neo-)Marxists,
Maoism and, of course, Lacan. In fact, Zizek himself has written that Uthe core of [his]
entire work is to endeavor to use Lacan as a priVileged intellectual tool to reactualize
German Idealism" (Zizek, uPreface" iX). For Zizek, the postmodern obsession with the
displacement of identity and of subjectivity is merely one manifestation of Uthe tacit
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acceptance of global capitalism as 'the only game in town'" (ix). Therefore, Zizek is highly
critical of what he sees as a self-congratulating trend in postmodern scholarship that
assumes a cynical stance toward the 'truth' or the 'reaL' While he concurs with the majority
of contemporary critics that there is no way to access whatever might be 'real' or 'true,' he
does not agree that the hermetically sealed character of subjectivity legitimates 'throwing
out the baby with the baby water.' Instead, in his view, such scholarly methodologies as
deconstruction and Habermasian approaches represent an uncritical stance that "rather
exhibits the unreadiness to come to terms with the truly traumatic core of the modern
subject" (ix), trading any hope of a critical examination of the processes of interpellation
and subjectivation for a project that indulges in a circular skepticism, which runs something
like this:
This representation claims to be true.
Of course, we know that this claim to truth is false, as a/l representation is artifice.
Knowing this, we are able to demonstrate how this representation is intended to
affect us.
To reveal how this representation intends to affect us is to represent the truth about
this representation.
For Zizek, this line of thinking proceeds as if subjectivity were merely a matter of
representation and not, as he avers, both the site of representation and the material effects
of its practices. In this way, Zizek (much like Foucault and Althusser3) seeks to straddle the
division between the materialism of Marxist and structuralist traditions and the idealism of
poststructuralist approaches - a project for which he relies heavily on the theoretical
contributions of Lacan (viii-x).
3 Foucault discusses 'biopower,' the ways in which discursivities shape biological realities by means of their material effects, as
well as mechanisms of power in and through which such effects are controlled and disciplined (Foucault, History 140). Althusser
discusses Ideological State Apparatuses (ISM), described earlier.
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There are a number of key Lacanian concepts and precepts of importance for Zizek,
including: the paradoxical relationship between representation, which is our only means of
accessing ourselves as subjects, and the Real 4 (including the 'real' person interpellated as
the subject), which can never be fully represented and, thus, never accessed; the discursive
nature of subjectivity and of any understanding of the body or other material things; the
role of desire and the subjective necessity of the Other; the negative nature of identity (and
its corollary, the impossibility of self-identity); and the melancholic attachment of the
subject to its lack (that is, to the Other). Lacan's work provides a particularly useful
reservoir of conceptual and theoretical grist for Zizek precisely because Zizek is, like Lacan,
committed to a critical investigation of the necessarily fractured nature of subjectivity even
while proposing ways to move the subject toward greater degrees of freedom from its
predicament (i.e., for Lacan, melancholic attachment; for Zizek, political unawareness). In
short, Zizek remains committed to the process of psychoanalysis as interpretation and
'treatment,'S and not just as a useful theoretical model.
In many ways, Lacan's understanding of subjectivity runs parallel to that of other
theorists of representation and the representational nature of subjectivity. Like many of
these other theorists, Lacan picks up the strands of linguistic theory from Ferdinand de
Saussure and his successors, but Lacan differs from other theorists in two important ways:
First, he views language as completely constitutive of all sUbjective knowledge, such that
4 Lacan employed a three-category system involving the Real (the 'reality' that cannot be accessed because it exists only outside
of language), the Symbolic (the realm of representation in and through which subjectivity is possible) and the Imaginary (the
realm that interacts with the Symbolic and that governs the 'mirror stage' of identity development - the stage in which the child
begins to create a divided and complex identity, named after the metaphor of self-recognition in a mirror) (Sarup 24-6).
s Neither Lacan nor Zizek take a clinical approach to 'treatment,' however, as both scholars are more Interested in using
psychoanalytic methodologies to treat social issues on a larger scale (Sarup 5-6; Johnson xiii-xvi).
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"[t]here is no subject independent of language" (Sarup 10, emphasis original). Thus, he
differs from Saussure as well, since, for Lacan, there is no such thing as metalanguage; all
language is representation, including even language used to discuss subjectivity or to
engage in psychoanalysis. Second, Lacan maintains that every signifier always signifies yet
another signifier, such that "no word is free from metaphoricity" (10). This observation
implies that, not only are all the signs in a linguistic system entirely dependent on one
another, and on the differences between them, in order for their meaning to inhere; all the
siginifers are also dependent on one another throughout the system of signification. To the
extent, then, that the identity of any individual subject is itself a kind of complex signifier,
we can see that Lacan's position will include a notion of identity as a metaphor, as always
referring to something other than 'itself' (10-12). This is not to say, however, that identity is
not 'real,' since representations have very definite consequences; indeed, for Zizek, in
particular, these consequences are not only discursive, but material as well. Instead, the
metaphorical nature of identity reveals its negative property; identity, like other signifiers,
can only come to have meaning by way of contrast with and negation from other identities.
Or, to put it differently, the site of identity is not coincidental with subjectivity but arises,
instead, in the spaces between various differing subjectivities.6 Thus, we are, in an
important sense, not ourselves. Lacan also made this point in his updating of the Cartesian
cogito from 'I think, therefore Iam' to "I think where Iam not, therefore Iam where Ido
not think" (Lacan 166). Moreover, Lacan's refocusing of subjectivity from a purely mental
6 Indeed, critics such as Homi Bhabha have elaborated on this observation extensively. In his landmark work The Location of
Culture (1994), Bhabha deploys the metaphor of the interstitial to describe the location in which cultural differences and, thus,
differences in identities, arise. Using the imagery of the stairwell as a location situated between identities, Bhabha notes that
"[t] he hither and thither of the stairwell, the temporal movement and passage that it allows, prevents identities at either end of
it from settling into primordial polarities" (4). Bhabha's theoretical elaboration of subjectivity emphasizes "the overlap and
displacement of domains of difference," providing a metonymical model for the complex sites of subjective identification (2).
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process to one propelled by interpellation, necessitated a further updating of the cogito's
emphasis on II think' to a new emphasis on II desire' (Roudinesco 56).
Desire is a structuring feature of Lacanian subjectivity, initiated during the mirror
stage, when the child both desires the mother and imagines itself to be desired by the
mother, to stand in for her lack (Le., in Lacan, the lack of the phallus, which is the 'Law of
the Father'). Once the Oedipal crisis occurs, however, and the child enters the symbolic
order, desire loses its precise focus on the mother and becomes the desire to resolve one's
own lack, to reverse the irreversible splitting of the subject that is required for participation
in the symbolic order (splitting apart the Ireal' self, the imaginary self, and the various
symbolic selves, or self-representations, used by any particular subject). Desire is also the
desire for the Other, since part of what constitutes the Self is negated and externalized in
the Other. Moreover, desire is directed at a need that can never be fulfilled, since the
subject's identity is entirely dependent upon the ongoing differentiation between the Self
and the Other. Ironically, this also means the subject will come to desire desire itself, since
desire will come to serve as a substitute for the thing desired.? Thus, the chain of subjective
desire looks something like this:
lack - the phallus - the Other - desire 'itself'
Because desire can never be fully satisfied, too, the subject develops an attachment to the
primordial loss it has suffered, the remains of which are externalized in the Other. Lacan
calls this the melancholic attachment (melancholic because it is an attachment to
something irretrievably lost). This melancholic attachment is often directed toward the
7 Indeed, it is precisely the attachment to desire itself that much of psychoanalysis seeks to uncover.
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Other as well, since the Other contains all that the subject is not, and it is, therefore, the
very site of what the subject lacks (Lacan; Sarup 20-6).
For Zizek, melancholy is not only a kind of faithfulness of the subject to the lost
object (as in Lacan), but also "the attachment to the very originary gesture of its loss"
(Zitek, "History" 660). Melancholy is the deeply rooted need for a central, foundational
loss at the center of subjective identity, for a placeholder to fill the void that is the
structuring principle of subjectivity. In this sense, melancholy is intricately interwoven into
the fabric of subjective desire: the cause of desire is not the desired object, but the
(imaginary) feature or trait on account of which the subject desires the object. Tellingly,
one of Zitek's examples of melancholic attachment is homosexuality as a melancholic
clinging ('arrested development') to a particular stage of sexual development. But, as Zitek
notes, the notion of the homosexual subject's 'nostalgia' for a utopian state of pre- or non-
heterosexual identity is not the issue so much as the use of this notion of arrested
development for the ongoing maintenance of the fragile borders of heterosexist logic. Of
course, for Zizek, this notion is not just an idea or a representation of the queer; it has
material consequences in the lived experiences of those who identify as queer.
One of the primary ways in which the symbolic order has material effects is
anamorphosis, the misrecognition of an object in such a way that the very material (lived)
reality of the object is distorted and the subjective gaze is "inscribed into its objective
features" (Zitek, "History" 659). By way of providing an example, Said's discussion of
Orientalism and its effects is again useful here. Said notes that the powerful discursivity of
Orientalism created, or 'Orientalized' the material realities of the peoples and geographies
of what Europeans called the Orient. In this sense, the Orient is the anamorphic object of
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Europe, literally embodying European desires and prerogatives. More importantly, though,
for Zitek, is that the void of desire is not only paradoxically emblematized in an
anamophosized object, but that the opposite paradox is also true: Uthis primordial void or
lack itself functions only insofar as it is embodied in a particular object; it is the object that
keeps the gap of desire open" (663). In other words, the gap of desire, the process of
objectification, requires that the subject come to rest upon (or against) a particular
anamorphosized object in order for the subject's subjectivity to remain closed, complete,
symptomatic. Anamorphosis is at work in the example of the monstrous Other, for
example, since the very body of the monster is, as Cohen indicates, inscribed with and
shaped by the subjective processes of the human subject. By analyzing the ways in which
particular monstrous Others embody the 'gap of desire' in human subjectivity, then, we can
uncover the symptomatic nature of the human and critically examine its non-neutral
boundaries, as well as their effects on lived experiences. In this way, Zitek's formulation of
the concept of anamorphosis provides us with a powerful tool with which to investigate
the coimbrication of discursivity and its material effects; it represents one of Zitek's most
productive elaborations of Lacanian theory.
In addition to Zitek's work, Lacan's theorizations of subjectivity and of desire have
been the ingress for a wide variety of critical applications and responses. Feminist scholars,
for example, have engaged in a longstanding love-hate relationship with Lacan, finding
incredible value, at times, in his description of the unmistakably gendered nature of
identity-formation (that is, the relationships between subjectivity and sexuality) as well as
his commentary on desire, but also lamenting his uncritical maintenance of Freud's
(hetero)sexist notions of the phallus and the Oedipus complex, and the elitism of his style
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of writing (Luepnitz 221-2; Sarup 27). Still, as Deborah Luepnitz (2003) has argued, feminism
and Lacanian psychoanalysis 'need' each other, since psychoanalysis helps feminist critics
theorize subjectivity without resorting to a pure materialism, while feminism provides a
way to critique the misogynist underpinnings of psychoanalysis (234-5). Indeed, Luepnitz
summarizes the position of many feminists - both those who love to hate Lacan, and those
who hate to love him - when she states that "[w]e have reason to hope that provocative
contact between them will continue to enhance the powers of feminism and
psychoanalysis both to liberate, and to question" (235). Zitek is also interested in salvaging
the Iiberatory potential of Lacan's work, though his approach is more like what cultural-
studies scholar Rey Chow calls an 'interventionary tactic.'
In Writing Diaspora (1993), Rey Chow formulates a compelling indictment of
cultural-studies scholarship on China, noting in particular its inability to do more than define
and give value to the subjectivity of scholars of Chinese culture. At the crux of this
indictment is the (Freudian and Lacanian) notion of the symptom as it was re-worked by
Zitek in his 1990 essay on Roberto Rossellini's films. In Zitek's formulation, the symptom is
"a particular signifying formation which confers on the subject its very ontological
consistency, enabling it to structure its basic, constitutive relationship towards enjoyment
(jouissance) ..." (Zitek, "Rossellini" 21, emphasis original). The symptom is, then, a
particular elaboration of the notion of the Other, with an emphasis on the psychological
dimensions of a subjectivity predicated on the existence of the Other and of that Other's
fundamental, irreconcilable difference from the subject. Thus, "'[w ]oman is the symptom
of man' means that man himself exists only through woman qua his symptom: his very
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ontological consistency depends on, is 'externalized' in, his symptom" (Zitek, "Rossellini"
21).
Chow makes interesting and provocative use of the concept of symptom,
transposing it into her discussion of scholarship on China. The relationship is indicative of
what Chow calls an "Oedipal structure of thinking" in which subjectivity is theorized as
"compensation for a presumed lack" (Chow 31). 'China' is everything that the (western)
sinologist can never be, the not-all, and, thus, the subjectivity of 'sinologist' is predicated
upon an attempted compensation for that lack. Whatever form that lack is presumed to
take, there is a corresponding form of compensation for sinologist-subjectivity: the form of
romanticization of the Chinese 'native' or 'culture' (i.e., in contrast with the sinologist's - or
her culture's -lack of 'authenticity' or 'nativeness'), or the form of a rescue of the Chinese
native or culture from its lack (Le., as non-western, voiceless object on behalf of which the
sinologist can speak). Thus, scholarship on China is a closed symbolic field in which all
potential approaches by (western)8 sinologists must attempt to compensate for some
immutable gap between sinologist-as-subject and China-as-object, if the possibility of being
a sinologist is to persist. 'China,' in short, is the symptom of sinology (and of sinologists).
Chow's interventionary tactic, then, in the 'postcolonial debates' in cultural studies
is significant in its insight into the symptomatic condition of cultural studies, namely, the
condition in which any cultural-studies scholar must address the lack - the gap - between
her subjective position as scholar of a particular culture and the (objectifying) position of
that culture-object on which the scholar's subjectivity as scholar is predicated. This
8 Much of Chow's work in Writing Diaspora addresses the conundrums faCing the displaced Chinese scholar of China who
resides in and works from the west (i.e., and not just the western sinologist). Chow's treatment of the diasporic scholar is
important but not of particular interest for me in this discussion, in which the general condition of cultural studies is the
central concern.
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condition is widely recognized and discussed in cultural-studies (anthropological,
comparative-literature, folkloric, etc.) scholarship, conferences, and classrooms, and there
are a variety of ways in which compensation is attempted, including: extensive language
training in the culture's 'native' language, residence in the country or geographic area in
which the culture originates (e.g., participant observation), and gestures of 'inclusiveness'
and 'cultural sensitivity' that typically take the form of caveats strewn through the
introductory remarks or footnotes of a paper or lecture, though greater collaborations
exist.
Merely noting the presence of the lack, however, does not compensate for it.
Indeed, as Lisa Freinkel notes, unveiling the symptomatic condition simply serves to
perpetuate it by heightening the anxieties and neuroses that already serve to keep it in
place.9 Freinkel's temptation is to conclude that cultural studies is ineffectual, since any
attempts to mitigate the (oppressive, colonial, sexist, etc.) functions of the symbolic order
simply reinforce the need for that order. This is a profoundly pessimistic stance within the
metatheory of cultural studies, as it abandons even the spirit of a progressive politics in
favor of a less politically engaged scholarship that accepts its impotence to intervene in
(the politics of) the symbolic order.
But Freinkel's position is not the only or necessary conclusion about cultural studies
that can be drawn from an acknowledgment of its symptomatic condition. Instead, the
growing revelation of the full extent of cultural-studies scholarship's symptomatic
condition can lead to a quite opposite stance in which the closedness of the symbolic order
9 In a presentation to the "Introduction to Graduate Studies in Comparative Literature" course at the University of Oregon,
on November 9,2001, Freinkel discussed her understanding of Zizek's statement that an ideology succeeds when even the
ideas that seem to contradict it serve as arguments in its support. It is Freinkel's reading of this statement of Lizek's, and
not the statement itself, that interests me here.
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is taken precisely as a given condition, that is, as an inherited state that was never the only
way in which scholarship (or knowledge) could exist. In other words, the more often that
notions that seem to contradict an ideology serve to support it, the more possible it
becomes to trace out the full contours of the anxieties that fix that ideology, to analyze and
counter its symptomatic condition.
Zizek does not suggest, however, that we can simply remove ourselves from the
symbolic order in one final moment of ecstatic separation. Instead, near the end of his
article on Rossellini's films (1990), Zizek discusses what he sees as an alternative to the
symptomatic subjectivity of the symbolic order. Specifically, he addresses Lacan's notion of
'subjective destitution,' the withdrawal of the subject from the Other. In Lacan, subjective
destitution is idealized in the act of suicide, in which the subject sacrifices the self in order
to liberate the Other from the constraints of the subject's symptomatic condition. Zizek
calls for a different understanding of the term, however, which "is not an act of sacrifice
(which always implies the Other as its addressee), but an act of abandonment that
sacrifices sacrifice" (Zizek, "Rossellini" 43). In other words, Zizek suggests a 'symbolic
suicide' in which the subject relinquishes its hold on the Other, giving up its stake in the
Other as its symptom, its 'not-all.' Zizek notes that "[t]he freedom attained by the act is
the very opposite of this last [a freedom from censorship, or a complete psychosis]: by
undergoing it, all the burden falls back upon the subject, since he renounces any support in
the Other" (Zizek, "Rossellini" 44).
Thus, subjectiVity becomes a more complex process than the mere act of speaking,
of taking up a place in the symbolic order in contradistinction to the symptom, which
cannot speak. With this new tactic, as in Marilyn Friedman's (1991) "social conception of
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the self," all subjectivity is tentative and must be drawn out by way of reference to multiple
coordinates; there is no Other or foundational opposition, only diverse others and an array
of constantly changing, amorphous differences. The subject is responsible for its own
multifarious subjectivity without an easy object/ive realm for reference. In short,
subjectivity is replaced with intersubjectivity, a process of constant re-negotiation of
alliances and points of departure.
Chow, too, suggests a dis-location from the easy geography of the symbolic order in
her section on "The Dissolute Woman and the Female Saint." Discussing XU Xiaodan's
refusal to present herself as either one of the two primary feminine genders in China, Chow
notes that "[i]nstead of speaking from the position of 'minority,' ... [Xiaodan] offers a
model which by its very impure nature defies the epistemic violence underlying the
perpetual dependence of the 'minor' on the center" (Chow 113). Xiaodan's embracing of an
intersubjective positionality that encompasses both virtuous and dissolute femininities
allows her "a freedom from the mutual reinforcement between education and morality,"
knowledge and the symptomatic condition (Chow 113, emphasis original). Xiaodan's acts
do not fail to carry meaning (as the acts of Lacan's psychotic, in his 'subjective destitution'
would); rather, their meaning relies upon multiple - even contradictory - referents that,
considered interdependently, escape the narrow logic of the binary opposition between
'good' and 'bad' Chinese women.
Based upon this understanding of intersubjectivity as an interventionary tactic in
the symbolic order, Chow extrapolates a related tactic for the use of cultural-studies
scholars. She notes that the time is past for scholarship that continues to rely on simplistic,
symptomatic identifiers like 'women' and 'third world' without careful consideration of the
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scholar's own relationship to these notions, as well as some attention to the specific
localities of experience with/in these monolithic constructions. Instead, /lit remains for ...
intellectuals to face up to their truthful relation to these 'objects of study' behind which
they can easily hide - as voyeurs, as 'fellow victims,' and as self-appointed custodians"
(Chow 119). In other words, the scholar can no longer write about a culture-object without
attention to her own (and her culture's) relationship to that subject-of-study, traced out
along multiple axes of interrelated concerns (differences of class, gender, religion,
language, race/ethnicity, and culture, to name but a few).
I am proposing, following Zizek, that we can begin to deploy within the symbolic a
model of intersubjectivity in which the difference between the scholar-subject and her
subject-of-study is not (or less) foundational in their definition. In this new model, it is not a
lack or gap that defines subjects (in both senses of the word), but rather the overlaps,
moments of contiguity, and a fundamental acceptance of the existence of many quite
mutable, transitory, and unknowable differences between the two-an acceptance of the
necessary ontological inconsistency of all subject positions. What I am proposing, in short,
is an interventionary tactic in the symbolic order that directly counters its foundational
heterosexism. This proposal finds ample support in Zizek's work.
Having himself been a student of Lacan's, Zizek defends his teacher's seemingly
antifeminist proclamation that "woman is a symptom of man" by drawing a comparison
between Lacan's formulation of the symptom and Freud's. Of particular interest for Zizek
is the logical if radical conclusion in the writings of Otto Weininger of Freud's theorization
of the symptom as compromise-formation. In Freud's symptom, lithe subject gets back, in
the form of a ciphered message, the truth about his desire, the truth that he was unable to
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confront" (Zizek, "Rossellini" 20). In Weininger's amplification of Freud's "symptom,"
woman becomes nothing more than a materialization of man's sin, an embodiment of his
lack and, thus, his desire; Weininger's application of Freud's formulation of the symptom
reveals, in grotesque exaggeration, its underlying sexism (20).
By way of contrast, Zizek characterizes Lacan's formulation of the symptom as
nearly the opposite of Freud's, for in Lacan's treatment, "man literally ex-sists: his entire
being lies 'out there,' in woman. Woman, on the other hand, does not exist, she insists,
which is why she does not come to be through man only" (Zizek, "Rossellini" 21, emphases
original). Thus, woman's existence lies partially outside the symbolic order, and the order's
sole purpose is to ensure the ontological consistency of 'man' as the subject position in and
through which it operates. For Zizek, who clearly holds some disdain for the sexist
character of the symbolic order, Lacan's allowance for the existence of woman as the 'not-
all' - as nothing with/in the symbolic order and, thus, as all that is beyond it - is at worst a
neutral position on gender politics and, in light of Zizek's view of the symbolic order as
suspect, perhaps a somewhat feminist position (20-1).
Feminist or not, however, Lacan's position that woman taken 'in herself,' without
reference to her relation to man, embodies the death-drive, follows Freud's formulation
completely in one very significant respect: both formulations assume a complete and
immutable difference between 'woman' and 'man' - object and subject - with/in the
symbolic order. From this basic assumption, both Freud's and Lacan's formulations
proceed to work within the narrowly circumscribed possibilities of a symbolic order in
which subjects and objects are entirely separable, even though the object is implicated in
the subject as its Other. This limitation is heterosexism, the theoretical assumption
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(ideology) that there are two and only two, 'opposite' sexes, and that the difference
between them is singular, absolute, and indicative of their 'natural' relationship to each
other. Heterosexism is intrinsic in the symbolic order precisely because that order is the
linguistic and cultural encoding of meaning in western cultures; it might just as easily be
referred to as the heteropatriarchal order, since its enforcement of subjectivity as the
experience of 'man' simultaneously bolsters the experiential superiority of men and the
irrefutable difference between women and men - indeed, the two concepts are entirely
interdependent.
As a queer man, I have often been frustrated by the intellectual acrobatics that
theorists like Lacan and Zizek (and rea Ily all Lacanian theorists) perform in order to work
with/in the heteropatriarchal order even while assuming a more or less critical stance about
that order's historically poor treatment of women. For me, these leaps of logic are doubly
suspect: Lacanian theory first requires me to believe that women, as women, can never be
subjects in the symbolic order, that is, that their subjectivity is always achieved by way of a
denial of their status as women, a kind of filtering of their experience through the chain of
knowledge-desire-Iack that dominates the subjectivity of 'man'; second, it requires that I
overlook completely the differences between heterosexual and queer male experiences, as
if all of my own experiences, too, are reducible to a fundamental experience of separation
from (the) mother, a loss of the primordial feminine that constitutes the first moment of
(male) heterosexual desire. That queer men like myself are often or even usually forced by
the heterosexist limitations of the symbolic order to experience our subjectivities as a sub-
genre of male heterosexuality does not preclude the possibilities of other ways of
experiencing it. Indeed, its very existence poses a problem for the symbolic order about
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which Lacanian and Freudian theory have only very implausible elucidations (arrested
development, primordial bisexuality, etc.).
The problem that I have identified here as the heterosexist limitations of the
symbolic order and the notion of the symptom is closely related to what Chow identifies as
the problem of cultural authenticity ('nativeness') and the notion of the nation. For
example, Chow discusses "[0]ur fascination with the native, the oppressed, the savage, and
all such figures" as " a desire to hold on to an unchanging certainty somewhere outside our
own 'fake' experience," " a desire for being 'non-duped,' which is a not-too-innocent desire
to seize control" (Chow 53). Sinologists and other cultural-studies scholars need the native
in order to be non-duped because we are attempting to counter the native-as-symptom by
a simple inversion, by making the native the one with the authentic knowledge and, thus,
the real subjectiVity. This move is not unlike Zizek's manipulation of Lacanian theory to
position woman outside the constraints of the symbolic order, over and apart from
(hetero)sexism. We want to save women and natives from the violence done to them by
the symbolic order, but our efforts fail because "[d]efilement and sanctification belong to
the same symbolic order," because the saving of a particular subjectiVity requires that it is
first endangered - that it is already the symptom of the subject (54). Thus, despite the
usefulness of Zizekian approaches to psychoanalytic theory - including its points of contact
with and departure from cultural-studies models like those of Chow - this work alone does
not provide a sufficient methodological basis for addressing the symptomaticity of
heterosexist subjectivity.
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And Now, for Something Completely Different:
Strassburg Digs Up Queer, Undead Cyborgs
Over the past few decades, 'queer' has become a much contested, often misunderstood,
and rather frequently volleyed term in loosely related scholarly work that has come to be
known as queer theory. Spanning the humanities and social sciences, queer theory -
though it cannot be categorically sealed - tends to take as its point-of-departure the
assumption that sexual and gender binaries (homosexual/heterosexual, female/male,
feminine/masculine, etc.) are discursive constructions that have little or no basis in biology
and instead exist to serve political ends. Queer theory goes beyond simply affirming the
social and cultural experiences of lesbians, gay men, transgender people, and others whose
gender and/or sexual identities fail to conform to the naturalized norms of sexist and
heterosexist societies; it also seeks to destabilize and reproach those norms and the
processes by which they are naturalized. Over time, the focus of queer theory has shifted
to larger and broader 'registers' of the normative, and the specific epistemological and
political projects of queer theory are applied to social issues that are not directly related to
LGBT communities. Although this work takes on increasingly broad aspects of social and
cultural norms, there is an undeniable trace of what we might call a queer stance in all
queer-theoretical work. Nevertheless, the term's definition has grown increasingly elusive.
One queer theorist who has provided a fairly lucid explanation of the term 'queer' is
Alexander Doty, whose work in Making Things Perfectly Queer (1993) highlights the
counterhegemonic projects that many queer theorists undertake in embracing the once
derogatory epithet. Doty is quick to point out that 'queer' is intended to be more than a
new, inclusive 'umbrella term' for such extant identity-markers as 'bisexual,' 'gay,' and
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'transsexual.' In fact, this conception of inclusivity, which was deployed without much
success by the now-defunct activist group Queer Nation, has been rightly criticized for its
failure to be inclusive of people who cannot simply choose to be non-assimilationist in daily
life activities, in short, for its racist, c1assist, ableist, and sexist tendencies. lO
For Doty, a better understanding of 'queer' proceeds from the works of Teresa de
Lauretis, Judith Butler and Sue-Ellen Case and asserts that "queerness is something that is
ultimately beyond gender-it is an attitude, a way of responding, that begins in a place not
concerned with, or limited by, notions of a binary opposition of male and female or the
homo versus hetero paradigm usually articulated as an extension of this gender binarism"
(xv). From this perspective, the presence of the queer in literary and other texts (and
contexts) does not depend upon the presence of LGBT themes or characters; as a reading
style, a positionality, a posture, an outlook, and a sensibility, the queer is potentially present
in (response to) a wide array of texts not clearly addressing LGBT concerns. 'Queer'simply
does not equate to 'LGBT.'
Doty goes on to elaborate that his purpose in adopting such a working definition of
'queer' is to "recapture and reassert a militant sense of difference" and to view the
erotically and sexually marginal as the potential locus of both resistance and "'radical
openness and possibilitylll (3).11 Following Case, Doty notes that this notion of 'queer' is
less about gender and sexuality than it is about the ontological politics of the symbolic
order itself (5). As such, Doty develops queer readings of texts as diverse as Laverne and
10 In addition, E. J. Rand (zo04) has pointed out that the very use of the term 'queer' by the organization Queer Nation
exposes the contradictions inherent in that organization's mission, since 'queer' signifies difference and multiplicity, while
'nation' signifies sameness and unity (303-4). In the end, this contradictory attempt to create a unity out of real differences
(e.g., the political causes of lesbians versus those of gay men) may have been the key to Queer Nation's demise.
11 The final phrase in this sentence is from bell hooks (1990), quoted in Doty.
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Shirley, Batman Returns, and the media coverage of Paul Reubens' arrest for masturbating
in an adult theater in Sarasota, Florida. Doty's retooling of 'queer' at once allows for the
application of queer theory in contexts far wider than what might be fairly termed 'LGBT
studies' and positions queerness as a fulcrum against which textual and other forms of
criticism may be radically opened to possibilities beyond binarism.
Published in the same year as Doty's work, Judith Butler's Gender Trouble (1993)
provides a thorough, if theoretically dense, critique of heteronormativity, or what she calls
the 'heterosexual matrix' (Butler, Trouble 35-78). Butler closely follows Lacanian theory,
demonstrating how the concurrence of sexuality and subjectiVity creates the "literalizing
fantasy" by which the body comes to be read as a sign of the naturalness of one's gender
and sexual identities (70). In addition, Butler also demonstrates how both the heterosexual
incest taboo and the homosexual incest taboo serve in the construction of heterosexual
identity, reading the loss of homosexual desire as part of the subjective 'divide' identified
by Lacan:
The loss of the heterosexual object, argues Freud, results in the displacement of
that object, but not the heterosexual aim; on the other hand, the loss of the
homosexual object reqUires the loss of the object and the aim. In other words, the
object is not only lost, but the desire fully denied, such that "I never lost that person
and I never loved that person, indeed never felt that kind of love at all." The
melancholic preservation of that love is all the more securely safeguarded through
the totalizing trajectory of that denial. (69, emphasis original)
Because, then, homosexual desire is preserved within heterosexual identity as a
melancholic attachment to an originary loss, homosexuality serves as the symptom of
heterosexuality (in much the same way that the monstrous serves as the symptom of the
human). RealiZing this symptomatic nature of normative heterosexuality, Butler shifts the
focus of both feminist and queer-theoretical scholarship to an examination of the politics-
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at once representational and material/embodied - of the prohibitions and divisions that
guide the heterosexual matrix (72-8).
In terms of a theoretical model for approaching the politics of the heterosexual
matrix, Butler is interested in Foucault's work on sexuality, especially in The History of
Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction (1976), and particularly his observations about the
'productive' nature of sexual prohibitions and repression. Foucault is critical of what he
calls the 'repressive hypothesis,' that is, a commonsense notion that there has been an
extreme repression of sexual expression in western cultures since the nineteenth century,
peaking in the Victorian era, and necessitating the 'sexual revolutions' of the twentieth
century. From Foucauft's perspective, this notion is merely one form of the politics of
heteronormativity in the twentieth century, and it serves the primary purpose of
obfuscating the dynamics of the generation of knowledges about and power over
sexualities:
Rather than the uniform concern to hide sex, rather than the general prudishness of
language, what distinguishes these last three centuries is the variety, the wide
dispersion of devices that were invented for speaking about it, for having it be
spoken about, for indUcing it to speak of itself, for listening, recording, transcribing,
and redistributing what is said about it.... Rather than massive censorship,
beginning with the verbal proprieties of the Age of Reason, what was involved was
a regulated and polymorphous incitement to discourse. (Foucault, History 34).
In Butler's reading, this 'polymorphous incitement to discourse' means that repression
(that is, the heterosexual matriX) is actually a productive force that generates the diverse
array of sexual and gender identities found in any given culture. The repressive law of
subjectivity, then, "produces both sanctioned heterosexuality and transgressive
homosexuality," which means that "[b]oth are indeed effects, temporally and onto logically
later than the law itself, and the illusion of a sexuality before the law is itself a creation of
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that law" (Butler, Trouble 74, emphases original). This latter observation is important to
Butler because it demonstrates that effective efforts to subvert the paradigmatic status of
the heterosexual matrix cannot rely on notions of an originary character of homosexuality
and other forms of queer expression; indeed, there is no such thing as a prelinguistic or
presymbolic sexual identity any more than there is any other signifier that pre-exists
subjectivity (76-8).
Butler does locate a space for subversive efforts, however, in the nexus between a
psychoanalytic understanding of sexual identity and the notion of sexual identity as
performative.12 Peformativity implies a situation in which constant reiteration of gender
and sexual cues is compulsory:
In the place of an original identification which serves as a determining cause,
gender identity might be reconceived as a personal/cultural history of received
meanings subject to a set of imitative practices which refer laterally to other
imitations and which, jointly, construct the illusion of a primary and interior
gendered self or parody the mechanism of that construction. (138)
It is in the latter possibility - the way in which imitation can parody the imitated model-
that Butler finds a possibility for subversive performances of gender and sexuality. Using
drag performance as a metaphor for performance-as-parody, Butler proposes that
performances can be subversive when they call too much attention to the machinations
required to maintain gender and sexual identities, and pull back the wizard's curtain on the
supplement, the excess content left over after gender identities are deployed. (This
supplement is, in fact, one way to track the symptomatic nature of identity-formation.)
12 Indeed, Butler's work is largely responsible for importing performance theory into gender studies and queer-theoretical
discourses. Her early work in Gender Trouble touched off heated intellectual debates about the extent to which gender is, in
fact, performative. Some feminist and queer-theoretical critics chastised Butler for entirely reducing gender and sexuality to
performance or discourse (see, for examples: Diseger 2008; Hekman 2008). In many ways, Butler has attempted to answer
such criticisms in her subsequent work, including Bodies That Matter (1993), which appeared shortly after Gender Trouble, and
the more recent Undoing Gender (2004), though the dates of her critics cited here demonstrate that such debates are ongoing.
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l\Jevertheless, Butler does not posit an utter freedom to perform gendered and sexual
identities in any conceivable way; instead, she positions subversive agency in "the
possibility of a variation on [compulsory] repetition" (145). This reading of the
performative nature of sexual identity - much like the work of Zizek - maintains the totality
and inescapability of the symbolic order while also holding open a space for interpellated
subjects to act in ways that can intervene in the politics of that order, even if only to an
incremental extent.
Donna Haraway also addresses the possibilities for subversive intervention into the
politics of domination, though her work focuses on the figure of the cyborg. In her
"Cyborg Manifesto" (republished in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, 1991), Haraway proposes
that we adopt the model of the cybernetic organism (or cyborg) and its location in a
massive cyborgian network, in place of the discursively configured subject and its place in
the symbolic order. Haraway defines a cyborg as "a hybrid of machine and organism, a
creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction" (149). She readily acknowledges
the monstrous qualities of the cyborg, noting that her proposal will very likely be seen as
blasphemous by many contemporaneous critics (149). All the same, Haraway asks that we
acknowledge the already fully cybernetic character of life in the contemporary world, in
which "we are all chimeras" well represented by the figure of the cyborg because it "is a
condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres
structuring any possibility of historical transformation" (150). Indeed, there are three
specific reasons that Haraway cites for the value of adopting the cyborg as "our ontology"
(150): First, the cyborg makes an excellent model for the simultaneous enjoyment of
breaking boundaries (e.g., between human and monster) and a means of assuming
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responsibility for their ongoing creation. Second, the cyborg is a 'post-gender' creature
without the same kind of origin story that western subjectivity provides for gendered
subjects. Third, "[t]he cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy, and
perversity" (151) and free of the structuring polarities of normative subjectivity (e.g.,
public/private, mind/body, male/female) (150-1). Somehow escaping being overdetermined
by its troubled origins in capitalism and militarism (after all, it is, as Haraway notes,
"illegitimate offspring"), the cyborg is the possible site of a (post)subjectivity that is not
structured by the Law of the Father and not symptomatic in its fluid, hybrid, and always
unstable identities (151). Moreover, the cyborgian approach to feminist and other
progressive work generates a "powerful infidel heteroglossia" that is not (fully)
constrained by the limits of discursive representation because it is fully integrated into the
cybernetic (i.e., both organic/subjective and technological/material) circuitries of
postmodern life (181).
Swedish archaeologist Jimmy Strassburg (2000) adopts Harway's 'cyborgian'
writing style and methodological stance but blends it with an application of queer theory
that is heavily steeped in Butler and Foucault, though also influenced by the work of
Elizabeth Grosz in Volatile Bodies (1994).13 His main objective is to disengage the naturalism
and scientism that tend to dominate his field, importing the best aspects of the cultural
theory of the humanities and the 'softer' social sciences as a way of breathing new life into
what he sees as the dead-on-arrival world of archaeological research and theorizing
13 In particular, Strassburg concurs with Grosz that Butler and Foucault ultimately maintain the sex/gender distinction, even while
critiquing it, and that, given the equally constructed nature of both categories, there is really no need for the separation; 'sex'
should suffice to describe all gendered construction. However, Strassburg disagrees with Grosz that the theoretical path of
Butler and Foucault is "fruitless" (Strassburg 42). Instead, he seeks to reinvigorate a materialist applicability of Foucauldian and
Butlerian theory by way of a detour through Haraway's cyborgian approach (42-4).
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(Strassburg 3-7). To be fair, Strassburg clearly loves his discipline and is not interested in
displacing its materialistic methods, fieldwork, documentary styles, etc.; instead, his
interests, like those of Foucault and Lizek, lie in the ability of the social critic to examine at
once the linguistic or representational nature of subjective experience and the material
'realities' that both shape and are shaped by subjectivity. What he hopes for is a future
archaeology that still meticulously examines the material remains of the past, excavated
from sites occupied by historic and prehistoric peoples, but that also allows for a 'reading'
of such artifacts and their cultural milieu that is informed by what he calls a 'queer
cyborgian' approach to scholarship on culture and cultural phenomena (12-S). This practice
involves examining objects not just with an eye toward their 'traditions' and their roles
within normative instantiations of their cultural contexts, as is typical for archaeological
scholarship, but also with an eye toward the extranormative aspects of objects. In other
words, this practice is to work "with the assumption that there is a resisting aspect to
material culture, a diverse and sporadic anti-tradition at work within every tradition" (66).
For Strassburg, the cyborg is as much an intellectual stance as it is a metaphor for a
postsubjective state - or, rather, he seeks to introduce the postsubjective metaphor of the
cyborg into the work of the archaeologist. For his purposes, such a move acknowledges
the speciousness of the typical scientific stance, which aims for the most infallible,
definitive and 'complete' answer to every question of inquiry. By way of contrast, a
cyborgian approach embraces the messiness that Haraway describes, authorizing a
scholarly position that is multi-sited, un-disciplined, flexible, and dynamic (12). It is also an
accountable and intersubjective stance - one that acknowledges and assumes the
responsibility of the individual scholar both to her objects-of-study and to her own process
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of critical reflexivity. The cyborgian approach, therefore, brings the scholarly site of
representation out of the particular closet of material, bodily integrity, rejecting both the
kind of disembodied intellectual voice that Cartesian dualism empowers and its equally
flawed analogue of fully embodied discourse, which is often postured as antagonistic to
Cartesian ism even though both approaches assume an organic unity of embodiment.
According to Strassburg, one of the implications of this un-disciplined stance for
archaeology is that 'science fictions' - the particular kinds of representation employed in
the sciences - are no longer privileged as the one true form of knowledge but are, instead,
considered alongside other forms of representation. While the idea of involving
extrascientific discourses in archaeologica I work is not entirely new,14 Strassburg intends
for archaeologists to employ a hybrid (cyborgian) approach that is never completely settled
in the methodologies of any single discursive practice (12-3). This dis-location of inquiry, a
movement outwards from an intellectual core toward several, disparate discursive
positions, unsettles the privileged status of an authoritative discourse reliant on Cartesian
dualism, allowing for the consideration of multiple discourses without the promise of a one-
sided resolution into anyone of them. Moreover, this outwards movement retraces the
path of the Lacanian division of the subject, embracing the 'disembodied' aspects of
subjectivities ejected by the Law of the Father Into the Other. In other words, a multi-sited,
cyborgian intellectual approach allows the Other to 'speak' in and through scholarly inquiry,
drawing on perspectives normally banned from academic discourses. Such a practice can
elevate our knee-jerk fears of subjective dissolution, since we all fear being polluted by the
14 See, for example, Spector (1993). Spector's feminist archaeological practice includes a short story that she writes about a
young Wahpeton Dakota girl who would have been the sort of person to employ the awl found at the excavation site.
However, Spector still separates this story out from the rest of her study, maintaining the boundary between scientific and
extrascientific discourses - the very boundary that Strassburg seeks to undermine.
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Other, of allowing deviation with/in ourselves - in short, of "becoming half-ghost or half-
human" (30). Yet Strassburg proposes that we embrace this possibility of an 'undead'
positionality - not in the typical sense of a zombie but, instead, in the sense of embracing
the extent to which our lives are not our own - in order to counter the effects of
disidentification (the negative end of subjective formation) and recover access to
knowledges and experiences normally foreclosed to the interpellated subject (31-47).
Strassburg proceeds to explicate two key traits of this 'undead' intellectual
positioning, the first of which is the gender-liminal or queer status it invokes. Because such
a stance violates the dictates of normative subjectivity, it fails to comply with gender and
sexual norms as well, since subjectivity and sexuality are intimately linked. Strassburg
compares the queer character of the cyborgian stance with a variety of subpopulations
whose identities also place them outside normative subjectivity, including people with
disabilities, "magicians and spiritual specialists," and intersexual people, and he feels that a
queer cyborgian approach allies scholars with people whose (failed) subjectivities are
employed to maintain (ironically, at times, by crossing) boundaries that are untraversable
for those who enjoy normative identities (48).
Similarly, the 'undead' quality of the cyborgian stance also refers to notions of
kinship and bloodlines. Strassburg defines kinship as "the sociomoral struggle between
benevolent and malevolent undead," noting that both the 'dead' and the 'living' are
undead, in various ways (53). Deceased relatives are undead both because they can
continue to have benevolent or malevolent effects on the living (for example, during the
liminal period after death, or when dishonored by their living ancestors) and because they
live on in the literal embodiment (genes) of their living kin. On the other end of these
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bloodlines, the living, too, are the ongoing embodiment of the dead, whose genetic
material lives on in them, and this fact complicates their status as living. Therefore, "[t]o be
counted as 'living' is an achieved fac;ade of normativity" (53). Moreover, Strassburg also
notes that kinship, like identity, is a signifier and has the elasticity of all signifiers. It can
encompass both cognates (relatives in the same bloodline) and affines (people selected as
kin), and it can also serve as a metonym for other, equally ideologically loaded signifiers,
such as 'nation. ,15
Of course, Strassburg's theorization of the undead and of cyborgs could not be
more apropos for a critical investigation of the monstrous Other, particularly in the case of
representations in which the monster is permitted to speak, that is, to participate in the
symbolic order. To the extent that the monstrous Other contains cast-off elements of 'our'
own identities, it is linked with us via the technologies of subjectivity, a cybernetic network
of difficult and convoluted associations and disassociations. In addition, any serious
engagement with the monstrous Other brings us into close proximity with the undead
(ejected) aspects of 'ourselves,' the repression of which does not forestall but incite the
production of multifariously perverse new identities, the queer supplement left over after
normative subjectivity is carved out of the infinite possibilities of human experience. By
15 Indeed, Cohen (2006) also comments on the way that bloodlines may stand in for national, religious, ethnic and other
identities. He recounts the story of a young boy found wandering along by the river in Norwich, England, in 1230. The boy
insisted that he was a Jew, and two Jewish men came to claim him as one of their own. The woman who found him hesitated,
and while the two men went to get the sheriff, another woman recognized the boy and summoned his father, Benedict, who
claimed the boy. The boy then averred that Benedict was indeed his father, and it also became known that the boy had been
circumcised while in the company of the Jewish men. The case ended up making its way through local, royal and ecclesiastical
courts and, in the end, a number of local Jews were executed or banished. It turned out that Benedict was a former Jew who
had converted to Christianity, and the case touched off a sensational spectacle of confusion that Cohen contends is
irresolvable. In particular, the courts had difficulty interpreting the 'real' directions of consanguinity in the case. The father
had been baptized and was therefore 'under the blood' of Christ, but the case raised questions about whether Jewish blood
could ever be made Christian. Furthermore, the boy's own blood had been spilled in the distinctly Jewish act of circumcision,
further diluting the purity of the bloodlines involved. The case is haunted by the undead nature of kinship, with rival claims to
consanguinity coming from disparate, even diametrically opposed, directions (13-7).
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engaging with postmodern representations of the monstrous from an intellectual stance
informed by Zizekian intersubjectivity and Strassburg's 'queer cyborgian' approach, we will
be able to overcome our melancholic attachments to the monstrous Other, and to examine
its functioning critically, on both subjective and material levels, in a way that is profoundly
responsible and asymptomatic.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MONSTROUS OTHER AND THE QUEERING OFTHE NORMAL
Under conditions of postmodernity, the monstrous Other is being subjected to a variety of
new functions. The vampire, for example, has 'come out of the coffin,' and its import is
now less about the dangers of forbidden erotic encounters and more about what Hollinger
(1997) calls 'fantasies of absence,' that is, the embodiment of a certain postmodern desire
for the perpetual suspense of normative subjectivity, the drive toward the state of being
undead, neither here nor there. In similar ways, other postmodern texts also reveal the
changing dynamics of the monstrous Other - a fact that, as Said would remind us, tells us
more about humanity than it does about the monstrous itself. By reading the texts under
consideration here in the context of psychoanalytic, queer and cyborgian theory, I hope to
demonstrate that the postmodern monstrous Other guides us toward a postsubjective
state in which Cartesian dualism and the Self/Other dichotomy are displaced by the queer,
the cyborgian and the intersubjective.
The three novels considered here present three different approaches to 'the return
of the repressed' in the figure of the monstrous Other. Grendel shifts the sites of
representation, such that the monstrous Other becomes the sympathetic narrator. As the
beneficiaries of Grendel's interior-monologue narration, we travel through the Beowulf
tradition on the opposite side of its subjective mirror, re-viewing it from the monster's
troubled perspective. This approach effectively positions the audience (the human)
alongside the monstrous, drawing attention to the opposition between the two categories
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by way of casting the audience in the role of the monstrous. The Forest of Hours does the
same thing in reverse, sending the monstrous other into the heart of the human world.
Skord, the main character, passes (mostly) as human, and his experiences of joining the
symbolic order challenge the human/monstrous distinction from another angle. In this
way, Kerstin Ekman collapses the sites of representation into a single site that is
nevertheless bifurcated, since Skord is never completely divested of his trollish persona.
Finally, Troll: A Love Story vastly multiplies and weaves together diverse sites of
representation, including perspectives from multiple first-person narrators and a number of
other lsources' of information. The effect is one that closely adheres to the spirit of
cyborgian consciousness, never fully positioning the audience in anyone narrative lsite,'
and demonstrating the interconnectedness of informational sources, diverse knowledges,
and the experiences of characters that are alternately subjects and Others in an lintegrated
circuitry' that completely forecloses the possibility of normative subjectivity.
In many ways, my choice of these three novels reflects a genealogical progression
through the theoretical stances that inform this study. Grendel is the most traditional and
Lacanian of the three works though, by positioning us inside the consciousness of the
Other, it opens a window into the radical possibilities that the monstrous other can
instigate. The Forest of Hours takes one large leap further into the intersubjective and the
queer, presenting us with a main character whose incredibly extensive life includes
subjective and intersubjective experiences that also trace the contours of the development
of modern, western discursivities, providing a provocative revision of the history of the
monstrous as outlined in the second chapter of this study. And Troll plunges headlong into
the most radical possibilities of the monstrous Other as a technology for disengaging
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subjectivity from its historical and cultural limits, clearing a path for a 'queer cyborgian'
postsubjectivity that promises to push us past the taken-for-granted limits of subjective
experience. Considered in this way, these three novels give us a glimpse into the state of
subjectivity in the postmodern, offering models for intersubjectivity that promise a (queer
cyborgian) replacement for subjectivity as we know it.
The Monstrous Other Thinks:
Gardner's Grendel and the Monstrous Howling of the Imaginary
John Gardner's metafictive novel Grendel (1971) recapitulates the narrative tradition of the
Old English epic poem Beowulf (Heaney 2000) by presenting the tale from the perspective
of Grendel, one of the chief monsters in the original epic. Gardner employs a first-person
narrative voice that allows his titular character to relay his perception of events that also
occur in Beowulf, as well as a number of events created specifically by Gardner in his
revisionist treatment of the Beowulf tradition. This recasting of our written record of an
oral epic in the mode of a confessional, faux-autobiographical novel modernizes (and
significantly enlarges) the fictional universe of Beowulf, while the use of first-person
narration creates an intimacy between a monstrous character and Gardner's audiences.
Such an intimacy runs directly counter to the received notion of the monstrous as the
inaccessible and unnamable; indeed, Gardner exerts considerable effort to ensure that his
readers are 'along for the ride' with Grendel as he alternately engages in his misdeeds and
contemplates their (possible) meaningfulness for himself and/or the human inhabitants of
Hrothgar's domain. This intimacy implicates us alongside Grendel as we cannot help but to
locate some justification for his actions, given the fact that the novel's sympathies run
--------_. - ------
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chiefly in his favor. This reversal of sympathies is the novel's chief derivation from the
Beowulf tradition and, given Gardner's almost exclusive focus on Grendel's psychological
processes, this novel more closely attends to the contours of Lacanian subjectivity than the
other two considered here, though Gardner manages to gesture toward a Zizekian stance.
That Gardner's Grendel' embodies the notion of the Other and serves as the
symptom of the human (or, at least, of Hrothgar's kingdom as a metonym for the human) is
evident throughout the novel. From his very first encounter with a small band of men to his
ultimate demise at the hands of the 'heroic' Beowulf, Grendel traces the Lacanian Other's
path from primordial differentiation (such as when the band of men he first encounters,
while he is stuck hanging from a tree, mistakes him for an outgrowth or spirit of the tree
itself, Gardner 23-7) to a fully troubled relationship between the subject and its Other, even
including the subject's violent response to the fear of the Other in the interaction between
Beowulf and Grendel. Interestingly, too, Grendel as delineated by Gardner is self-aware of
his status as the Other, and he reflects on his importance to Hrothgar and his followers
throughout the novel. In the very first description of his interaction with Hrothgar's people
(that is, the first description given in the novel, not the chronologically first encounter), we
find Grendel in medias res, eleven years into his 'war' with Hrothgar's kingdom. His actions
are presented as part of a longstanding repetition, with his sudden and violent entrance to
the meadhall punctuated by terror, bloodletting, and general confusion. The total state of
confusion he induces is indicative of his status as the Other: /lIn the darkness, I alone see
clear as day. While they squeal and screech and bump into each other, I silently sack up my
1 From this point in the chapter forward, 1will refer to Gardner's character of Grendel as simply 'Grendel' and will only provide
distinguishing verbiage when referring to Beowulfs version of Grendel. The same applies to other characters shared between
the two works as well.
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dead and withdraw to the woods" (12). A bit later, gorged on the blood of the dead,
Grendel admits that he is "filled with gloom again," as his one sole purpose as the Other
has been served, and he recedes into his cursed state of meaninglessness once again (13).
As he begins to sicken from his feast of "their sour meat," he overhears some of the people
characterizing his invasion as a punishment or a manifestation of the anger of the gods (13).
In this way, he is at once the Other as fearsome embodiment of the ejected aspects of
subjectivity, and the Other as the embodied reminder of the Law of the Father.
Perhaps the formative encounter between Grendel and the people at Hart
(Hrothgar's Hall) - at least, in terms of establishing Grendel's role as the Other- occurs
shortly after the arrival of the Shaper (Old English: 'scop'), who plays his harp and sings
about the heroic exploits of Hrothgar and his (undead) ancestors, as well as the terrible
trials exacted by Grendel. At first, the Shaper secures his place in the service of Hrothgar by
focusing on the heroic deeds of Hrothgar and his men, and even Grendel remarks on the
power of the Shaper's representations of Hrothgar and his honor. The episode, which
occurs in the third chapter, comes immediately after Grendel's descriptions of the
sweeping acts of violence necessary for Hrothgar to establish his authority. The
expansionism of Hrothgar's polity exacts a terrible toll on the people of surrounding
villages; the animals employed in the service of war, road-building and agricultural
development; and on the natural environment itself (Gardner 31-40). When the Shaper
arrives and begins to sing his rather different representations of these events, Grendel
remembers what 'really' happened but finds that not only the people of Hart, but he
himself, cannot resist the representational allure of the Shaper's songs. "The man had
changed the world," Grendel laments, "had torn up the past by its thick, gnarled roots and
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had transmuted it, and they, who knew the truth, remembered it his way - and so did I"
(43). This episode leaves Grendel in a "queer panic" and "torn apart by poetry," and he
screams and behaves wildly in the forest away from the hall, flailing futilely against the
power of discursive representation to change the actual character of events already past
When Grendel later hears the Shaper representing his own role in relation to the
settlement at Hart, we are introduced to the idea (carried over from Beowulf) that Grendel
is a descendent of Cain (51).3 This attribution refers to the biblical account of Cain and Abel,
two brothers whose main abilities (horticulture for Cain and animal husbandry for Abel)
drew differential responses from God, leading Cain to murder Abel, in response to which
God marked Cain (the exact meaning of 'marked' is not clear) and cursed him, noting that
the ground would no longer yield its crops for him (Gen. 4.3-24). This ancestry, and the
curse that follows it, would certainly explain why Grendel and his kind are unable to
cultivate vegetables and are left to hunt and forage (like omnivorous wild animals) in order
to sustain themselves. The idea that the cursed descendents of Cain still walk the earth
appears in a variety of cultural sources, including some of the popular-culture sources
mentioned earlier in this text. In True Blood, for example, we learn that all vampires are
descended from Cain, and in Supernatural, during the fifth season, the main characters (the
2 It is worth noting, too, that this episode comments directly on the novel's ancestral text, Beowulf. Because Beowulf, too, was
originally a work of oral tradition, and it also represents the deeds of Beowulf as heroic and praiseworthy, Grendel's resistance
to the Shaper's art in Gardner's treatment casts Beowulfin a new light. We can infer from this association that Gardner was
drawing attention to the discursive politics of Beowulf even while setting it on Its head by allowing one of its originally
extradiscursive characters to speak.
3 Interestingly, the name Cain comes from the Hebrew 1'j7 (Qayin), meaning 'spear: while the name Hrothgar is the combination
(common in Old Norse and Old English names) of two words, 'hroth: meaning 'honored' or 'renowned: and 'gar: which also
means 'spear: making the combination something like 'renowned spearman.' The pairing is difficult to ignore, since it implies
both a similarity and an animosity between Hrothgar and the descendents of Cain (a Self/Other dichotomy). Likewise, Beowulf
comes from the 'Gar-Dane' people, the 'Spear-Danes.' For additional support of Grendel's association with Cain, see Nelson
(2008).
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Winchester brothers) learn that their family is descended from Cain, and that is it this
undead aspect of their notorious ancestor, embodied in their own existences, that makes
them possible vessels to host the earthly instantiations of Lucifer and Archangel Michael
during the Apocalypse. Apart from fictional representation, too, the idea of Cain's lineage
has played a significant role in ethnocentric explanations of racial difference. In the period
of colonization, many Europeans believed that the mark of Cain was black skin, and that
living persons with black skin were the cursed descendents of Cain. In the medieval period,
Saracens as well as hybrid creatures like centaurs were attributed to Cain's lineage. Thus,
the idea of Cain's race has enjoyed wide cultural circulation, in both literary and other
discourses, providing a quasi-religious explanation for the Other in many of its guises.4
The episode that most clearly defines Grendel's status as the Other, however, is his
encounter with the Dragon in chapter five. In the preceding chapter, Grendel had begun to
notice a kind of phantom presence around him, calling to him and dogging his every move.
Finally, he "make[s his] mind a blank" and falls toward the Dragon, "like a stone through
earth and sea" (56). The imagery of Grendel's passing toward the Dragon suggests the
dissolution of the Real, with the materiality of space-time giving way to allow Grendel's
almost mystical, and nearly instantaneous, movement from the moor beneath the mere
through which he leaves and enters the human world, to the lair of the Dragon. Although
the Dragon's lair itself is overwrought with materiality - indeed, the Dragon sits upon and
guards a massive collection of baubles and trinkets and notes that his greatest ambition "is
to count all this" - the necessity of Grendel's audience with the Dragon seems to create a
4 The idea also appears to echo Lacan's description of the divided nature of subjectivity, with the Cain/Abel episode serving as an
origin story for the splitting apart of the subject and the Other.
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moment in which the Imaginary and the Symbolic exist apart from the Real, letting Grendel
move 'like a stone through earth and sea' (73). Something in the Real gives way as the
Other moves toward fully embodying its role; anamorphosis inscribes the demands of the
subject into the material reality of the Other itself.
The Dragon's reactions toward and tutelage of Grendel, too, serve to inscribe
Grendel fully as the Other. When Grendel first arrives, the Dragon already knows him [lilAh,
Grendel!' he said. 'You've come!1II (58)] and tells him that he has been expected, just the
next arrival in the long sequence of Others necessitated by the human. The Dragon's
comments wax philosophical (epistemological and ontological, with ample quotation of
numerous unnamed sources), frequently losing both the attention and interest of Grendel,
who seems half imbued with a human-like intellect, and half caught in a more primordial
existence. A primary purpose of the exchange is to undermine, once and for all, the
authority of the kinds of representation performed by the Shaper (and even by Grendel
himself), leaving him with little other than his commitment to serving as Hart's Other. Like
any neophyte, Grendel is troubled by the matter of why he should take up such a role, a
question the Dragon calls ridiculous. Then, suddenly, the Dragon seems "almost to rise to
pity," and he tells Grendel,
"You improve them, my boy! Can't you see that yourself? You stimulate them! You
make them think and scheme. You drive them to poetry, science, religion, all that
makes them what they are for as long as they last. You are, so to speak, the brute
existent by which they learn to define themselves. The exile, captivity, death they
shrink from - the blunt facts of their mortality, their abandonment - that's what
you make them recognize, embrace! You are mankind, or man's condition:
inseparable as the mountain-climber and the mountain. If you withdraw, you'll
instantly be replaced. Brute existents, you know, are a dime a dozen." (73,
emphasis original)
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This passage, which firmly establishes Grendel's role as the Other (at least, once he decides
to believe the Dragon), could almost have been written by Lacan himself, so closely does it
echo his own characterizations of the Other.
Moreover, the pivotal passage also indicates Grendel's close association with the
Imaginary, since his need to see himself (the Other) reflected in humanity (the Self) is the
obverse side of the mirror stage. Indeed, the whole novel follows Grendel along this
painful process of coming to terms with his individuation from the Self (he wants
desperately, at times, to join the people at Hart and become welcomed into the symbolic
order of their society) and his role as the Other. As the Other, though, he is never
permitted full entry into the Symbolic, even though he makes considerable strides in that
direction (e.g., by coming to understand the language of Hrothgar's people, though he is
seldom able to make himself understood when trying to use it). Lacking the investiture of
subjectivity (that is, remaining caught in the Imaginary), he is unable to allow for the Law of
the Father. In successive sequences, we see him rejecting the Law as it is ensconced in
political power (chapter eight), religion (chapter nine), and art, or representation itself,
which comes in the form of the death of the Shaper in chapter ten. In spite of all of the
human discourses to which he is exposed, Grendel remains the howling, libidinous,
unbridled sheer terror of the Other to the novel's bitter (and already well-known) ending.
The meaninglessness of Grendel's situation also supports a reading of him as
presymbolic, since he is unable, as the Other (the one configured outside the symbolic
order) to apply any sort of discourse toward the organization of a meaning for himself. He
struggles from one end of the narrative to the other in a vain attempt to find some sense of
purpose or value (a fact that makes him, ironically, an excellent postmodern antihero,
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adding to his sympathetic reception among contemporary readers). This fruitless struggle
leaves him extremely cynical, as we see even in the novel's opening chapter, where he
describes his recollections of past acts of violence as I/the tiresome memories of a shadow-
shooter, earth-rim-roamer, walker of the world's weird wall" (7). In this sequence, he has
little reason to distinguish between normative subjects, like the people in Hrothgar's
kingdom, and the flora, fauna and inanimate objects of the forest. He portrays himself as
the I/[d]isfigured son of lunatics" and notes that I/[t]he big-boled oaks gaze down at me
yellow with morning, beneath complexity. INo offense,' Isay, with a terrible, sycophantish
smile, and tip an imaginary hat" (7). Later, once he accepts the Dragon's inducements to
his role as the Other and it, as he notes, I/became my aura," he finds that I/[f]utility, doom,
became a smell in the air, pervasive and acrid as the dead smell after a forest fire" (75). And
later still, when he muses on the need for Ibalance' (the Self/Other equilibrium), he
wonders, I/What will we call the Hrothgar-Wrecker when Hrothgar has been wrecked?"
(91).5 What, indeed, would be the purpose of the Other if its monstrousness were to
obliterate the Self? Even Grendel's defeat by Beowulf fails to fix any meaning for the
troubled character. He calls the defeat itself I/[b]lind, mindless, mechanical" and I/[m]ere
logic of chance," and then he describes his own movement toward oblivion: 1/11 look down,
down, into the bottomless blackness, feeling the dark power moving in me like an ocean
current, some monster inside me, deep sea wonder, dread night monarch astir in his cave,
s Gardner's use here of the kenning 'Hrothgar-Wrecker' imitates one of the main stylistic features of Beowulf a nd of the
Germanic epic tradition in which it arose. A kenning is an attribution that relies on the combination of two or more terms,
sometimes in a compound construction (as in the present case), and sometimes in a phrase (e.g., 'walker of the world's weird
wall'). The device makes use of a metaphorical association that unselfconsciousiy employs the representational nature of
language commented upon by Lacan, Butler, and others. Interestingly, too, the Icelandic scholar (and 'father of Old Norse
literature') Snorri Sturluson approved only of kennings that employed straightforward metaphors, calling those that mixed
metaphors nykrat, which can be interpreted as 'made monstrous' (Faulkes 24). Nykrat is precisely the monstrous potential of
discourse hijacked by the Other that Grendel and the other monsters in this study embody.
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moving me slowly to my voluntary tumble into death" (173, emphasis added). Here we see
Grendel experiencing a kind of perverse Lacanian jouissance (//1 seem to desire this fall"),
realizing, in the last moments of his life, that he is other even to himself (173).
While Grendel's existential struggle may be meaningless to him, however, it is not
meaningless to us, the readers of Gardner's novel; indeed, we are positioned, in the end,
alongside the less sympathetic characters: Hrothgar, his people, and the visiting Spear-
Danes - Beowulf in particular. Our correlation to these characters is not only due to the
fact that we, too, are (more or less) normative subjects with investments in the discursive
representations of politics, religion, art, and so on, but also because we share with them, as
fellow subjects, the human need for the monstrous Other as a foil to hem in the loose
components of our identity as human. Ultimately, and in spite of all its innovations in the
narrative tradition of Beowulf, Gardner's novel ends in much the same way as the episode
between Beowulf and Grendel does in the epic poem. We still need Beowulf, our hero, to
arrive on the scene and rescue us from the horrifying spectacle and haunting threat of our
Other, the likeness of ourselves appearing inside-out, all repressed aspects of our humanity
teeming on its surfaces. Even though we know that 'the monster always escapes,' and that
there will be another one coming (a warmongering attacker or a dragon, perhaps), we
cannot help but to feel a sense of subjective relief in the moment that our lack, the
externalization of our subjective incoherence, is slain. Gardner toys with this inevitable
subjective response, refusing to allow us to remain in the meadhall with Hrothgar and the
others while Grendel meets his end, and placing us instead at the scene of crime, implicated
and culpable.
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Yet the Beowulf of Grendel is not a hero with whom it is easy to identify. Indeed,
even the 'original' Beowulf is a boastful, brash, and socially inept visitor whose presence is
as unsettling as it is promising. In Beowulf, when Unferth, a thane of Hrothgar's (that is, a
warrior pledged to his service), challenges the tales told of Beowulf's superhuman feats
(e.g., defeating massive sea monsters with his bare hands in the middle of a swim from
Sweden to Finland), Beowulf remains unflustered and retorts that, not only are the tales
true, but that they have diminished the extent of the feats. In contrast to the prideful
heroic ethic of Beowulf, though, Gardner's revision of this exchange, and all of his
descriptions of Beowulf, cast him as psychotic, creating an unnerving presence that Grendel
can sense days before Beowulf's arrival. In the mead hall interchange with Unferth,
Beowulf's response is dramatized: "he spoke, soft-voiced, his weird gaze focused
nowhere" (161). He proceeds to tell the assembled people in Hart that he actually slew nine
different sea monsters, describing the events in some detail. Afterwards, Grendel notes,
"the Danes weren't laughing. The stranger said it all so calmly, so softly, that it was
impossible to laugh. He believed every word he said. I understood at last the look in his
eyes. He was insane" (162).6
A number of other attributions similarly mark Beowulf as psychotic. When he
speaks on his arrival on Hrothgar's coastline, he does so with the "[v]oice of a dead thing,
calm as dry sticks and ice when the wind blows over them" (153-4). (The undead character
of Beowulf in this passage is difficult to miss!) His face, too, troubles Grendel, like
something "from a dream I had almost forgotten," as if Beowulf embodies something from
6 An alternative (or expansion) here is to read Beowulf as a throwback to the tradition of the berserk warrior, a type of fighter
who uses no weapons and faces impossible situations with his bare hands. This tradition is described fully by Speidel (2002),
who notes that the image of the berserk evokes responses of both wonder and respect - precisely the kinds of responses that
Beowulfs performance of heroism seems intended to elicit.
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the primordial depths of the Imaginary that even Grendel, poised as he on the boundary
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, cannot recapture (154). Indeed, Lacan
commented that psychosis is the result of the failure to enter the symbolic order properly,
the state of being able to use discourse without its full or proper effects - a mode of asocial
functioning that represents the irruption of the Imaginary into the Symbolic, infusing it with
elements that seem otherworldly or 'unreal.' In this sense, Gardner's rendition of Beowulf
is another kind of Other, like Grendel but without the 'controls' that the Self/Other
dichotomy provides. Thus, Beowulf is "an outsider not only among the Danes but
everywhere," the kind of creature that is "holding something back, some magician-power
that could blast stone cliffs to ashes as lightning blasts trees" (154). His discourse is
impossible to receive in a normative fashion: even Grendel comments that "I found myself
not listening, merely looking at his mouth, which moved - or so it seemed to me -
independent of the words, as if the body of the stranger were a ruse, a disguise for
something infinitely more terrible" (155).
Beowulf's insanity is never more apparent than in his deadly confrontation with
Grendel. The event depicts him with an odd combination of cunning trickery and outright
madness. On the one hand, he does not partake of mead and remains awake, waiting for
Grendel's arrival, while pretending to sleep. Furthermore, once Grendel enters and
commences his attacks, Beowulf watches his movements and sizes him up, quickly
detecting his weaknesses. He knows almost instantly that Grendel is immune to the sword
(a trait that emerged only after Grendel's encounter with the Dragon, in Gardner's version),
and he hastily creates his plan to attack Grendel in hand-to-hand combat, which has the
only chance of success. Yet, once he has Grendel's arm firmly in his grasp, he begins to
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whisper a litany of terrifying phrases into Grendel's ear, some of it seeming to echo the
words of the Dragon, and some of it hovering around the edges of discursive practice in
that peculiar way that only insanity can induce (liThe world is my bone-cave, 1shall not
want," etc., 170, emphasis original). A bit later, still holding onto Grendel and beginning to
threaten the integrity of the sinews and muscles in his shoulder, Beowulf demands that
Grendel sing about the hardness of the wall used to crack his head (170-2). Interestingly,
too, Beowulf can understand the words used by Grendel in this scene, even though the
creature's attempts at language seldom met their mark. It is an odd moment of
convergence between two characters differentially distinguished from and outside of the
symbolic system they (attempt to) employ, and it leaves Gardner's Beowulf squarely
outside the novel's sympathies. The classic epic hero becomes another face of the
monstrous, even to those whom his heroism purportedly serves.
Moreover, Beowulf's relatively expedient defeat of Grendel begs the question of
why the Danes themselves could never achieve the same during all the years of
encountering him. Indeed, this is a question that has occupied scholars of the Beowulf
manuscript since long before Gardner's novel appeared. In a 1992 essay on this point, Fidel
Fajardo-Acosta postulates that Grendel is " a symbolic rather than a literal monster of the
epic" (209). While Fajardo-Acosta is right about Grendel's symbolic importance, however,
his explanation of why it exceeds Grendel's literal importance relies too closely on a reading
of the text as one that arose in the transition from pagan to Christian worldviews. He
argues that, from the perspective of the Christian narrator of the epic poem, the Danes
'deserved' the punishment of Grendel's attacks, regular and horrible, because of their own
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immoral and heathen practices (206-9). Such a reading leads logically to the conclusion
that
in the Grendel adventure Beowulf exhibits a degree of self-control and moral virtue
which make it possible to see the Geatish hero as a sort of spiritual warrior engaged
in a dangerous psychomachia or internal battle from which he emerges victorious
as the vanquisher of the monstrous passions and violent tendencies which lurk
inside his own heart and the hearts of all human beings. (210)
Gardner's Beowulf hardly complies with such a reading, however, and seems to challenge
normative values as much as Grendel himself, if from a somewhat different angle.
Furthermore, Gardner's depiction of Hrothgar and his followers is not as flat as that of the
epic, giving us a more well-rounded portrayal of a society in which there is at once
drunkenness, depravity and fratricide, on the one hand, and poetry, refinement, and
decency, on the other.
In fact, Gardner seems less interested in an extended meditation on the tensions
between pagan and Christian views that serves as a backdrop to the oral epic; for him,
pagan and Christian worldviews are but two among many philosophical inventions of the
western world that are surveyed and - one by one - rejected in the course of Grendel. As
Fawcett and Jones (1990) indicate, the novel unfolds through twelve chapters in which
Grendel dispenses with (at least) twelve key philosophical traditions of the Euro-American
inheritance. Grendel muses, IITwelve is, I hope, a holy number. Number of escapes from
traps" (Gardner 92). Fawcett and Jones read these Itraps' as canonical theoretical
approaches, including skepticism, metaphysics, solipsism, and others that they see
presented by Gardner in a careful juxtaposition with the twelve astrological signs and -
most importantly for their work - the Iheroic ideals' of the west, which they describe as
lithe saving fictions of pattern-making creatures, who hypocritically proclaim allegiance to
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something larger than themselves when they are actually driven by instinct or greed"
(646). Yet, as they also indicate, Grendel, even with all his verve for deconstructing such
ideals, never fully abandons them. Throughout the novel he struggles to reconcile his
nagging, existential observation that all such ideals are fictions with his enduring desire to
locate for himself some semblance of meaning. In the bitter end, defeated by the Iheroism'
of Beowulf and facing certain death, Grendel finds himself surrounded by Ilevil" animals
who have gathered to witness his demise, and he narrates his own final utterances: IIIPoor
Grendel's has an accident,' I whisper. ISO may you all'" (174, emphasis original). For Fawcett
and Jones, Grendel's plight is the philosophical struggle of postmodern humanity, a flailing,
individualistic disdain for any Isaving fiction of pattern-making creatures' even though
II[s]omewhere in our cavernous hearts the old heroic ideals continue to haunt and illumine
us" (647). That is why we are so much more tempted to identify with Grendel than with
Beowulf, who can only be read, from such a perspective, as a model for the perpetual
subjective death experienced by the psychotic.
However, Gardner provides us with one additional model that is both closer to the
commonest experiences of postmodern subjectivity and, given his own interactions with
Grendel, a fine example of the ways in which the monstrous Other talks back, refusing to
allow our need for a symptomatic and closed subjectivity to be satisfied in full. This other
model, of course, is Unferth, whose interactions with Grendel in chapter six make for a
perfect inroad for reading the novel's commentary on the nature of the monstrous Other
and our dependence on it. Unferth first faces the creature during a typical attack at the
meadhall, but his self-righteous need to embrace heroism irritates Grendel who, in a
moment of sheer wickedness, begins pelting him with apples. The apple-bashing
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completely undermines Unferth's hopes for a glorious face-to-face sword battle and makes
him a laughing-stock, even among the other people in the hall. This is a really odd and
telling moment in the narrative, in which we see other normative subjects enjoying a fellow
subject's humiliation by the monstrous Other; the scene is imbued with a kind of catharsis,
a deep-seated satisfaction that the lack is always there to put us, as it were, in our place. As
the sequence ends, Grendel leaves Unferth unharmed physically but entirely mortified and
dishonored.
Shortly afterwards, Unferth arrives in the cave occupied by Grendel and his mother,
where he has come to face Grendel in a quixotic encounter that underscores the
importance of honor to his identity. At first, Grendel can hardly be bothered to pay
attention to Unferth even though his presence alarms Grendel's mother and the mysterious
others - other descendents of Cain? - who also occupy the cave. Moreover, once Grendel
realizes that Unferth has come to be killed, in order to restore his precious honor, he
immediately decides that he will not humor him. Unferth senses that he may not get what
he has come for, and his speeches shift into a defense of his position, the position of the
subject-on the-whole. HI caught your nasty insinuations," he says. 1111 thought heroes were
only in poetry,' you said. Implying that what I've made of myself is merely fairytale stuff"
(87). Such a proposition is unbearable to Unferth as it cuts to the very core of his
subjectivity, revealing it for the artifice (and metaphoricity) that it is. Desperately, he
pleads his case:
HGo ahead, scoff," he said, petulant. HExcept in the life of a hero, the whole world's
meaningless. The hero sees values beyond what's possible. That's the nature of a
hero. It kills him, of course, ultimately. But it makes the whole struggle of
humanity worthwhile." (89, emphasis original)
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But Grendel will not give him the satisfaction of a hero's death. When Unferth threatens to
kill himself instead, Grendel taunts him with "it may seem at least a trifle cowardly to
some" (90). In the end, Grendel waits for Unferth to sleep, and then carries him,
unharmed, back to the stoop at Hrothgar's hall, noting that he "killed the two guards so I
wouldn't be misunderstood" (90).
Because most subjects are not psychotic but fully integrated into the symbolic
order, Unferth's experiences demonstrate the more typical encounter with the monstrous
Other. While we need the monster as the delimitation of our humanity, we also desire it,
welcoming the chance for the dangerous encounter that could end our lack but, in the
process, lead to our subjective demise. As much as we might like to believe the contrary,
this matrix of repulsion and desire is not the animating tension of heroism. Instead,
heroism is, as Gardner's Beowulf makes clear, a state apart from, and itself a troubling
problem for, subjectivity. This observation implies as well that our normative relationship
to the monstrous Other is one of helplessness in the face of an alterity that is composed of
everything we abhor. Yet Grendel is not without its commentary on this relationship.
Although Grendel never succeeds in joining the symbolic order and is only ever truly
understood by other monsters (the Dragon, Beowulf), he does engage in an intensive and
running interior monologue that, given the structure of the narrative, forms a kind of
dialogue with the audience. And it is in this dialogue that Gardner provides the beginnings
of an intersubjective rapport with the monstrous Other, one that allows our sympathies to
run toward the monstrous in a narrative in which its atrociousness is never diluted, its evil
fully intact. By giving us this window into the extrasubjective positionality of the
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monstrous Other, Gardner moves us one significant step toward a Zizekian intersubjectivity
that could facilitate interventions in both subjectivity and its Others.
Robert Merrill (1984) presents a very different reading of Grendel that runs counter
to my own and others like it. In his view, Gardner's project in the novel may include a
representation of the troubled state of (post)modern humanity, but he argues that
Gardner's intentions in rendering Grendel in this way are not to push us toward, but to pull
us back from, the existential precipice. Indeed, he quotes Gardner's own remarks about his
intentions and about his views on the nature of humanity and the purposes of art, drawing
on several sources. Ultimately, Merrill interprets Grendel as a rumination on the power of
the human imagination and, specifically, its ability to create meaning in spite of the
arbitrariness of life's circumstances. In particular, Grendel, then, serves as a negative
model, as a representation of the postmodern subject's failure of (a Blakean?) imagination.
Merrill notes that this example is Hall too representative" since Hwe moderns have become
monstrous precisely to the extent that our assumptions parallel those of ... Grendel" (170).
For Merrill, too, this misreading of Grendel results from a terminal mismatch between the
tendency of (post)modernist writers like Gardner to use first-person narration by an
antihero in an ironic mode, and the average reader's inability to dissociate the direction of
our sympathies in engaging the text, and its moral valences (171-2). That is, Merrill argues
that we miss Gardner's intended meaning - that the sort of reveling in meaninglessness
that characterizes both Grendel's trajectory and postmodern sensibilities in general
ultimately leads to devastation and ruin - precisely because we perceive a certain
verisimilitude in Grendel's experiences of isolation and hopelessness. In other words, we
miss the fabular nature of Gardner's work.
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Such an observation does not undermine an argument like mine, however, since I
am not proposing that we read Grendel as a positive model for subjective volition but,
instead, that we consider him as an exceptional portrayal of what we might call the 'crisis of
subjectivity' that characterizes postmodern life. Indeed, to consider Grendel a fable that
depicts the possible outcomes of an unfettered existentialism is not so different from
reading the novel as an allegory on the postmodern condition of the subject. Both
approaches address the symbolic disposition of the novel, and both include a reading of
Grendel as an antihero. The main difference between these two approaches is that Merrill
focuses on the generic qualities of the novel and how those qualities affect its reception,
while I am proposing that we approach the novel as an early example of the particular role
of postmodern representations of the monstrous Other. While I do not argue that Gardner
gives us a fully formed prototype for either Zizekian intersubjectivity or a queer cyborgian
approach to subjectivity, I assert that his novel is representative of the shift toward a
monstrous other that challenges the (hetero)normative character of subjectivity, moving
us closer to such a prototype. Kerstin Ekman comes much closer to creating this prototype,
as I will discuss in the section that follows.
The Monstrous Other Speaks:
Ekman's Skord and the Monstrous Power of the Symbolic
Kerstin Ekman's Rovarna i Skuleskogen (1998, published in English as The Forest ofHours,
1999) presents us with the portrayal of a different monstrous Other, a troll named Skord who
is, in the novel's opening pages, living entirely in the forests of northern Sweden, the realm of
both the natural and the supernatural. Throughout the course of the novel, though, Skord
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gradually assimilates more and more into human society, oscillating between respectable
social positionings and the life of a thief. Interestingly, too, Skord is a troll who attempts not
just to pass as human but - for all intents and purposes - to become human. His efforts begin
with simple mimesis as he tries to parrot human speech but, as he becomes ever more adept
at the fully representational use of language and of narrative, he performs his identity as a
human with incrementally increasing acuity, becoming, at times, a more-than-human
simulacrum of a subject. No matter how effectively he passes as human, however, he remains
always hybrid, straddling the boundaries between human and troll, culture and nature,
settlement and forest. Nevertheless, Skord's performance of human subjectivity draws
attention to the ways in which subjectivity is always already performative, and this odd sort of
'drag' queers normative subjectivity by revealing its instability (Le., its need for continual
reiteration) and its artificiality. In this section, I will first trace how Skord's gradual initiation
into subjectivity functions, from Lacanian and Zizekian perspectives, and then I will discuss
how his experience highlights the performative nature of subjectivity and thereby offers a
queer critique of the heteronormativity of the Self/Other dichotomy.
Skord is not even differentiated as a troll in the first pages of the novel, as he has not
yet, by that point in this largely linear narrative, come into any sort of contact with the
symbolic order of humanity. The opening sequences instead portray this creature being drawn
into interactions with a small family of giants who themselves live deep in the forest.
Interestingly, the giants (also a monstrous Other) already have a basic (or 'primitive') social
existence at the time that Skord meets them. Much like the wild men of European lore,
Ekman's giants inhabit the outer reaches of the known world and enjoy certain features of a
human or 'civilized' existence, including living in a simplistic house, storing and cooking their
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food and - most importantly - using a form of language to engage in discursive exchanges.
Skord hovers around the edges of their lives, doing little favors for them in exchange for a
constant flow of small portions offood. Indeed, this exposure to the symbolic order, ironically
generated by contact with Granarv, Groning, and their crone mother, sets Skord on a path that
will take him into the center of human life in Sweden and, at times, other parts of Europe as
well. Thus, Skord is, ironically, introduced to subjectivity by another monstrous Other.
At the outset of this long narrative, Ekman portrays the troll as a creature more
aligned with the rhythms of the natural world (and, thus, the Real) than with either of the two
registers of normative subjectivity (the Imaginary and the Symbolic). After the giants
disappear from their home and Skord, having waited for a considerable amount of time (some
years), dares to go inside, he discovers the corpse of the crone shriveling away in her bed
(Ekman 8). In this brief encounter with the undead (she is dead and decaying but her presence
lives on in the building itself), he is able to absorb a little information about what a house is
and how it can be used, but then additional time passes and he starts to lose most of the
memories of the place. "Troll brains do not hold many memories," the narrating voice states,
continuing:
Mostly, their minds flicker and ripple like the glossy water in a forest tarn ruffled by
the wind. There are fluttering movements and faint whispering or whirring noises as
of wings, and there are thin roots twisting round each other and searching ever
downwards, looking for something with their fine, hairy points. But they find so little.
So much happens in vain and is drained away, so much drifts down towards a smooth
surface, is sucked in and disappears. Pulled down, it sinks into the slime and becomes
one with the thick, black darkness. (8-9)
This passage seems to describe the mental processes of wild animals, aligning the troll with
the other animal inhabitants of the forest. The seed planted by Skord's contact with the
giants, though - and particularly his visceral memory of the joy of eating a prepared
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pancake - lead his mind back to the imagery of the experience again and again, such that
//thoughts kept clustering around that goodness, because he knew how goodness tasted"
(11). Eventually, he connects the memory to the small bands of wandering people (in this
case, orphaned children who live as beggars) that he had sometimes seen in the forest, and
he decides to try and infiltrate one of the bands to see if he can increase his chances of
having a pancake again (11). By this point in the narrative, Skord has rapidly progressed into
the Imaginary and has begun to allow its primal drives to push him toward subjectivity.
The next logical step is for Skord to acquire the facility of language, and he begins
to watch these bands of children and listen to their chatter, trying to make out the meaning
of the sounds. Although Skord is still presymbolic at this point - at least, in the strictly
human sense - he is familiar with the idea of language, both from the giants he had
encountered earlier and the many animal languages that he is able to understand.?
Interestingly, though, he has to exert a conscious effort to try and learn human language;
this positioning of his character puts the Lacanian cart before its horse, attributing to Skord
a drive or perhaps even desire that is determined prior to his entry into the symbolic order.
Rather than reading this portrayal as some sort of authorial mistake, however, I think it is
useful to remember that Ekman's novel sets about to challenge the boundaries between
the human and the non-human, as well as between the human and the animal, and
between the magical or supernatural and the /real.' The entire novel holds open the
tensions that arise when such foundational binary oppositions are discarded, so it may be
the case that Skord is at once presymbolic, in the case of human language, and yet already
7 Ekman presents Skord's exchanges with animals in standard narrative dialogue, suggesting that animal languages may be closer
to human languages than we might assume. Nevertheless, she does differentiate them as well, as when the ferret that Skord
encounters while imprisoned tells him that he sounds more like a human than an animal (Ekman 277).
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cognizant of the conceptual power of language. In other words, Ekman, from early in the
novel, directly challenges the notion that subjectivity is strictly confined to the human
world.
Skord's efforts to learn the language of the roaming bands of children are slow and
painstaking. At first, his attempts are largely mimetic, leaving him sounding "like a starling
mimicking human speech, toneless and whirring" (12). However, his trollish facility for
mimicry and the mastery of the languages of other creatures prevails, and he eventually
gathers enough of a vocabulary to enact his plan, which leads him into the company of a
pair of siblings whose life circumstances have left to fend for themselves. In his first
encounter, he hides in the forest foliage and does not introduce himself, but the children
leave a piece of bread crust for him, and he returns for it after dark. He spends
considerable time thinking about the events of the day even though "[i]t was like trying to
catch midges in your hands without killing them" (14). By the next day, the children start
speaking to him, yet he keeps some distance and only after a while is he coaxed out of the
undergrowth to introduce himself. The children - Ecker, the elder and a boy, and Bodel,
the young girl- are surprised by his odd name, Skord (15). In fact, his name presents, for
Nordic readers, an easily recognizable combination of 'skog,' ('forest') with lord' ('word'),
so Ecker's remark that the name is odd draws attention to the ways in which Skord will
continue to straddle the boundaries between the natural and human worlds, even as he
gradually becomes more and more a part of the human world, and this questioning of his
name foreshadows events to come.
Some time later, after Skord has settled into a routine with the children and has
learned a great deal more of their language and beliefs (mainly from Bodel), an incident
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involving a farmer who gives day-work to Ecker further elucidates Skord's liminal status
with respect to representation. Over the course of his day working for the farmer, Ecker
accidentally damages the man's ax, for which he is repaid with a blow from the blunt end of
a spade, and a refusal of the food he was promised for his work. Throughout the time that
he had been working, Bodel and Skord had occupied themselves just out of sight, on the
edge of the forest above the farm. At one point, Bodel starts using small found objects
(stones, sticks, pinecones, etc.) to build a tiny model of the farm and its little village and,
though it takes Skord a while to understand what she is doing, he is most impressed when
he works it out, realizing the potential of discursive representation by means of Bodel's
simplistic form of it: "He got some idea of why they all seemed to enjoy stories and images
so much. It was not just the craftiness. It meant power" (Ekman 29-30). Once Ecker has
been sent away from the farm without any food, Skord picks up some other stones and
drops them onto the tiny model of the village, talking as he does about the destructive
power of the Creator. The next morning, the smell of burnt wood attracts their attention
but, as they have moved on some distance, the village is no longer visible. Before the
children wake up, though, Skord climbs a cliff-face and sees the results of his sympathetic
(or representational) magic: the village and farm have been utterly destroyed by fire.
Although this is the only time in the novel that we see Skord use this particular variety of
magic, the incident reveals the powerful potential of the combination of his growing
mastery of human styles of representation with his own trollish abilities. In fact, Skord's
magical abilities playa relatively minor role in the novel, which focuses largely on his
increasingly humanlike character.
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Skord's supernatural abilities mainly include typical trollish talents, such as an ability
to convince people of the things he says; a telepathic ability to call objects to himself; and
an ability to enter the astral plain, leaving his body lifeless and limp, while occupying the
body of an animal. He does not seem to have the ability to shape-shift, which is, in Nordic
tradition, /lone of the most salient talents of the troll" (Asplund 95). We also do not see
him having the ability to regenerate lost body parts, another of the typical abilities of the
troll, though Ekman does present him as believing that he can do so, when he cuts off his
little finger to impress a crowd of people gathered at a summer market (Asplund 95; Ekman
34-6). Skord is surprised to learn that his finger does not regenerate, perhaps suggesting
that he had been able to regenerate lost appendages before he entered the human
symbolic order. In fact, his magical abilities, in their interaction with human society, are
perhaps best understood by way of what Ariel Glucklich (1997) calls /lmagical experience,"
that is, the myriad ways that magic plays out in specific, historically and culturally bound
settings and practices. Rather than focusing on a renewal of nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century anthropological efforts to define magic and categorize its various
objects and aspects, Glucklich argues that a better theoretical tool for scholars interested in
magical phenomena is the concept of 'magical experience,' which shifts the focus from the
objects and acts themselves to the lived (and performed) sense of interrelationality(-ies)
that magic creates (222-5). In Skord's case, his magical abilities are but one of many tools
he deploys as he simultaneously joins the symbolic order and retains some of his pre human
experience. Indeed, for Skord, such human practices as writing, religion and medicine all
involve elements of a distinctively magical experience.
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Skord's gradual imbrication of the presymbolic and the symbolic continues
throughout the course of the epic novel. Because Skord lives for at least five hundred years
(the period of his life covered by the novel), he has a considerable amount of time to
become more and more skilled at passing as a human. Nevertheless, his long life presents
some challenges in remaining in one location for very long, since his very slow process of
aging, and the fact that he never regenerates his little finger, make him susceptible to the
memories of older individuals who might remember a similar-looking fellow, from many
years earlier, who was at about the same age and was missing the same finger. In some
ways, Skord's missing finger marks him as the Other, frustrating his efforts to be perceived
as a man (even if a slightly odd one) and, at times, a woman. Moreover, his lack of the
finger functions much like the Lacanian lack, frustrating his attempts to fulfill his desires,
and linking his subjective identity to the Other - though, in his case, this Other is himself.
That is, to the extent that Skord gradually becomes more and more successful in his human
subjectivity, he also becomes his own Other, a paradoxical embodiment of the Self/Other
dynamic that complicates and shapes a number of his experiences.
The novel's trajectory moves Skord through a succession of experiences that
progress from the late medieval period to the Age of Reason, and through a sequence of
events that involve such landmark episodes of European history as the completion of the
Christianization of northern Scandinavia in the late medieval period; the end of the reign of
alchemy; the succession of continental wars that reshaped the political map of Europe in
the seventeenth and 'long' eighteenth centuries; and the beginnings of modernity,
complete with its shift to a focus beyond Europe itself, to its many colonies and 'interests.'
Throughout these many episodes, Skord's experiences are recounted in the style of
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vignettes (corresponding, for the most part, to Ekman's sectioning ofthe narrative) that
each focus on one particular historico-cultural moment; between these vignettes, immense
expanses of time pass outside of the purview of the narrative, magnifying the drawn-out
effect of Skord's long life. Indeed, by the last few sections of the novel, Skord has begun to
forget the specifics of the more distant past, such that his own living memory (and, indeed,
his subjectivity) mirrors the forgetful pattern of history, in which the vast majority of
particularities such as names, details of events, and even some of the local placenames
begin to fade away. In this way, Skord's elongated life reveals another of the limits of
subjectivity, namely, its inability to account for its own historicity. The normative subject
resides always in a specific time but, in the case of Skord, that 'specific time' becomes so
immense that his subjectivity begins to fail to track the entire duration. Nevertheless, there
are a few - we might say - 'trends' that run through Skord's experiences and that
therefore help give an overarching shape to the narrative.
One of these trends is Skord's alternating experiences as a member of respectable
society (though with variable degrees of rank and profession throughout his long life) and
as a member of a band of outlaws occupying Skule forest. Living long enough to evade the
living memory of human beings, Skord is able to experience long stints on either side of the
law-abiding/outlaw opposition and, indeed, he hybridizes both by means of importing
characteristics of the one into the other. Just to consider one example, in Skord's third
stretch as a forest-dwelling robber, he takes note of the ways that even the society of the
thieves has been influenced by the Law, stating that lII[n]ow robbery seems to have
become a part of the kingdom of Sweden'" (Ekman 322). The old woman who was ruling
the band of thieves at that particular time replies with: '''Inside or outside it' ... 'we live in
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the Kingdom'" (322). Skord's dissatisfaction with these changes leads him to wander off
alone for a few days, but he finds himself feeling sick and cold and wonders, "Was it a
dream that he used to be indifferent to cold and wet?" (322). This passage highlights the
way that the symbolic order and its dictates have taken an ever greater hold not just in
Skord's personal experiences, but in the world around him as well. As he moves
incrementally closer to the status of a fully interpellated subject, he is less able to return to
the forest as a 'free' creature, just as the forest itself begins to give way to the encroaching
advances of the social order of humans. This movement in the novel towards an ever more
expansive Symbolic characterizes the arc of Skord's character development and leads into
the novel's commentary on the Other, including especially its examination of Cartesian
positivity.
In a 1998 essay on The Forest of Hours, Linda Haverty Rugg discusses the novel's
dialogue with Cartesian philosophical thought. Rugg reads Ekman as sympathetic with
feminist, ecocritical and similar critiques of Cartesianism as an insistence on rationalism at
all costs - a violent ideology that has fanned the flames of oppression for women, animals,
'primitive' peoples, and many other Others. Although Rugg takes a rather too harsh stance
on Ekman's work and misses at least one major conceit of the novel - points Iwill return to
below - she rightly marks the importance of challenges to Cartesianism for an
understanding of the role of the monstrous Other in postmodern fiction.
The trouble with Descartes, as Rugg herself indicates, is that he was "a stern
rationalist, a thinker whose espousal of the mathematical method and mind-body dualism
drives a wedge between humans and their bodies and thus between humans and nature,
and, some would argue, between male and female" (Rugg np). The separation of mind and
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body is the particular 'wedge' for critics of Descartes, who see this dualistic conception as
justifying a range of more or less violent forms of control exercised by the rational mind
over individual bodies, the body politic, the body of nature, and the bodies of all sorts of
Others. This line of criticism holds that Cartesianism, contrary to its precept of detached
rationality, is actually a quite political architecture of the social and natural order according
to the dictates of a few, very powerful people, and glossed as 'rationalism'. What Rugg
indicates that Ekman has done is to find ways to resist the closed-circuit logic of
Cartesianism (which tends to pervade all aspects of western thought) by giving voice (and,
thus, thought) to the monstrous Other. Indeed, with the multifarious effects that Skord
has on both individual lives and the society in which he lives, he serves as a powerful figure
of resistance to Cartesian dualism and to the anamorphosistic subjectivity it advances. That
is, his insistence on entering the symbolic order in spite of his status as Other represents
the return of the anamorphosized body within subjectivity itself.
Ultimately, though, Rugg reads the novel as a partially failed attack on Cartesianism,
mainly due to the copious violence that fills every cycle of the narrative. She sees Ekman re-
enacting the very kinds of violence that anti-Cartesianism seeks to counter, both in the
violent display of Descartes' corpse in Moshe's account of his death in Sweden, and in the
multitude of other violent acts in the novel. Moreover, Rugg reads Ekman as sympathetic
to a certain strand of anti-Cartesian feminism that actively resists the undead presence of
Cartesianist positivity within every major western discourse. For, Descartes 'himself' may
be dead, but his undead presence haunts more than just a short scene in Ekman's novel;
indeed, his influence lurks in the shadows of western thought in general and is the very
specter of dualism that Skord (as well as Grendel and Pessi) resists. However, Rugg is
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critical of this feminist stance because of its insistence that knowledge and language and
rationality are associated, in western cultures, with masculinity, which she notes continually
re-inscribes both 'woman' and 'nature' as Other. Rugg also indicts Ekman (a bit absurdly)
for using language - that violent and masculinist medium - to create an anti-Cartesian
novel. This criticism implies, though, that resistance to dualistic thinking is impossible as
long as we continue to use language - or else Rugg proffers these bizarre comments in
order to satirize what she sees as the absurdity of anti-Cartesianist theorizing.
However, Rugg's reading oversimplifies the complexity of the character of Skord,
who is not just a foil for Cartesianist dualism, but at once both the subject and the other of
language and rational thought. In addition, Rugg's reading elides the novel's important
conceit that magic is real (if somewhat reduced or redirected by Skord's gradual
interpellation into the symbolic order), and that Skord, in addition to cleverly talking his
way out of difficult situations, also employs a handful of supernatural powers to effect the
results he seeks. Skord can project his consciousness into the bodies of nearby animals,
leaving his own body for extended periods (a kind of disembodiment that is, in some ways,
more complete and more monstrous than that of Cartesian dualism). Magic, as the use of
rational thought to create effects that exceed the purview of a rational universe, is itself a
monstrous Other that speaks volumes about the troubled nature of Cartesianism and poses
a direct threat to the symbolic order.
Taken together, Skord's magic and his other monstrous qualities make him an
unlikely candidate for initiation into the symbolic order, but he nevertheless experiences
such an initiation, even if it is never fully complete. In one of the novel's final sequences,
which depicts his death, Skord wanders as high up into Skule forest as his weak and ailing
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body will allow, accompanied all the while by a small creature referred to as a dog-mink
(some sort of loosely described hybrid and, thus, another monster). Skord finds, to his
surprise, that he has largely become an alien in the wilds of the forest, steeped as he is in
human subjectivity. He can no longer understand the many languages of the woodlands,
and he is unable to effect a full return to the presymbolic state in which he began his
journey into the heart of western civilization. The strange company of the dog-mink
suggests a certain ongoing connection with his prehuman experiences, but he is not able to
leave his hundreds of years of human experiences behind. In his final moments, he realizes
that his name - his identity - will be forgotten, but this realization does not imply any
demise of the symbolic order (Ekman 477-82). Instead, Skord's challenge to the status quo
lies largely in his unique embodiment of a sort of Zizekian intersubjectivity within his own
complex character, as he is at once a participant in the symbolic order (a subject) and an
incontestably monstrous Other. Indeed, Skord provides powerful examples of Zizek's
conceptions of melancholic attachment as well as the notion of the subjective suicide that
clears the way for intersubjectivity.
Throughout the novel, Skord has a deeply melancholic relationship with his former
presymbolic experiences as a troll, beginning with his introduction to human life in the
company of Ecker and Bodel, and culminating in his strange relationship with Xenia. Shortly
after being introduced to human society by the siblings he first encounters, Skord begins to
have the first realizations that he has lost something. In one early passage, Ekman even
employs the word 'melancholy' to describe his feelings: "Melancholy overcame him,
because he realized that he had brought the human world with him into the forest. It was
inside his head and kept pushing its way out" (48). likeWise, in his interactions with the
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Magister, Skord finds himself drawn to the most nostalgic and far-fetched of the Magister's
stories, as if hearing them again and again could reinvoke his own innocence. Encountering
the Magister again after several years of separation (during which he was living as a thief),
Skord asks him to tell the story of King Magnus' coat, a coat that the Magister had
described, in previous renderings of the story, as made from living stoats. The Magister
wonders whether Skord is "still a child, with childish desires" (98). He then proceeds to tell
Skord that "[t]here is always somebody else standing behind," by which he means that the
Other, the very embodiment of the loss that is the source of melancholy, is always present
beneath the surface of one's identity. Later still, when Skord (posing as Dr. Saintsday) and
fellow thief Birger Birgersson are trying to convince Pastor Ragundius to allow them to help
in his quest to uncover Drakenstierna's treasure, Skord himself notes that "however you
select ... whatever is selected for removal will- in one way or another - remain" (336).
Although he intends to use this observation as an explanation for Birger's inability to
separate proper from improper behavior, Skord's comments here reveal his own
predicament: he cannot fully rid himself of his trollish self since it remains in spite of the
selection of human behaviors, if in no other way than as melancholic attachment.
The role of Xenia in Skord's experiences presents a particularly compelling example
of his Zizekian tendencies. Xenia appears relatively late in Skord's long life and represents
an interesting inversion of his own experiences. For, in contrast to Skord, whose
experiences have taken him from the forest (the extrasymbolic realm) into the heart of the
symbolic order, Xenia's experiences began within the bounds of normative subjectivity but
included twelve years during which she had been mysteriously absent from the home of
her father (and from the Law). Indeed, she is a victim of bergtagning, the traditionall'lordic
158
concept of 'being taken to the mountain,' and she has therefore experienced the same
transition as Skord had, but in reverse. Her return presents her with a second need for
transition, and it is one with which Skord is uniquely well positioned to assist her. Of
course, her return is never fully actualized; as the tradition of bergtagning goes, one is never
quite the same if one is lucky enough to return at all (Ingemark 98-104). She learns about
her twelve initial years as a child, "[bJut for Xenia there was no predetermined internal
order governing the images from the past," just an order that she learned to repeat
without conviction (420). Her changed state is so severe that her father doubts whether
the person who has returned is, in fact, his daughter, though she bears a physical
resemblance (426). Over time, Skord and Xenia grow increasingly fond of one another, and
they find in each other missing pieces of themselves, such that they develop what Xenia's
brother Abraham calls "their secrets" (468). These secrets, though, are not mere lover's
enigmas, but a special kind of experience that comes with the development of an
intersubjective relationship. Having always struggled with the burdens of the symbolic
order, the two characters find solace in the ways that their mirror-image experiences allow
them to perceive images of themselves in each other without requiring a closed,
symptomatic relationship between them. The relationship is not a fully-formed Zizekian
intersubjectivity, but it is an initial movement in the direction away from a Self/Other
dichotomy as the basis for subjective identity.
In addition to introducing a nascent intersubjective relationship, Ekman's novel also
provides a powerful queer critique of the heteronormative character of subjectivity, both
through Skord's overtly queer experiences and his very need to perform not just his gender
identities (which are multiple and contextual), but subjectivity itself. His first queer
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experience occurs in liThe Moon of Illyria," the section that immediately follows his
experiences with Ecker and Bodel. In this section, Skord lives primarily with the Reverend
Magister Ragvaldus Ovidi, an educated man who is exiled from the more 'civilized' south of
Sweden when his cousin, the Bishop of Link6ping, forces him to cede his property under
false charges of heresy. The Magister is a man of refinement who finds himself out-of-place
in the muddy, damp, 'backward' areas that border Skule forest. He feels utterly alone until
he stumbles upon Skord, whom he overhears one day parroting his church Latin for the
amusement of Bodel and Ecker. The Magister is immediately taken with Skord and invites
him to be his assistant in his duties as the parish priest. Over the course of their time
together, the Magister teaches Skord to read and write in a variety of languages (an ability
that Skord employs, much to the Magister's dismay, to provide magical runesticks to local
people seeking to fulfill particular desires or redress grievances). The two also sleep
together in one bed in the Magister's humble cottage, and their sexual interaction begins
as an assault in which the Magister suddenly gives in to his burgeoning desire for Skord,
whom he (and everyone else) perceives to be a young boy. Although their sexual exchange
begins with this assault, and the Magister keeps Skord on a leash throughout much of their
time together, the relationship is one that is queer in multiple respects, not all of them
unproblematic (e.g., age and power differential, domination/submission, and a kind of
prostitution in which Skord exchanges his companionship for linguistic instruction and
other tutelage).
This relationship is indicative, though, of Ekman's gritty and all-too-real take on the
place of the queer in its cultural settings. For, while she presents the queer as messy and
not without its role in various kinds of violence, she presents 'normative' heterosexual
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relationships in much the same way, and this treatment has the interesting effect of
normalizing the queer alongside the full gamut of human sexual identities and experiences,
in all their troubled and untidy formations. In later cycles, Skord is involved with
prostitutes, robbers, and with Xenia, whose twelve years in the forest have made her, in
some ways, more of an Other than Skord is. In addition, while in Uppsala, Skord dons the
attire of a female prostitute and proceeds to develop a relationship with lIIuster that
endures long after the troll has ceased dressing as a female. This Imessiness' persists
through Skord's other queer experiences as well, including even his relationship with Xenia
that, while nominatively heterosexual, still challenges the heteronormative standards of
their cultural context since both Xenia and Skord have become hybrids across the same
boundary, but from opposite starting places. Thus, Ekman's work is a queering of the
tradition of the monstrous Other in the broadest possible sense, achieving, as Doty would
say, a recapturing and reasserting of a militant (and wide-reaching) sense of difference, and
not just a referencing of strictly ILGBT' experiences.
Moreover, Skord's performance of his various identities also underscores the queer
volatilities brimming beneath the surfaces of normative subjectivity. From his starling-like
mimicry of childish language, to his female persona in the brothel in Uppsala and his
performance of the identity of a wizened medical doctor in both Uppsala and Sanga,
Skord's efforts to pass fully as human are always encumbered by both his constant need to
perform and the excesses of performativity itself. One interesting example that occurs
early on is his performance of the identity of a wandering magician while accompanying
Bodel and Ecker. During this period, he frequently tricks people into buying useless items
or giving him and the children extra food or other resources. His trickery involves
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convincing periormances of a person in possession of a charmed item or other such roles,
and he is often successful in getting what he wants. Nevertheless, these periormances go
too far at times, putting him and the children at risk of retaliation. In particular, his
employment of troll ish abilities in these periormances undermines the very identities that
he seeks to periorm and reveals the tenuousness of his subjectivity. Likewise, when Skord,
having taken to periorming his identity as a female brothel worker, encounters the king's
scholar, Illuster, whom he already knows from the alchemy lab, the periormative nature of
identity is palpable. Skord has learned, like Butler's drag queens, how to use the markers of
feminine identity to alter how he is perceived, and Illuster desires him " or the girl wearing
Lissla's dress" immediately upon seeing her (221). Illuster tells Skord that he wants to sleep
with her, adding: IIIWhen I look into your eyes and sense who you are, it is as if I were
looking at my own soul'" (222). Of course, such a comment is informative, since Skord is,
first, a troll passing as human and, second, a male passing as female. That his/her identity at
this particular moment 'rings true' for Illuster demonstrates the extreme plasticity and
highly periormative nature of all identities. By thus unveiling and dramatizing the
periormative nature of subjective identity, Skord continually queers normative subjectivity,
revealing its seemingly fixed and opposed roles of Self/Other and man/woman as
constructs (or 'social fictions') without a presymbolic existence. This kind of excess
uncovers, as Butler notes, the machinations required to keep normative subjectivity afloat
while also providing counterexamples that can help us see the possibilities beyond the
norms.
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The Monstrous Other Acts:
Sinisalo's Pessi and the Monstrous Return of the Real
Johanna Sinisalo's Troll: A Love Story (2000) differs markedly from both Grendel and The
Forest of Hours, both in form and function. The novel is highly metafictive, proceeding
through a loose and nonlinear assemblage of two primary kinds of short sections. The first
kind are first-person narratives that shift between the novel's five major characters, and the
second kind are passages that seem to have been quoted from purportedly authoritative
sources (scholarly studies, websites, etc.) but that are part of the fictional universe created
by Sinisalo. The sections are headed either with the name of the character in whose
perspective they are narrated, or with the title or identifying information of the fictitious
cited text. Use of this cacophony of narrative voices and lexternal' sources allows Sinisalo
to employ multiple first-person perspectives together with textual passages that appear to
derive from biological, anthropological, folkloric, and mass media discourses - all in the
service of driving a metanarrative arc that begins in a highly recognizable setting of
postmodern urbanity and ends in a stunning moment of intersubjective action. The novel's
intensive intertextuality also intervenes in the reading practices of its audience, forcing
readers into a less receptive role than is generally facilitated by the more traditional
narrative style of much novel-length fiction (including the other two works considered
here). In addition, Troll's intricately intertextual and thoroughly queer rendering of
postmodern life makes it a powerful model of what Strassburg called a queer cyborgian
perspective, pointing us toward a postsubjective existence in which identity is thoroughly
multi-sited, discordant and, as Foucault would say, polymorphously perverse.
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The main character of the novel, whose name is Mikael but who is known to
everyone as Angel, is both the initiating and concluding narrator in the novel, and his
central role in its narrative trajectory keeps him and his experiences at the center of our
attention. The story picks up with Angel returning home one evening, drunk, and just after
having been 'dumped' by another man in whom he was very romantically interested.
Stumbling into the parking lot of his apartment building, he sees a group of teenage boys
who are gathered around what he assumes to be small, domesticated animal, and they are
kicking and taunting it, and goading each other on. After scattering the boys, with the help
of his nosey neighbor (who claims she has called the police), Angel goes over to the
creature and realizes that it is troll cub, very weak and in need of assistance. In a
momentary decision that will alter the course of his own life and the lives of several people
who know him, he picks up the creature and takes it into his apartment, with the plan to
nurse it back to health (and little other forethought at the time) (Sinisalo 3-7).
Once Angel has carried the tiny troll into his apartment and realized that it will need
something to eat, he begins conducting online research to see if he can locate any useful
information. The information that he does find is included in the first of many 'resource'
sections that comprise nearly half of all the contents of the novel, and the fact that he is
engaged in research in order to learn more about trolls carries through all such sections.
Angel's research also helps to reveal one of the central conceits of the novel: that trolls are
a known, taxonomized species of large predator found in areas of Finland, Norway,
Sweden, and northwest Russia. In Sinisalo's fictional universe, trolls have been 'discovered'
and have been granted their proper place in the system of biological classification. They
remain an elusive and seldom encountered species, so specific knowledge of their habitats
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and mannerisms is patchy at best. Much of Angel's initial research, while providing him
with interesting background reading on the troll and its folkloric history, provides little
information of use to someone trying to figure out what to feed (and how to care for) a
young troll cub. Nevertheless, Sinisalo's decision to cast the troll as a documented species
positions the novel squarely in dialogue with the discursive origins of taxonomic systems
identified by Foucault and discussed in the second chapter of this study. For, while Sinisalo
places the scientific verification of the troll in 1907, the weight of the genealogical evidence
about trolls - particularly that of the folkloric sources - together with the ongoing
elusiveness of living trolls allows for Sinisalo's troll to straddle the epistemic break between
prescientific and scientific discursivities. A fully hybrid creature, at once animal and
anthropomorphic, 'real' and mythological, natural and supernatural, the troll of Sinisalo's
fictional account actively resists the neat compartmentalization of dualistic thinking and
embodies an anti-Cartesian presence replete with a cacophony of cultural references.
Angel eventually names the troll Pessi (after a trollish character from a children's
story), and the novel's narrative arc traces the process of Angel and Pessi gradually bonding
and becoming a kind of queer pairing. Although he understands that trolls are wild animals,
Angel tends to view Pessi more like a pet (or a companion) than a creature of the forests
and mountains. His need for ideas on how to help Pessi return to good health eventually
involves many of the novel's other characters, including Dr. Spiderman, Ecke, and Palomita.
The novel's multiple trajectories trace along several interconnected and intersecting lines,
encompassing an assortment of (mostly) unrequited romantic interests, various forms of
manipulation, domination and resistance, the use of the troll in an advertising campaign -
all with the backdrop of Finnish nationalism and culture.
165
Writing about this novel and Sinisalo's work in general in 2008, Andrew Nestingen
observes that Sinisalo, in her stylizations, characters, and formal conventions, resists the
'national disclosure' that characterizes most Finnish literature published since the end of
the Second World War. Applying with equal efficacy to music, political discourse, popular
culture, and literature, 'national disclosure' is a term that describes the tendency of Finnish
cultural production to be linked directly with a hegemonic and ethnocentric notion of
Finnish national identity. For example, Nestingen describes the example of sports
celebrities, who are often represented (and represent themselves) as possessing sisu, "the
mythologized [Finnish] trait of toughness, guts and determination" (154-5). In February
2001, a scandal involving steroid usage among Olympic-caliber skiers in Finland sent shock
waves through this Finnish sense of pride - a situation that Sinisalo revisits in her
subsequent novel Heroes, which recasts the scandal in the sport of the decathlon and
presents its characters with an overlay of folkoric content from the Kalevala, the Finnish
national epic. In Nestingen's view, Sinisalo's unconventional use of a variety of sources that
usually serve national disclosure resituates the audience with respect to such content,
destabilizing the sense of a unified national identity and drawing attention to individuated
experiences of self-disclosure (154-65).
In order to elucidate this point further, Nestingen also examines one of Sinisalo's
short stories, "We Assure You," reading the actions of its characters, who work in
advertising, as indicative of Sinisalo's own stylistic approach to seemingly familiar content.
In the story, the two main characters are burdened with the task of creating an effective
advertising strategy for an insurance company with little name recognition (its name is
Anar) in a market saturated with companies the names of which recall mythological
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characters and motifs from the Kalevala and Greek mythology. The characters devise a plan
to fabricate a mythological backdrop for Anar, deciding to associate it with Lake Inari in the
Sami territories of northern Finland.8 They create a spurious journal purportedly kept by a
lone traveler who disappeared while exploring the lake and after having encountered Anar,
the Sami spirit of the lake. They then proceed to send this journal together with an
anonymous letter to a tabloid and then, waiting for the I news' to break, they start creating
vague advertisements with oblique references to their fakelore (Nestingen 161-2).
Nestingen notes that they need not be too specific and can instead rely on a syntagm, //a
chain of correlated parts ... which they work to construe in national terms that are both
resilient and have the capacity to absorb the attribution of many parts" (162). Nestingen
argues that Sinisalo uses content in much the same way, particularly in Troll, where she
strings together different characters' first-person narrations (interior monologues and
unreliable reports on conversations and events) with brief passages of text that appear to
come from websites, literary works, folkloric scholarship, scientific articles, and more. In
both cases (advertising and the kind of fiction that Sinisalo creates), enough referentiality is
present to signal the general discursivities in which the content resides, but these
references are sparse enough that audiences are left to fill in the gaps with their own
existing understandings of these discursive fields. The effect is a kind of intersubjectivity
between authors and ad designers and their assorted audiences, who must choose (even if
B The Sami are the indigenous peoples of northern reaches of Norway, Sweden, and Finland and the northwestern corner of
Russia. Speaking nine or more variations of Sami (sub)languages, these peoples were traditional fishers and reindeerherders
but have been facing rapid changes in their cultures and ways of life over the past hundred years, in the context of rapid
modernization in the cultures that govern their territories. Interestingly, Sinisalo herself was born in Finnish Lapland, the
regions primarily occupied by the Sami peoples (Ekman, back cover).
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they are not conscious of it) how to navigate the discursive cues they have been given (162-
Sinisalo's specific use of such variegated content is, in Nestingen's view, part of her
project to disrupt the processes of national disclosure by representing a multiplicity of
perspectives on the seemingly unitary content of national identity. In Troll, for example,
she incorporates not just 'authoritative' voices of such sources as the Kalevala and scientific
studies on the troll, but also the perspectives of queer characters, a Filipina mail-order
bride, and others. This approach generates a heterogeneity of subjective experiences and
information that cannot be reduced back to a singular or authoritative voice, breaking the
binarism of the typical sites of representation (representerjrepresented) and
acknowledging the profound multi-sited ness of postmodern subjective experience. By
employing this approach, Sinisalo renders her content, not just her form, as deeply
intersubjective. In the specific case of Troll, the multi-sitedness of perspectives includes an
array of queer perspectives that arise concomitantly with what Nestingen calls the
"alternative pUblics" of postmodem life (160).
Sinisalo's fictional universe, set in the city of Tampere, Finland, presents an
environment in which heteronormativity is apparently completely absent. On the one
hand, many of the novel's characters are queer, but the queer temperament of the novel
goes well beyond that feature, which is common enough. What makes the novel
particularly queer is the fact that even its purportedly heterosexual characters have
deviant, non-normative sexual and gender identities. The couple who lives downstairs from
Angel, Pentti and Palomita, deviate from the norms of mainstream Finnish culture
considerably, not because they married in spite of their cultural differences, but because of
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the extranormative aspects of their relationship: the relationship of a certain kind of Finnish
man with his mail-order bride. In addition, Martes, who is nominally straight, uses a certain
performance of queer sexuality to bait Angel into doing inexpensive photographic work for
his advertising company. In some ways, this representation of the heterogeneity of
ostensibly heterosexual identities is not unlike that of The Forest of Hours, since both
Ekman and Sinisalo queer heterosexuality - or, to be more precise, heterosexualities in the
plural - by exposing the vast array of extranormative experiences and identities that
heteronormativity would seek to elide.
Sinisalo ultimately leaves Martes' sexuality ambiguous: it is possible to read the text
as indicating that he is simply a straight man who takes advantage of Angel, but it is also
possible to read Martes as a man who is wavering between (or amongst) various sexual
identities - an experience not that uncommon in postmodern life and indicate of why
campus-based organizations like the LGBTQQIAA at the University of Oregon have added
the second 'Q,' for 'questioning.' In fact, Martes' ambiguous sexuality may also be read as a
metonym for the novel's refusal of normative subjectivity, what Nestingen identifies as its
heterogeneity. Moreover, Martes' ambiguous sexuality is thematically linked with his
somewhat amoral persona, which makes him, at times, the most monstrous character in
the novel. We see this particular representation most commonly in the sections in which he
is the first-person narrator. For example, when Angel delivers to him the photographs of
Pessi wearing (or rather, trying to rip off of his body) Stalker brand jeans, Martes' interior
monologue belies his manipulation of Angel: "God it was worth it, it was worth it" (150).
The 'it' that was worth his effort is his use of Angel's attraction toward him as a means of
manipulating Angel into creating stunning images with a high market value for a low
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stipend. As the encounter continues, Martes becomes worried that Angel will realize
IIwhat a treasure-trove this CD is" and begin to inflate his asking price (151). So he adopts a
posture of being pleased but not thrilled, saying that the images are "[q]uite okay" and
then admitting to himself (and Sinisalo's readers) that "one could no doubt afford, but
there's no point if we can get away with less" (152). As they adjourn from Martes' office to
get a drink and discuss the payment, bringing the Martes-narrated section to its conclusion,
he places his hand on Angel's shoulder and notes that "he almost wobbles trying to walk
away without making it leave his shoulder quicker than necessary" (152).
His persistent, conscious manipulation of Angel's feelings is presented in sharp
relief with the 'natural,' tender and mutual affection between Angel and Pessi. In another
Martes-narrated scene later in the novel, after Martes has forced his way into Angel's home
(literally pushing past Angel, who is, of course, hiding Pessi), and Pessi has attacked Martes
in order to defend Angel, this contrast grows even stronger. Martes, stunned from the
attack and bleeding from his face, notes wryly that "in all this surrealistic show Mikael's
staring at me, half kneeling under the coats, hugging a devil" (191). Yet his perspective
hardly convinces since, as a character who manipulates the feelings of the vulnerable for his
own financial and professional gain, he is much more the 'devil,' in Sinisalo's
representation, than Pessi.
Another interesting example of a purportedly heterosexual character whose
identity is extranormative is the woman who sits alone in Cafe Bongo, the queer-friendly
bar, either to 'slum' or to look for a way to gain a certain cachet from involving herself in
the queer community. Sinisalo presents this "breeder-woman" through the perspective of
Ecke, who postulates that she is interested in the queer bar patrons as "noble savages, a
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kind of gray area outside the respectable, minutely organized community, an untamed
wilderness it takes a lot of guts to step into" (107). In Ecke's view, this woman's visitations
to the bar provide her with a kind of freedom from social constraints not without a certain
resemblance to Cohen's comments about how fear of the monster is really a form of desire
(Sinisalo 107). In a later scene, we see this woman again, this time conversing with Dr.
Spiderman (another gay character, and a veterinarian) about the boundaries between
humans and other animals. Dr. Spiderman takes an intellectual approach to the discussion
(perhaps, in part, as condescension toward her) by challenging her on definitions of normal
and abnormal, humanity and whatever humanity is not. Yet the woman is not interested in
deconstructing binaristic conceptual pairings and instead turns the discussion toward the
ways in which humanity oppresses other species, ending the section with the comment:
"we won't recognize the chimpanzee as a person until it rises up against us in rebellion"
(225). The comment is highly ironic, given the woman's treatment of a queer-friendly cafe
as a sort of zoo (as Ecke notes earlier), but it is also resonant with many of the novel's
themes, including the outsider status of the queer as well as the relationship between
Angel and Pessi, and the relationship between Pentti and Palomita.
The queer is also intimately linked with the monstrous in the novel. Not only does
the relationship of Angel and Pessi contain a direct queer-monstrous association; a number
of other occurrences in the novel connect the two. For example, the novel draws out an
association between the pheromonal attraction between males and the scent known as
Calvin Klein's Obsession for Men. Of particular interest here is the fact that Angel's clothing
begins to reek of Pessi's pungent scent, described variously as including hints of juniper
berry, spruce, lemon and spice, and that several of the other men in the novel associate the
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smell with cologne, possibly Obsession, and are attracted to Angel on account of it. That a
fragrance popular among queer men is so easily associated with the pheromonal scent of a
troll cub who loves his alpha male draws an unmistakable parallel between queer desire
and the desire of and for the monstrous Other. In addition, the fact that Angel, a queer-
identified man, and Pessi, a young troll, are so easily drawn into one another's worlds raises
the question of whether those worlds - both of which are located in the space of the Other
- were really so far apart to begin with. The novel's final sequence seems to provide a
definitive answerto this question - a point I will return to below.
Another relationship of interest is that of Palomita, the Filipina mail-order bride, and
Pentti, her Finnish 'husband.' As the novel unfolds, there are numerous brief glances into
the lurid and troubled details of their private lives. The first of these occurs when Angel
notices a leash in the couple's apartment when he drops in one day to ask for something to
feed his 'cat' (when he is trying to revive Pessi). After learning that the couple does not
have a cat, Angel thinks, "I ought to have been qUicker on the uptake about that pretty,
soft, red-leather harness" (26). Later, in a section narrated by Palomita, we learn that
Pentti likes to dress her in split hot pants and "stuff [her] with two penises at once", that
he counts the change from the shopping money to ensure she has not pocketed any, and
that he forces her to remain naked throughout the day after she spills some tea on her
blouse (162). The relationship between Pentti and Palomita is indicative of the queer
migrations of coupling in the wake of global capitalism. In this context, Pentti represents a
particular sort of western man who rejects the possibility of a reciprocal relationship with a
western woman (who would be too much his equal) and opts instead for an asymmetrical
pairing with a woman who is, for all practical purposes, his slave. To the extent, though,
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that heteronormative identities in contemporary Finland are predicated on a mostly
equinanimous union, the relationship of Pentti and Palomita fails to conform to normative
standards and provides another variation of the queer channels of desire and subjectivity
(albeit a very troubled and fraught example).
Palomita's role in the narrative is quite important, too, since she provides, as a
disenfranchised immigrant with almost no understanding of the Finnish language, an
intercultural counterpoint to the status of the troll. For Palomita is also the Other in this
story, though her status as the Other has more to do with her gender, age, and cultural
background than anything monstrous or uncanny. Moreover, her inability to use even
rudimentary Finnish also positions her, not unlike Pessi, at least partially outside the
symbolic order (at least, as far as that order is culturally specific). For, although Palomita
can use other languages, her lack of facility in Finnish cements her status as the Other and
makes her a perfect target for Pentti's desire for utter control over her and her complete
dependence on him.
In addition, the relationship between Palomita and Pentti may be read in
juxtaposition with the relationship between Angel and Pessi - a reading that leads to some
interesting observations. First, as in The Forest of Hours, sexuality and eros are messy in this
novel; desire is variously directed and takes forms that are not untroubled by imbalances of
power and differences of culture and species. The relationship between Palomita and
Pentti is abusive and incredibly lopsided, and Palomita's carefully planned acts of resistance
are often so minute as to be barely noticeable to Pentti (their target). In the case of Angel
and Pessi, on the other hand, the relationship is generally mutual, once Pessi accepts Angel
as his alpha. The interspecific relationship, while intensely loving in the way that only a
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bond with a devoted animal can be, is largely asexual, though Angel does find himself,
while holding Pessi in his lap, experiencing an orgasm - as if against his own wishes - on
two different occasions. These incidents leave him filled with shame but also - in an odd
way - more deeply satisfied than his casual encounters with the likes of Ecke and Martes.
Nestingen reads both of these relationships against the story of Pessi and I/lusia that
is included among Sinisalo's folkloric sources. In the story, IIlusia is a fairy who has broken
her wings and falls to the ground, and Pessi is the troll who falls in love with her and cares
for her, nursing her back to health. For Nestingen, the tale of Pessi and I/lusia is a leitmotif
for the two main relationships in the novel, both of which bear resemblances to the
folktale. In the case of Pentti and Palomita, the relationship between the troll and the fairy
is less a loving one and more an indefinite trapping of the fairy in the troll's world. By way
of contrast, the relationship between Angel and Pessi reverses the folktale's roles, with the
troll being the one needing to be nursed back to health, and the 'fairy' being the one who
keeps the troll in his world (Nestingen 167-8, 192). In this way, Sinisalo draws on a
fabricated Finnish folkloric tradition as well as two extranormative relationships in order to
destabilize the closed and symptomatic nature of subjective desire, complicating it with a
multiplicity of perspectives.
Sinisalo's fixation on multiplicity, however, goes beyond the perspectives of the
sundry narrators and the general content of the novel and extends into the very structure
of the novel and its multiple modalities. Nestingen discusses Sinisalo's formalistic
innovations at some length, noting that her use of shifting, multifarious narrative
perspectives, as well as a particular kind of intertextuality, greatly contributes to the ways
in which her work challenges what he calls the national disclosure tradition. Of course,
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Nestingen's use of the concept of national disclosure is not far removed from the notion of
normative subjectivity that it is the focus of much of the present study. Both of these
concepts describe the ways in which particular discursive formations ossify and unite
disparate experiences, impulses, and drives under the banner of an apparently singular
agency, whether that is construed as a national identity or the normative subject. In either
case, Sinisalo's formalistic approach includes strategies that serve as unmistakably
interventionary tactics in the practice of fiction-writing. Nestingen highlights a few of
these, including Sinisalo's use of information that appears to come from the Internet, a
technology of information distribution that both democratizes (among those who can
afford a computer and Internet access) and problematizes the flow of information. In
particular, information found on the Internet generally lies outside the normative
mechanisms for controlling reliability and authorship, and such information is subject to a
seemingly endless chain of iterations, citations, editions, and mutations, rendering it, as
Nestingen points out, ontologicaJly troubled (169-70). The free-flowing nature of web-
based information makes it as multivocal and lunreliable' a way of propelling the narrative
as the multiple first-person narrations that Sinisalo also employs.
Likewise, Sinisalo uses not just Internet-based information, but a bewildering
chorus of what Nestingen labels diegetic and metadiegetic discourses. The former
category includes discursive passages (re)presented as coming from literature, folkloric
scholarship, the national epic, and other similar sources that mainly belong to the Inational
disclosure' tradition, though some of them are the Iless reliable' sources, including
websites. These diegetic passages generally correspond to the narration of one of the five
narrating characters - most frequently, Angel - and relate directly to passages that
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precede or succeed them, giving the effect that the character in question is also
referencing the source. The latter type, the metadiegetic passages, include miscellaneous
snippets of textual and web-based discourses for which there is little or no textual evidence
of having been read or encountered by any of the five narrating characters. Instead, these
passages serve more as additional sources of information for Sinisalo's readers than for her
characters, and they often resonate with the surrounding narrated passages in ways that
are more oblique and sometimes serve to presage the monstrous events to unfold. Taken
together, as Nestingen points out, the diegetic and metadiegetic discourses IIform a
heterogeneous construction of the troll," resisting the kind of foreclosed definition of the
(monstrous) Other that normative subjectivity requires (167).
The net effect of Sinisalo's stylistic configurations is a markedly and irreducibly
heterogeneous, multi-sited and metadiscursive narrative that meets all the major criteria of
a cyborgian approach to the conditions of the postmodern subject. Nestingen identifies
the novel's chief modality as an 'interface,' not unlike the nonlinear, interconnected and
multivocal experientiality of the Internet. liThe purpose of this formal strategy," he writes,
lIis to underscore the way in which language can be used to form multiply mediated, plural
identities, which point toward a reformation of notions of national culture" - and, we
might add, of subjectivity (178). Nestingen also indicates that this textual interface creates
what, following a collection of Danish essays,9 he calls the 'realism effect.' The concept
relies on the general acceptance of the arbitrariness of the sign among postmodern
audiences, for which even television commercials comment on the ways in which one sign
can refer to other signs. In this context of the interreferentiality of signification, then, the
9 The collection is Virkelighedshunger (Reality Hunger), edited by Knudsen and Thomsen (2002).
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sense of realism is achieved not by reference to some external, prelinguistic reality, but by
the degree to which the interrelationships between signs situate any particular sign; the
more any given sign appears to be interconnected to other signs, the more 'plausible' its
signifying seems. As Nestingen notes, it is plausibility, not resemblance, that sustains the
sense of realism under conditions of postmodernity (178-82). This movement toward a
brave new 'order of things' relies on the negative functioning of discursivity, rather than
the classical similitudes identified by Foucault.
This 'interface' modality of Sinisalo's texts fits neatly into Haraway's vision of a
cyborgian existence, addressing all three of her reasons for the efficacy of the cyborg as a
metaphor for postmodern consciousness and encapsulating, in the relatively minute form
of the novel (albeit an altered version of that form), the 'powerful infidel heteroglossia'
that can undermine discursive authority. To interact with an interface like Troll is to be
plunged headlong into the joy of simultaneously breaking boundaries (e.g., of national
identity, sexual identity, etc.) and re-establishing new boundaries and relationships that
require the participation (and culpability) of the reading audience. The interface also defies
conventional gender roles and norms, reconstituting what might be termed 'post-gender'
experiences along multiple axes of identification and disidentification. Moreover, the
interface modality of Troll severs the simplistic circuitries of normative subjectivity by
situating readers in relation to multiply and chaotically interconnected circuitries of, as
Haraway would say, "partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity" (Haraway 151). As
Nestingen notes, this sort of cyborgian approach restages the novel in such a way as to
undermine the sovereignty of aesthetic representation, eradicating the usual binary sites of
representation and relocating the artistic object in a space of collaborative, multivocal and
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heterogeneous meaning-making (Nestingen 182.). Importantly, such a move eliminates the
notion of the novel as a singular, unified 'work' of art, undermining the possibility of
subjectivity in the formal attributes of the object 'itself.'
There are several pertinent examples, including Sinisalo's use of intertextuality, for
example, between the narrated passages and the diegetic and metadiegetic passages; her
employment of interreferentiality between and among the narrated passages themselves;
and her styl ization of the text to mimic the effects of the cyborgian technologies she
includes in the story itself, namely, the cybernetic interface of the Internet and the
mechanical medium of photography.
The examples of intertextuality abound throughout the novel, but we need
consider only a few examples to perceive the effect of Sinisalo's formalization of
intertextuality (a literary device that need not be expressed in the formal attributes of a
text). One interesting example involves one of the first instances in which Angel begins to
recognize that there may be more to the troll than the animal qualities ascribed to the
species by the scientific discourses that address the creature. In a section narrated by
Angel, the character depicts himself busily working on an advertising campaign photo-
shoot when he suddenly realizes that Pessi is being too quiet. Getting up to find Pessi, he
discovers the troll cub amidst the building blocks used in the photo shoot, "putting one on
the summit of an almost faultless pyramid" (111). Turning the page to the next section, we
find a passage purportedly from a collection of articles on hunting that reports that large
animals require extensive and stable areas of habitat - an observation that recalls several
other metadiegetic passages in which we see trolls (or something else rather like them)
encroaching on areas occupied by humans (112.). Then, we're back to Angel's narration, and
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Angel himself recalls a book about the prehistoric stone piles, known as cairns, that
punctuate Finnish (and other Nordic) landscapes. A moment later, and Angel recalls
another name he has heard ascribed to the somewhat mysterious stone piles, "a devil's
stove," which connotes the idea that ancient peoples may have used them as cremation
sites (113). Then he reads in his book that archaeologists have found caches of animal
bones under some of the cairns (113-14). The next section, coming in quick succession, is a
metadiegetic passage supposedly taken from a 1933 story, and it reports that a troll may
have "been buried there under the stones of his cave" (115).
This string of loosely associated discourses constitutes what l\Jestingen identified as
a syntagm, providing enough of the connected circuitries to allow for the plausibility of any
number of readings, depending what aspects of the various discourses we emphasize. Are
the trolls actually humanlike creatures who bury their dead? Are the cairns sacrificial sites in
which either earlier humans, or perhaps the trolls themselves, burnt and/or buried other
trolls or animals? Do the cairns stand as evidence of a former moment in which trolls and
humans came into closer (and dangerous) contact - a situation now being replayed as the
ever-growing reaches of human settlement encroach on Finnish wildlands? Ideas and
resonances dance off of the excess of material presented through this novel's formal
hybridity, making the work itself, and not just one or more of its characters, qualify as
monstrous.
A similar effect emerges in the interplay of various characters' first-person
narrations. In fact, Sinisalo often uses this interplay in a concentrated manner, swinging
back-and-forth between two of the five characters' narrative voices to move the audience
between the two (or multiple) perspectives that two characters can hold on the 'same'
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sequence of events and dialogue. One of the most dramatic of these sequences occurs
when Pessi attacks Martes in the entranceway to Angel's apartment. At the sudden onset
of the attack, Martes narrates, and he perceives Pessi as "a snarling demon" that "stands
on two legs," and as a "sci-fi movie monster" with a "grotesque face" (188). The creature
"walks with a spooky softness, sways closer to [Martes], raises its forelimbs" (188). The
next section, one of the shortest in the novel, is narrated by Angel and consists merely of
seven words: "No. Not this.; Anything, but not this" (189). Then we're back inside the
perspective of Martes, who describes seeing himself - as if from partially outside his own
perspective (and thus, even more closely alongside our own perspective as the audience)-
using an umbrella to defend himself as best he can. He suddenly becomes aware that
Angel is "spitting out words" and is angry with him (191). He reads Angel's response as
"surrealistic" just a moment before we come upon another metadiegetic interruption, this
one quite long and dealing with the "Satan sects" that may have held the troll as an
embodiment of the evil they worshipped (1g1, 192-7). Then, it's back to Angel's voice, as he
expresses surprise over the incredibly petrified state of Pessi after Martes' retaliation and
also observes that everything between himself and Martes has changed in an instant (198).
And the sequence ends with Martes narrating again, noting both that the award he
anticipated for the ad campaign that featured Pessi's photo is now unlikely, and he 'sees'
Angel (after the door has been closed) with "his face so hard up against that monstrosity's
black mane - breathing it in, breathing in that horrible stiff black tar doll" (199). The
sequence is one of the novel's more dramatically heightened and presents us with an
emotionally charged, rapidly evolving pair of shifting perspectives, locked for a moment in a
dangerous dance around complex and lurid themes. Sinisalo's deployment of these
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differently narrated sections, punctuated as they are with diegetic and metadiegetic
passages, forestalls the ability of the reader to settle into a singular reading of the novel's
events. Our sympathies - which Gardner locked onto Grendel throughout his metafictive
but less cyborgian treatment of the monstrous Other - find no lasting respite in Sinisalo's
hands. We have no choice but to consider the multifarious and unstable perspectives she
presents.
This restlessness carries over into Sinisalo's employment of photographic and
Internet-derived formal qualities as well. In Troll, as in Sinisalo's other works, postmodern
advertising and its stylized employment of multiply signifying images plays a significant
role. Angel works as a freelance photographer with a particular aptitude in PhotoShop,
largely earning a living by creating photographic images and then consciously manipulating
them for the desired effects or, to put in Nestingen's terms, to deploy the proper
syntagmatic effect. Already known by Martes as "an actual wizard" in the employment of
PhotoShop to alter images, Angel achieves - for a while - the ultimate magical coup by
presenting unaltered images of Pessi in the Stalker brand jeans and letting Martes and the
public at large assume that the images have been altered (150). This sequence is
reminiscent at once of both Lippard's comments about the framing modalities of
photography, and Sinisalo's own 'wizardy' in the employment of similar kinds of alteration
and perceptions of alteration in creating a syntagmatic 'reality effect.' For Sinisalo, like
Angel himself, frames and re-frames the troll in a variety of 'poses' throughout the novel's
collection of narrated and discursive passages, at times altering what we see (for example,
by inserting lines into the Kalevala passages she quotes), and at other times presenting
exactly what we expect in a form that is impossible to anticipate. The passages purportedly
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from websites also reflect the novel's overall structure, which proceeds, as Nestingen
notes, like a literary interface, providing the same options for /surfing' and nonlinear
engagement that a Google search can supply.
But to what end do all of these unique innovations in content and form lead us?
The culminating scenes of the novel support a reading in which Sinisalo gestures toward
what we might call a postsubjective stance. While escaping into the forest together after
Pessi has killed Ecke, Angel and Pessi are suddenly face-to-face with an adult male troll who
confronts them with a shotgun. From the actions of this troll (and other adults
encountered shortly thereafter), it is clear to Angel that the trolls are very familiar with
both guns and cigarette lighters; they have used them before. Indeed, the novel's dramatic
closing sequence poses serious challenges for normative subjectivity: Angel experiences an
updated and odd form of bergtagning as he led into a troll-cave by Pessi and followed by a
gun-toting adult male troll. The trolls of the end of this novel, while still not versed in
human language, can hardly be said to be presymbolic. At once animals incapable of
engaging with normative discursivities, and subjects pursuing their own desires, these trolls
represent an irruption of the Rea! into the Symbolic. Angel's status, too, is ambiguous as
the novel ends. One of the last things he mentions is that //[f]ar off somewhere a cuckoo
calls," and this comment refers back to an earlier (diegetic) observation that cuckoo calls
are associated with death (278). Yet it seems unlikely that Angel will be killed by the trolls,
particularly given how he arrives with Pessi, marked by his scent, and returning him to his
forested home. Yet it is entirely possible to read the somewhat abrupt ending as implying a
subjective death for Angel, who may be permanently departing from the known symbolic
order, and joining a very different kind of social order predicated on rather different
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precepts. Certainly, the fact that he is wanted for the murder of Ecke suggests that he
cannot easily return to his own society - indeed, he made that decision much earlier,
perhaps even at the moment that he violated the Law by bringing a 'wild animal' into his
home, facilitating the incursion of the Real into the domain of the Symbolic.
Here the arc of the plot merges with the stylistic and content-related innovations of
Sinisalo. The book's most continuously sympathetic character, Angel, leaves the symbolic
order just as the novel spins out its final first-person narration, weaving together the
cyborgian textual and intertextual strands with the Zizekian conclusion of symbolic suicide.
This merger creates a new chain of significations, perhaps a metasyntagm, in a finale that is
at once masterful and impossible without our participation. Sinisalo's artistry here is not
the authorial achievement of a Gardner, or the metadiscursive triumph of Ekman; instead,
she is more like the ad writers of her fiction than a fiction-writer in the traditional sense.
She gives us multivocal, heterogeneous fictions that are functionally located in the vast
constellations of late capitalist culture, divested of their authorial intentions, and desirous
of a participatory reader willing to 'link into' the multifarious circuitries they can connect.
Coda
The three novels considered here each address the postmodern functioning of the
monstrous Other in unique ways. Grendel gives us the monstrous Other at the precipice of
entering the symbolic order, challenging its boundaries by way of deeply humanistic
consideration, and sequential rejection, of various schools of western philosophizing. The
Forest of Hours presents the monstrous Other interacting directly with (and serving as a
living deconstruction of) the west's transition from medievalism to modernity, and the high
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degree of success that Skord enjoys as he expends his energies trying to develop a full-
fledged subjectivity poses a serious challenge for a symbolic order that should exclude his
kind completely. Finally, Troll more or less demolishes the boundaries of normative
subjectivity, at once queering the identities of all of the human characters, and casting their
status as human into doubt as the novel's narrative and discursive innovations create a fully
wired, connective tissue of doubt that leaves us with (the possibility of) a postsubjectivity
informed by and from a queer cyborgian stance.
Considered collectively, these works demonstrate the efficacy of adopting an
intersubjective, 'queer cyborgian' stance that eschews simplistic notions of the Other to
embrace a wider sense of the polymorphously perverse possibilities for interconnectedness
and intersubjectivity. Working against such oppositions as human/animal,
natural/supernatural, and hero/villain, these three novels 'plug into' a diverse array of
circuitries in the cybernetic channels of postmodem identity, pointing the way toward a
postsubjectivity that embraces multi-sitedness and a rigorous sense of the need for a
radical revision of the Cartesian platform, which would hold apart not only bodies and
technologies, but even the mind and the body. Given the 'heterosexist' nature of such
dualisms, novels such as these also queer our understandings of both subjectivity and its
Others. What we are left with is not a utopian alternative to the symptomatic nature of
normative subjectivity, but a muddle of intersubjective stances waxing and waning within
and between 'individuals' in an interminable, interconnected, postsymbolic disorder. If we
take its instability and indeterminacy seriously, we have no choice but to assume
responsibility for our necessarily partial, conflicted, and heterogeneous experiences. No
monsters will save us from normativitYi no heroes rescue us from facing our Others. All
such entities are effects of the Symbolic, and the Symbolic offers us solace no longer.
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